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Abstract
This thesis examines topics on the Economics of crime, with a spe-
cific focus on the application of Econometrics in studying issues
around crime, community safety and policy in England and Wales.
Chapters two and three highlight the gender gap in crime rates
and sentencing outcomes and endeavours to identify possible causes.
Utilising an ordered logistic regression model and a decomposition
method, we find that differing risk preferences between men and
women go some way to explaining the difference in offending rates.
The analysis in chapter three uses a rich, individual-level dataset for
sentencing in England and Wales and, controlling for confounding
factors, we find that women are less likely than men to receive a
custodial sentence when committing the same crime and receive a
significantly shorter sentence when they do.
Chapters four and five analyse key risk factors for “Killed or Seri-
ously Injured” (KSI) road traffic accidents in Norfolk and Suffolk.
While chapter four employs an ordered logistic regression model to
identify specific risk factors, such as not wearing a seatbelt and poor
visibility, chapter five adopts a more novel approach by estimating a
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) model to identify groups
of significant characteristics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In light of public funding cuts in recent years, there is an increasing
demand for evidence-based policing and policy-making in England
and Wales. The use of Econometric methods allows us to identify
patterns and relationships in the data so that future policy can be
based on sound evidence. The chapters in this thesis use a variety
of econometric techniques to analyse two issues which face policy-
makers today: the gender gap in crime and sentencing and serious
road traffic accidents.
Chapter two tries to understand why women commit far fewer crimes
than men. In particular, it looks at the role of differing risk pref-
erences and provides evidence that female offenders are more risk
averse than male offenders. A regression of offender characteristics
on earnings risk produces a negative and significant estimated coef-
ficient for the female dummy. This result indicates that female of-
fenders choose crime types with lower risk in earnings and provides
a way to determine which crime types women are most likely to
choose. A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition indicates that differ-
ences in elasticities of offender behaviour with respect to changes in
expected earnings and probability of apprehension account for the
entire gender participation gap.
Chapter three tries to understand whether there is a gender gap in
sentencing. Specifically, it investigates whether women receive lower
1
sentences than men for the same crimes. Generalised ordered logistic
regressions (GOLOGIT) are estimated for sentence type and length
to find the difference in the probability of each outcome occurring
for male and female offenders. The results from the empirical ana-
lysis show that the severity of sentencing outcomes for women are
lower than for men even when aggravating and mitigating factors
are controlled for. Given that an offender receives a custodial sen-
tence, women receive significantly shorter sentences than men in
most offence categories.
The purpose of the research in chapter four is to determine the
factors and characteristics which affect the severity of road traffic
accidents and to identify driver groups who are most at risk. Several
variables are found to significantly effect the severity of an accident,
including gender, wearing a seatbelt and visibility. Drivers found to
be most at risk of being involved in an accident are those aged 17-39
and female drivers over the age of 70.
Chapter five classifies drivers according to the severity of their ac-
cident using Classification and Regression Tree Analysis (CART).
Developing this type of predictive model allows policy makers to
identify groups who are most at risk of being involved in KSI acci-
dents and allows them to target severity-reducing measures accord-
ingly.
2
2 RISK PREFERENCES OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS AND THE GENDER
PARTICIPATION GAP IN CRIME
2.1 Introduction
In 2015, women made up 25% of first time offenders and only 14% of
repeat offenders [Ministry of Justice, 2016]. These percentages are
even lower for serious offences and illustrate the magnitude of the
gender gap in crime. Various explanations for this gap have been
offered in the literature, some suggest that criminality is a male
characteristic [Lombrosso and Ferraro, 1895, Akerlof and Kranton,
2000] and others discuss barriers to crime such as children and in-
come [Freeman, 1999, Hart, 1985]. In this chapter we will explore
the role of differing risk preferences as there is evidence that women
are more risk averse than men [Fehr-Duda et al., 2006, Schubert
et al., 1999].
The analysis in this chapter finds that female offenders choose prop-
erty crime types in which earnings risk is lower than in offence types
chosen by men. This result complements the findings by Gavrilova
and Campaniello [2015], who also find a negative and significant re-
lationship between being female and the earnings risk of a crime.
This result is found by running an OLS regression of earnings risk
on gender, controlling for offender and environment characterist-
ics, and estimating a statistically significant coefficient of −0.21.
This indicates that women choose crime types in which the earnings
3
risk is 21% lower than crime types chosen by men. Following this,
a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique [Blinder, 1973, Oaxaca,
1973, Jann, 2008] is used to show that gender differences in risk
preference account for the entire gender gap in crime.
There are very few papers in the Economics literature which study
the reasons for the vast gender gap in crime that we observe, fewer
still explore the possibility that male and female offenders differ in
behaviour due to their preferences. The analysis in this chapter is
the first to study this relationship for a nationally representative
dataset from England and Wales. For this reason, the outcomes
of this chapter are interesting and add to the current literature, ex-
ploring the role of risk preferences within an inherently risky activity
such as crime.
This chapter also contributes to the crime literature by adopting a
novel measure of risk and applying it to an individual level dataset
for England and Wales from 1981 to 2015. One reason for the relat-
ively few studies on female crime in the Economics literature is that
researchers often find it convenient to drop the small proportion of
female offenders from the dataset before carrying out their analysis.
The small numbers make it difficult to perform hypothesis tests
and make robust conclusions about statistical significance. This is
overcome by using a representative, repeated cross-sectional dataset
which provides a large number of female observations to analyse.
4
Figure 1 shows the number of offences for single male and female
offenders by survey year. Although the Crime Survey for England
and Wales (CSEW) began in 1981, it was not carried out annually
until 1999, so there are some missing years before this. The CSEW
is weighted in such a way that it represents the whole population and
provides a large sample of male and female offenders for analysis.
Figure 1: Number of Offences by Gender for Single Offenders
Using this representative dataset, empirical analysis is carried out
to investigate male and female preferences for earnings risk and how
responsiveness to incentives contributes to the gender gap. The
earnings risk is calculated for each crime type by estimating a Mincer
style wage equation, following the method outlined by Bonin et al.
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[2007] and taking the standard deviation of the estimated error term
for each crime category. The results from the analysis show a strong
relationship between female offenders and earnings risk, implying
that women choose crimes in which their pay-off is more certain.
This observed behaviour reinforces the general idea that women are
more risk averse than men, very few choose to commit crime and
those who do tend to choose crime types with the lowest earnings
risk. Following this, the participation gap is decomposed to find how
much of the difference can be explained by the elasticity of offender
behaviour with respect to two of the most important incentives: the
expected pay-off from crime and the probability that they will not
be apprehended. A synthetic panel dataset is constructed and used
in a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the results strikingly show
that, if these elasticities were the same for women as they are for
men, the gender gap would be reversed, with women committing
more crimes than men.
2.2 Literature Review
Gender-specific risk preferences have been explored by several au-
thors in a number of disciplines, but conclusive results are relatively
sparse. These studies generally analyse self-reported preferences or
calculate revealed preferences through observed behaviours and find
6
that the behaviour of men and women in uncertain situations de-
pends on the context.
Schubert et al. [1999] conduct an experiment where male and fe-
male subjects are offered lotteries which are framed either as insur-
ance, investments or gambling opportunities. Their results indicate
that risk preferences only differ between genders when the lottery is
framed as an abstract gamble, with men seeking more risk in mon-
etary gains and women seeking more risk in monetary losses. When
framed as insurance or an investment, they find no significant dif-
ference between the certainty equivalents of each gender, implying
that probability weighting does depend on the framing of a ques-
tion. In a similar experiment, Fehr-Duda et al. [2006] use monetary
incentives to test whether female subjects are more risk averse than
males. They hypothesise that there is a gender difference in probab-
ility weighting and their results show that women do underestimate
gains with a larger probability relative to men.
When analysing self-reported data, the validity of a characteristic
such as risk aversion can be difficult to accept at face value. To deal
with this problem, Dohmen et al. [2005] use survey data in which
22,000 individuals are asked to rate their willingness to take risks
by choosing a number from 1 to 11. They test these reported pref-
erences in an experimental setting by asking participants to choose
one of two lotteries, one more risky than the other. These revealed
7
preference results indicate that the self-reported risk preferences in
the dataset are accurate and, on the whole, women are more risk
averse than men.
The analysis in this chapter takes inspiration from a paper by Gav-
rilova and Campaniello [2015] in which they use a measure of earn-
ings risk developed by Bonin et al. [2007] to test whether female
offenders choose offence types with lower earnings risk. The premise
of Bonin et al.’s paper is that jobs in the legitimate sector vary in
several different types of risk, such as health risks, but one which
has not been studied is risk in earnings when wages vary in different
occupation groups. The aim of their paper is to find whether people
sort into occupation types according to their risk preferences. They
are able to use a unique dataset in order to analyse this relation-
ship. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) dataset contains
information about self-reported risk preferences for every individual
in the survey, which measures their personal willingness to take risks
by asking them to choose a number within a linear range. The au-
thors recognise that this self-reported level of risk preference is very
subjective so they conducted a separate field experiment [Dohmen
et al., 2005] to show that these risk preferences and actual risky
behaviour are very closely correlated. They found that those who
describe themselves as risk-loving are more likely to take part in
activities such as playing the lottery or smoking.
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In order to categorise occupation types according to their earnings
risk, they develop a measure of risk using the variation in monthly
wages which cannot be explained by independent variables in a
standard Mincer wage equation [Mincer, 1958, 1974]. They hypo-
thesise that if variables related to human capital cannot explain the
variation in wages, this variation is a risk associated with the job
type.
In order to measure the earnings risk for a particular occupation,
the authors estimate a Mincer wage equation using the log of the
monthly earnings as the dependent variable and several character-
istics of the job and human capital of the individual as independent
variables. They take the estimated residuals for each wage equation
and assign the standard deviation of these residuals to each occu-
pation type, calling this the measure of earnings risk. The standard
deviation of the residual will depend on which independent vari-
ables are included in the Mincer equation, some of the variance in
the error may just be due to omitted relevant variables. The validity
of the earnings risk measure relies on the assumption that all rel-
evant, human capital variables have been included in the equation
and any unexplained variation is considered to be earnings risk. The
estimated Mincer [1958, 1974] wage regression is given by Equation
9
1.
(1)
logEarnings = α + β1Experiencei + β2Experience
2
i
+ β3Experience
3
i + β4Tenurei + β5Tenure
2
i
+ β6Educationi + β7EastGermanyi
+ β8PublicSectori + β9RiskAttitudei + i
The authors seek to find whether those individuals who claim to be
willing to take risks sort themselves into occupation categories with
a high measure of earnings risk, according to the standard deviation
of the residuals from the Mincer equation. Throughout the analysis,
it is assumed that individuals take the earnings risk of occupation
types as given and are fully aware of it. The authors initially carry
out the analysis for male, full time workers aged 25-55 and calculate
the earnings risk for each occupation type, which ranges from 0.2
to 0.8. By regressing earnings risk on risk attitude, amongst other
control variables, they show that there is a positive and significant
relationship, indicating that those individuals who are more willing
to take risk do indeed sort themselves into occupations with higher
earnings risk.
The analysis is then repeated for female workers and the results
are very similar to the male results. The slightly weaker results
are shown by a lower R2 statistic for the Mincer wage equation is
lower, which implies that the variation in wages for females is ex-
plained less by independent human capital variables than it is for
men. They conclude that these results offer a potential explana-
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tion for the gender wage gap observed in most countries. Previous
literature has shown that women are more risk averse than men
[Dohmen et al., 2005] and that more risky occupations tend to have
higher wages [McGoldrick, 1995], therefore we would expect to see
a gender wage gap given these results.
It is of course possible that women are sorted into occupation types
with lower wages through discrimination by the labour market rather
than by choice. This would lead to lower earnings risk but this is not
discussed by Dohmen et al. [2005]. These findings about risk pref-
erences and earnings risk enable Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015]
to analyse a similar relationship in the crime market.
Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] outline a theoretical model which
adapts Becker’s theory [Becker, 1968] that potential offenders com-
pare costs and benefits when deciding whether to commit a crime.
They show that individuals have a threshold legitimate wage, W∗,
below which they will choose to commit crime over legitimate work.
(2)(1− p)E [U (Earnings)] + pU (Punishment) > U (Wage)
(3)W∗ = U−1 {(1− p)E [U (Earnings)] + pU (Punishment)}
> Wage
Equation 3 indicates that an individual’s threshold wage is determ-
ined by probability of apprehension, expected earnings from crime
and expected punishment. The authors regress criminal earnings
11
on gender and other characteristics to find that women earn 30%
less than men in crime. However, when they control for the type of
offence committed, this gender gap in criminal earnings disappears,
indicating that the earnings gap is due to men and women choosing
different types of crime. This sorting behaviour, which leads to dif-
ferences in expected criminal earnings for men and women, would
lead to a difference in threshold wages in Equation 3 and could, at
least partly, explain why fewer women than men choose crime over
legitimate work.
Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] use the National Incident Based
Reporting System dataset, a US dataset which contains details of
criminal incidents for a sample of reporting agencies. Included in
their analysis are 7, 812,439 observations for offenders aged 15 to 65
who commit property crimes during the years 1995 to 2010. To test
whether female offenders sort into crime types with lower variance
in monetary earnings, the authors calculate earnings risk for each
crime type by estimating a Mincer style wage equation, shown by
Equation 4. This parallels the method outlined by Bonin et al. [2007]
and is followed by taking the standard deviation of the estimated
error term for each crime category.
(4)logEarnings = α + β1Femalei + β2Agei + β3Weaponi
+ β4Femalei ∗Weaponi + τyear∗agency + i
After running this wage equation for each offence type and assign-
12
ing the correct earnings risk to each individual crime, the authors
run the second regression using the earnings risk as the dependent
variable, to find whether the results are similar to those found by
Bonin et al. [2007] in the legitimate job market. The results show an
estimated coefficient for female offenders which is negative and stat-
istically significant, implying that female offenders sort into crime
types with lower earnings risk.
After showing that female offenders are more risk averse than males,
the authors propose a theoretical model which shows how different
risk preferences can lead to a gender participation gap in crime.
Equation 5 gives the offender’s expected utility from a crime in
terms of the probability of apprehension (p), earnings from crime
(E), coefficient of risk aversion (r) and dis-utility from time in jail
(D). By summing over individuals, the authors are able to define the
total number of crimes, C, in terms of these variables in Equation 6.
Equation 7 takes logs on both sides and assigns the value a to the
size of the potential population of offenders. This crime equation is
used to specify an OLS equation with the log of the total number of
crimes as the dependent variable in Equation 8, where g represents
gender, j is the location, t is the time period, R is a dummy for
race, A is age category and Y is a year dummy.
(5)E (U) = (1− p)
(
E1−r
1− r
)
− pD
> ε
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(6)C  (1− p)
(
E1−r
1− r
)
(7)log (C) = a+ (1− r) logE + log (1− p)
(8)logCgjt = αj + β1glogEjt−1 + β2glog (1− pjt−1)
+ β3gRjt + β4gYjt + β5gAjt + εgjt
The results of this estimation show that male offenders react pos-
itively to both the expected earnings and the expected probability
of getting away with the crime. The elasticities for female offend-
ers are much lower and are only positive for expected earnings, the
estimated elasticity for probability of not being apprehended is in-
significant. This result shows that women are less responsive to
changes in incentives than men and suggests that, since crime is
a risky activity, female risk aversion reduces the probability that
women will choose crime when incentives increase.
Finally, to measure the effect of these differences in incentive elasti-
city, they used a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to construct a coun-
terfactual equation for female offenders using the estimated incent-
ive coefficients for male offenders. The results from this estimated
equation show that women would increase their number of offences
by 40% of the participation gap if they responded to incentives in
the same way as male offenders. Differences in risk preferences can-
not explain the other 60% of the gender gap in crimes. A limitation
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of this paper is that the data is not representative of the US since
only certain reporting agencies collect the data.
The gender gap in crime is large and persistent, with only 16% of
crimes committed in England and Wales by female offenders, ac-
cording to the CSEW. The bulk of research on this topic has been
carried out in disciplines such as Psychology, Criminology and So-
ciology and several reasons for this difference have been cited from
the “Biological Essentialism” argument, the idea that women are
genetically programmed to care and nurture and are not predis-
posed to crime or violence, to psychological explanations. In 1915,
Lombrosso and Ferraro suggested that women who commit crime
lack female characteristics which leads them to behave like men. To
support this claim, they produce several measurements of physical
and mental characteristics of female criminals and show these to be
similar to average male measurements at the time.
Due to the small number of female offenders, researchers often find
it convenient to drop them from datasets used in their analysis and
focus on male offenders. For this reason, there are relatively few
papers on women in crime in the Economics literature. Economists
have not yet studied the role of incentives in female crime, there are
many different incentives at play such as legitimate wage differences,
working hours and child-rearing [Freeman, 1999].
Several other theories have been published as to why women are
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less likely to commit crime, with many citing a woman’s role in
society as a barrier to criminal behaviour. Akerlof and Kranton
[2000] discuss the idea that individuals have a particular identity
within society and they lose utility when they behave in a way that
does not fit in with the norm. In this model, there are different
categories within society and each category has a certain type of
ideal behaviour attached to it. Individuals identify with a particu-
lar category and their utility is dependent on their self image, their
behaviour and the behaviour of others. People have a choice about
their identity to a certain extent, but when identities are limited
or prescribed in some way, their behaviour and utility functions are
predetermined. This theory could be extended to explain offender
behaviour if gender is assumed to be a prescribed category and crime
is seen as a typically male activity. Women would therefore lose util-
ity if they commit crime because they are demonstrating behaviour
that is not compatible with their social identity. However, Hart
[1985] argues that traditional theories about female crime are no
longer relevant since the role of women in Britain has changed so
dramatically. Arguments such as that women have fewer opportun-
ities to commit crime and are only concerned with marriage and
family no longer represent modern women, who have the same op-
portunities as men [Hart, 1985]. Although, despite the changing
roles of women in society, there is evidence that women still face
many barriers to entry when it comes to crime. Steffensmeier and
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Terry [1986] interview several male offenders about their attitudes
towards women and find that they, almost universally, do not think
that women have the necessary skills to be successful criminals and
therefore choose to commit crime with men.
2.3 Theory
Crime is an activity that was originally thought of as irrational and
therefore not suitable for Economic analysis. Early theories dis-
cuss psychological reasons for committing crime and offenders were
viewed as inherently bad. Becker (1968) was the first to suggest that
committing crime was, in fact, an economic choice like any other.
There are costs and benefits, each with particular probabilities at-
tached, and individuals are likely to choose crime or legitimate work
depending on which will maximise their expected utility. With this
idea in mind, he developed a model outlining the decision process
followed by potential offenders and claimed that they will choose
to commit a crime if the expected utility from doing so outweighs
the expected utility from legitimate work. He outlined the expec-
ted utility from committing crime which is illustrated by Equation
9, where j denotes the offence, pj is the offender’s probability of
conviction for committing offence j, Yj is the expected benefit from
committing offence j, fj is the expected punishment for committing
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offence j and W is the expected wage from a legitimate job.
(9)E(Uj) = pjUj(Yj − fj) + (1− pj)Uj(Yj)
> W
This model has been adopted by scores of subsequent work and
forms the basis of most economic papers in the crime literature.
We can use this framework to consider the differences between male
and female offenders. Let all potential offenders belong to one of
two groups, males are denoted “M” and females are denoted “F”.
The expected utility function above can then be written separately
for males and females. For a man to commit a crime, it must be
true that
(10)E(U
M
j ) = p
M
j U
M
j (Y
M
j − fMj ) + (1− pMj )UMj (Y Mj )
> WM
For a woman to commit a crime, it must be true that
(11)E(U
F
j ) = p
F
j U
F
j (Y
F
j − fFj ) + (1− pFj )UFj (Y Fj )
> W F
It can be seen in Equations 10 and 11 that each of the variables
has its own superscript, which implies that probability of appre-
hension, expected benefit, expected punishment and expected le-
gitimate wage can differ for men and women. This is explored in
the literature and there are several studies which claim that female
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offenders are less likely to be apprehended and are likely to face
a lower punishment if they are [Gavrilova and Campaniello, 2015,
Visher, 1983]. It is also shown in chapter three that sentencing for
women is more lenient than for men, even when in the same offence
category. These observed differences would, however, make crime
more inviting to women and cannot be the explanation for the large
gender gap in crime. The important difference to consider is, of
course, the utility functions or more specifically the differences in
risk preferences. For fewer women to choose crime than men, it
could be true that their utility functions take different forms.
When deciding between crime and legitimate work, individuals from
both groups face a choice between two lotteries. If they choose crime,
the pay-offs are Yj − fj with probability pj and Yj with probability
1 − pj. Whereas, if they choose legitimate work, the pay-off is W
with certainty. These two lotteries are defined in Equations 12 and
13 and the expected values are calculated in Equations 14 and 15
respectively.
(12)L1 = (Yj − fj, Yj; pj, 1− pj)
(13)L2 = (W ; 1)
(14)E(L1) = pj(Yj − fj) + (1− pj)(Yj)
(15)E(L2) = W
19
To begin with, let us assume that crime pays for women, for reasons
discussed above. It is therefore true that the expected value of L1
is higher than the expected value of L2.
(16)EF (L1) > E
F (L2)
The expected pay-off from crime is higher than the expected pay-off
from legitimate work for women. When all women are risk neut-
ral, it would be reasonable to assume that they would all choose
to commit crime over legitimate work since their expected utility
is proportional to the expected value of a lottery. If their utility
function were, for example, u(x) = x, then E(u(L1)) > E(u(L2)).
However, if we assume that women are risk averse, their utility func-
tion is now concave. The expected utility is no longer proportional
to the expected value and the utility function needs to be taken into
account when choosing between L1 and L2.
The aim here is to find the conditions under which women will choose
legitimate work over crime, even when the expected pay off from
crime is higher. When the expected value of crime is higher than
the expected value from legitimate work, but the expected utility
from crime is lower than the expected utility from legitimate work,
the following conditions must hold.
(17)W < pj(Yj − fj) + (1− pj)Yj
(18)EU [W ] > EU [pj(Yj − fj) + (1− pj)Yj]
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The concavity of the utility function means that there is a certainty
equivalent below the expected value of the lottery. At this point, the
individual is indifferent between the gamble and the certain amount.
To find the certainty equivalent (C.E):
U(C.E) = pj [U(Yj − fj)] + (1− pj) [U(Yj)]
Assuming a log form, we get:
ln (C.E) = pj ln(Yj − fj) + (1− pj) ln(Yj)
eln(C.E) = epj ln(Yj−fj)+(1−pj) ln(Yj)
(19)C.E = epj ln(Yj−fj).e(1−pj) ln(Yj)
C.E = (eln(YJ−fj))pj .(eln(YJ ))1−pj
C.E = (Yj − fj)pj .(Yj)1−pj
For argument’s sake, if the individual is indifferent between the cer-
tainty equivalent and the gamble, let them choose legitimate work
in order to avoid the social stigma attached to committing crime, or
something other reason. Considering the condition given in Equa-
tion 17, there must be a range of values for W where the expected
value of crime is higher but the expected utility is lower for women.
(20)(Yj − fj)pj .(Yj)1−pj ≤ W
< pj(Yj − fj) + (1− pj)Yj
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When Equation 20 is satisfied, risk averse individuals will choose
to work in the legitimate sector over crime, despite the expected
value from crime being higher. If it is the case that women are
generally more risk averse than men, this theory could go some way
to explaining the gender gap in crime.
2.4 Data
The dataset used in this chapter is the Crime Survey for England
and Wales (CSEW), formerly known as the British Crime Survey.
The CSEW was first carried out in 1981 and aims to survey around
50,000 households, biennially until 2000 and then annually. There
are several benefits of using this dataset over Police Reported Crime
(PRC), mainly the fact that it includes those crimes which have not
been reported to the police. The survey data also give a better idea
of long term trends in crime because they are not subject to trends
in reporting.
The CSEW is designed in such a way that the core set of questions
have been kept constant since the beginning, so it is possible to
compare answers to identical questions over time. The data are also
weighted in such a way that it can be used as representative of the
whole population of England and Wales.
There are drawbacks to the dataset, namely that it excludes what
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can be thought of as “victimless” crimes such as fraud and drug
possession. It also excludes homicide. These limitations are not too
important for the analysis in this chapter as the main focus is on
property crimes. This restriction is necessary for this analysis since
the calculation of an offence’s earnings risk relies on observing the
offender’s earnings from the crime, namely the value of the stolen
property. The value of stolen property is recorded in the CSEW
dataset as the answer to the question, “what was the total replace-
ment value of what was stolen?” and this value is treated as the
offender’s earnings in this analysis.
Variable descriptions for this dataset are given in Appendix A.1
and it can be seen that there are sub-categories within each offence
category. The main offence categories are robbery, snatch theft,
theft from the person, domestic burglary, theft from a dwelling,
domestic burglary in an outhouse, vehicle-related thefts, theft from
outside dwelling, other personal theft and criminal damage. Table
15 shows the questions that the victim is asked during the survey, the
answers to which are used as offence characteristics in the analysis
that follows.
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2.5 Estimation Methodology
Female Offender Risk Preferences
One of the principle concepts in economics is the idea that indi-
viduals are rational and behave according to their own personal
preferences. The above theory section uses this concept to show
that, given the other known constraints for men and women such as
legitimate wages, probability of apprehension and so on, it may be
the case that men and women have different preferences for there
to be such a vast gap in the crime rates. More specifically, it may
be true that women are more risk averse and, despite the possible
high profits from crime, would almost always prefer the certainty of
a legitimate wage.
The aim of this analysis is to explore the risk attitudes of female
offenders compared with male offenders using individual-level data
from England and Wales for the years 1981 to 2015. Following on
from the work by Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015], it uses Bonin
et al.’s measure of earnings risk to find whether offenders sort into
different crime types according to the their risk preferences.
In order to use the total earnings of crime, it is necessary to restrict
the dataset to property crimes, where the total value of stolen goods
is recorded for each offence. This earnings value is used to run Min-
cer wage equations [Mincer, 1958, 1974] for each crime type, and
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the standard deviation of the residuals is recorded as the earnings
risk. Each offence is then assigned the appropriate earnings risk
value and an OLS regression is run using the earnings risk as the
dependent variable. The idea behind Gavrilova and Campaniello
[2015]’s paper is that a significant and negative estimated coeffi-
cient for the female dummy variable in this regression indicates that
female offenders sort into crime types with lower levels of earnings
risk. Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] do find a negative and sig-
nificant estimated coefficient in their analysis and interpret this as
evidence that there is sorting. This leads to their conclusion that
female offenders are more risk averse than their male peers.
It has been well documented that female offenders choose different
crime types to male offenders. Figure 2 shows that, even within
property crimes, there is low participation of female offenders in
certain offence categories. The three most popular for women are
theft from the person, personal theft and criminal damage (including
pick-pocketing). The offence categories in Figure 2 are robbery,
snatch theft, theft from the person (TFTP), domestic burglary, theft
from a dwelling (TFAD), domestic burglary in an outhouse (DBOH),
vehicle-related thefts, theft from outside a dwelling (TFOD), other
personal theft and criminal damage.
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Figure 2: Crimes by Type and Gender
To put the earnings risk measure into context, Bonin’s measure of
earnings risk can be used with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data-
set to calculate the earnings risk associated with different legitimate
industries in England and Wales, the results are shown in Table 1.
Each individual in the dataset belongs to one of nine industry cat-
egories and the earnings risk is calculated for each. There is very
little variation in the measures which range from 0.84 to 0.89. These
are very close to those found by Bonin et al. Reasons for the small
differences could be that it’s a different country and different time
period.
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Table 1: Earnings Risk by Occupation Type
Industry Earnings Risk
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.861
Energy and Water 0.886
Manufacturing 0.844
Construction 0.850
Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants 0.846
Transport and Communication 0.850
Banking and Finance 0.847
Public admin, Education and Health 0.842
Other Services 0.850
When compared with work in the legitimate sector, crime is clearly a
much riskier choice, as shown in Table 2. In addition to the potential
problems faced in the legitimate sector, those choosing to commit
crime also face the risk of apprehension and punishment, not to
mention the fact that the illegal job market is not regulated like the
legitimate market. These risks, however, are likely to be specific
to individual crimes and will depend on a multitude of factors. In
order to compare risks across offences, it must be something that is
common across individuals and can be quantified in the same way.
Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] restrict their dataset to property
crimes in which the total value of stolen goods can be measured and
compared across the board, this can be regarded as the “earnings”
from a particular offence.
The US dataset used by Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] covers
only a few crime reporting agencies and is therefore not representat-
ive of the country as a whole. This is not a problem for the CSEW
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dataset since the frequency weights allow it to be used as represent-
ative for the whole population.
Only crimes with a single offender are considered in this analysis
since individual characteristics such as age and ethnicity are not
given when there are multiple offenders. This means that 48% of
the observations are excluded because either there are multiple of-
fenders or the victim did not know how many there were. Although
this is a reasonably large proportion to exclude, the characteristics
of individual offenders are vital in order to calculate the wage equa-
tions shown in Equation 21. There are also many more independent
variables that can be included in the Mincer wage equation than in
Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015], for each separate offence type the
following model is estimated where i denotes the individual offence.:
logEarningsi = Femalei + Agei +Drugi
+Drinki +Relationshipi +Racei
+Weaponi + Contacti + Forcei + Threateni
+ Sexuali +Knewi + StreetGangi+
(21)Timei +Weekendi + Y eari + εi
The standard deviation of the residuals is then recorded and each
individual offence is assigned a measure of earnings risk according to
the offence category that it comes under, which are given in Table
2.
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Table 2: Offence Earnings Risks
Offence Obs Residual Mean Residual S.D
=Earnings risk
Robbery 5,576,170 2.224 2.624
Snatch Theft 1,567,959 -1.636 6.030
Theft from the
Person
10,537,378 -1.522 3.158
Domestic Burglary 21,621,478 -0.698 2.391
Theft from a
Dwelling
2,613,583 -0.613 1.858
Domestic Burglary
Outhouse
6,302,198 0.089 2.766
Vehicle Theft 54,786,220 -0.843 1.777
Theft from Outside
Dwelling
19,717,500 0.178 2.081
Other Personal
Theft
24,991,293 -0.005 2.199
Criminal Damage 55,542,421 -5.173 6.327
The mean earnings and earnings risk for each offence category are il-
lustrated in Figures 3 and 4. In the context of this analysis, earnings
are given by the total value of stolen goods. It may be surprising
that criminal damage and arson have such high mean earnings given
that they don’t necessarily involve stealing any property. However,
the recorded offence is the main offence committed and not neces-
sarily the only one, therefore offenders who commit criminal damage
and arson may have stolen some property during the offence.
The mean earnings in Figure 3 vary across different types of offence
and between men and women. Aside from arson and criminal dam-
age, burglary in a dwelling has the highest average earnings among
offence types, while theft from outside a dwelling has the lowest.
Figure 4 shows that the crime type with the highest level of earnings
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risk is arson and criminal damage while the lowest is theft of/from
a vehicle. As explained earlier, the earnings risk is the variability in
earnings which cannot be explained by an offender’s characteristics
included in Equation 21. The level of earnings and earnings risk are
not correlated with each other, as shown in Section 2.7, so the effect
of earnings risk on female offender decision making is unlikely to be
driven by the level of earnings.
Figure 3: Mean Earnings
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Figure 4: Earnings Risk
2.6 Why is there a Gender Gap?
To analyse the participation gap in crime, it is necessary to model
the to number of crimes in terms of incentives faced by potential
offenders. Equation 22 is the derived crime equation from Gavrilova
and Campaniello [2015], adapted for this analysis, which gives the
total number of crimes in terms of expected log earnings and the
log probability of not being apprehended, with g[M,F ] denoting
gender.
logCrimegt = β0g + β1glogEarningst−1 + β2glog (Probabilityt−1)
+ β3gRacet + β4gAget + β5gY eart + εt
(22)
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log ˆCrimeCounterfactualF t = log
ˆCrimeFt+
(
βˆ1M − βˆ1F
)
logEarningst−1
+
(
βˆ2M − βˆ2F
)
log (Probabilityt−1)
(23)
The objective of this part of the analysis is to find whether men
and women respond differently to expected earnings and probabil-
ity of arrest when deciding whether to commit a crime and to find
how much of the participation gap can be explained by these differ-
ent responses. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method [Blinder,
1973, Oaxaca, 1973, Jann, 2008] is used to estimate a counterfactual
crime equation for female offenders in the case where they have the
same estimated coefficients as male offenders, shown in Equation 23.
The results give a decomposition of the participation gap in crime,
one component is due to differences in endowments and the other is
due to differences in elasticity of offender behaviour with respect to
changes in the expected earnings or probability.
To carry out this analysis, the repeated cross-sectional dataset from
the CSEW has been transformed into a synthetic panel which groups
individuals into cohorts sharing similar characteristics. Specifically,
they are grouped according to race, gender and age, creating 30
cohorts per year who are tracked over time. Cross sectional char-
acteristics in this type of synthetic panel are consistent over time,
since these are the characteristics on which they are constructed,
so individual fixed effects are redundant as they would have perfect
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collinearity with the dummy variables for age and race.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Synthetic Panel
Variable Observations Mean S.D Min Max
Year 420 2007.5 4.036 2001 2014
Log Crime (F) 169 9.382 1.856 5.497 12.620
Log Crime (M) 187 10.821 1.936 6.596 14.090
Log Earnings 336 5.072 1.130 1.609 8.956
Log Probability 338 -0.334 0.229 -1.731 -0.027
2.7 Results
Risk Preferences
Table 4 shows the results for an OLS regression of the log of criminal
earnings on offender characteristics. The unconditional log earnings
for female offenders are 35% lower than for males, but when other
attributes and the offence types are controlled for, this earnings
gap falls to 4%. This implies that a large part of the gender gap in
earnings is due to gender-specific sorting in crime and the results are
very similar to those found by Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015].
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Table 4: Gender Earnings Gap
Log(Earn) Log(Earn) Log(Earn) Log(Earn) Log(Earn)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.353*** -0.234*** 0.070*** -0.073*** -0.041***
Age=16-24 0.622*** 0.316*** 0.087*** 0.259***
Age=25-39 1.349*** 0.877*** 0.799*** 0.947***
Age=40+ 1.516*** 0.447*** 0.423*** 0.581***
Drug Influence 0.292*** -0.023*** -0.072***
Drink Influence -0.018*** 0.195*** 0.131***
Rel=Family -0.693*** -0.667*** -0.769***
Rel=Friend -1.292*** -1.019*** -0.918***
Rel=Acquain. -1.583*** -1.171*** -0.772***
Rel=F. Spouse -0.798*** -0.255*** -0.325***
Race=Black 0.151*** -0.111*** -0.091***
Race=Asian 1.023*** 0.121*** 0.124***
Weapon 0.380*** 0.398***
Contact -0.065*** -0.099***
Force -0.161*** -0.738***
Threaten -0.217*** 0.108***
Sexual 0.692*** 1.285***
Knew Offender 0.374*** 0.646***
Street Gang 0.044*** 0.037***
Time=Night 0.006*** 0.076***
Weekend -0.030*** -0.116***
Constant -4.419*** 3.298*** 5.335*** 4.701*** 4.572***
R Squared 0.027 0.0368 0.1549 0.1161 0.2039
Observations 10,132,691 6,951,226 2,174,878 908,503 845,274
Year dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Offence dum. No No No No Yes
The same OLS regression is run using earnings risk as the dependent
variable to find whether female offenders tend to choose offences
with lower earnings risk. Table 5 shows the estimated results when
using Gavrilova and Campaniello’s specification, given by Equation
24. The estimated coefficient for the female dummy is positive for
the US dataset and negative for the CSEW dataset, but both are
relatively small in magnitude.
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(24)EarningsRiski = αi + β1Femalei + β2Agei + β3Weaponi
+ β4Femalei ∗Weaponi + εi
Table 5: Specification from Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015]
Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015] CSEW Dataset
Earnings Risk Coefficient Coefficient
Female 0.004*** -0.091***
(Age) Age=10-15 0.000*** -0.813***
Age=16-24 - -1.225***
Age=25-39 - -1.123***
Age=40+ - -0.685***
Weapon -0.001 0.434***
Female*Weapon -0.015*** 0.915***
Alone 0.014*** -
Female*Alone -0.008*** -
Gang 0.018 -
Female*Gang -0.014 -
Constant 1.772*** 4.887***
Observations 9,205,070 16,029,381
R squared 0.521 0.0251
Year*Agency FE Yes -
The CSEW has the advantage that many more observable charac-
teristics of the offenders are recorded in the survey and these are
controlled for in the regression estimates outlined in Table 16.
The estimated coefficient for female is −0.213 and significant which
indicates that female offenders generally choose offences with lower
earnings risk and the magnitude of this effect is larger than in the
previous specification. When considering the possible directions of
causality, it seems unlikely that a crime type would have lower earn-
ings risk because women are more likely to choose it. It is necessary
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to consider the possibility that an external factor causes some of-
fence types to have both lower earnings risk and a higher rate of
female offenders, for example the expected earnings. It would be
reasonable to hypothesise that crime types with lower levels of ex-
pected earnings also display lower earnings risk, and women choose
crimes with lower earnings potential than men. A simple estimate
of Pearson’s correlation coefficient for level of earnings and earnings
risk, however, gives a value of 0.02, implying that there is no cor-
relation between them. Of course this doesn’t mean that the level
of earnings isn’t correlated with other types of risk, for example
risk of apprehension. Assuming that the direction of causality is
correct, the results support the idea that female offenders are more
risk averse than males and sort themselves into crime types with
lower earnings risk.
Gender Participation Gap
The results from the decomposition analysis are given in Table 6,
with the endowment and coefficient effects in the second table.
These estimates indicate that the average total crime for men is
78,042 and the average total crime for women is 15,214. The figures
reported are the log total crimes, therefore total crime is calculated
by taking the exponential of 11.265 and 9.630 for men and women re-
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spectively. If female behaviour had the same elasticity with respect
to changes in expected earnings and probability of apprehension,
there would be an average of 88,876 crimes committed by women
each year, which is larger than the average number of male crimes.
The calculation for this is shown in Equation 25.
log(FemaleCrime) + CoefficientEffect
= 9.630 + 1.764
= 11.395
(25)e11.395 = 88, 876
This result is very different in magnitude from that found by Gav-
rilova and Campaniello [2015] who suggest that differences in elast-
icities account for 40% of the gender participation gap. Here we are
saying that, if elasticities were the same, the gender gap would in
fact be reversed since they account for 108% of the gap.
The validity of this result could possibly be improved by considering
limitations in the data and analysis methods. Individual offenders
from the repeated cross section are split into cohorts according to
gender, age and race and are treated as groups that can be tracked
over time in a synthetic panel. In theory, the idea is that these
groups will respond to incentives in the same way because of their
shared characteristics. A more rigorous method may be to alloc-
ate offenders to cohorts by several different characteristics and to
test which groupings most accurately split offenders into groups
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who respond to incentives in the same way. Characteristics used
to split offenders into cohorts should be those which affect an indi-
vidual’s propensity to commit crime. In addition to those used in
this analysis, these may include variables such as education, income,
unemployment and number of children, which have been shown in
previous literature to have a significant effect on crime [Gould et al.,
2002, Machin and Meghir, 2004, Witt et al., 1998, Bartel, 1979]
Unfortunately, this level of information is unavailable in the CSEW,
due to the nature of victim-based surveys. The number of descript-
ive characteristics about the offender is limited to the victim’s obser-
vations, namely easily observable characteristics like age and race.
Another key point to remember is that this analysis is only for prop-
erty crimes with single offenders, it doesn’t necessarily explain the
participation gap for all crime types.
Table 6: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Log Crime(Female) Log Crime(Male)
Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E
Lag Log Earnings -0.068 0.051 0.114*** 0.041
Lag Log Probability 0.241 0.250 0.532** 0.204
Race=Black -2.890*** 0.108 -2.627*** 0.088
Race=Asian -3.587*** 0.162 -3.125*** 0.091
Age = 10 - 15 3.389*** 0.309 1.887*** 0.284
Age = 16 - 24 4.625*** 0.314 4.139*** 0.263
Age = 25 - 39 5.142*** 0.318 4.396*** 0.273
Age = 40 + 4.453*** 0.325 3.528*** 0.280
Constant 7.587*** 0.324 9.398*** 0.324
Observations 148 156
R squared 0.8848 0.9390
Year dummies Yes Yes
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Log Crime Coefficient S.E P-Value
Differential
Prediction (Male) 11.265*** 0.139 0.000
Prediction (Female) 9.630*** 0.148 0.000
Difference 1.635*** 0.203 0.000
Decomposition
Endowments -0.096 0.193 0.621
Coefficients 1.765*** 0.079 0.000
Interaction -0.034 0.067 0.608
2.8 Conclusions
The large gender participation gap in crime has puzzled academ-
ics for many years, but very few Economists have researched this
topic. The current chapter offers an analysis of the difference in
risk preferences of male and female offenders using a novel measure
of earnings risk also adopted by Gavrilova and Campaniello [2015].
Following this, a Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition is used to ex-
amine the gap in participation and to find how much of this gap
can be explained by preferences and behaviour. Propensity to com-
mit crime is likely dependent on a multitude of factors for both men
and women, many of which are discussed in previous literature. The
analysis in this chapter seeks to examine the role of risk preferences
and reactions to incentives, which may play a role in addition to
other variables.
The results from the earnings risk analysis show that female of-
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fenders sort themselves into crime types where the earnings risk is
21% lower than the types that male offenders choose. Controlling
for additional characteristics leads to an estimated coefficient which
is larger in magnitude than in the specification used by Gavrilova
and Campaniello [2015]. When calculating the earnings risk, it is
important to keep in mind that the standard deviation of the resid-
ual will depend on which independent variables are included in the
Mincer equation, some of the variance in the error may be due to
omitted relevant variables. The validity of the earnings risk measure
relies on the assumption that all relevant, human capital variables
have been included in the equation and any unexplained variation
is considered to be earnings risk. These results show that female
offenders demonstrate risk averse behaviour and may explain why
they tend to choose different types of crime.
The results from the second part of the analysis suggest that the en-
tire participation gap can be explained by differences in the elasti-
city of male and female behaviour with respect to incentives and
the gap would be reversed if women behaved in the same way as
men. Compared to the results found by Gavrilova and Campaniello
[2015], who find that this accounts for 40% of the gap, this finding
is very striking indeed. This analysis could be extended by employ-
ing a more comprehensive data set with a larger number of offender
characteristics available, such as income, education and number of
children.
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The main drawback of the data used in this chapter is the fact that
all observations are from the victim’s point of view. Their know-
ledge of events after the crime may be limited and as such, arrest
and sentencing information about the offender are rarely recorded.
The exclusion of all non-property crimes also means that the results
found cannot necessarily be generalised to other crime types where
the main pay-off to the offender is non-monetary.
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3 THE GENDER GAP IN SENTENCING
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter addressed the difference in offending rates
between men and women and found that risk preferences may play
a role in the large gender gap. When thinking about the gender gap
in crime, however, there are three stages to consider in determin-
ing why the gap may be wide. The first stage is the subject of the
previous chapter and that is the difference in the number of men
and women who commit crime in the first place. This was analysed
by focusing on the reasons why individuals commit crime or crimes
and how different risk preferences might contribute to this gap. The
second stage is the difference in the number of male and female of-
fenders who are apprehended for crimes and reach the sentencing
stage. During the year ending March 2017, 459,222 male offenders
were cautioned or arrested in England and Wales compared with
91,603 female offenders. Although analysing this gender gap would
be an interesting and logical next step in the overall analysis, data
for this are insufficient since victims surveyed in the Crime Sur-
vey for England and Wales often do not know whether the offender
was later apprehended for crimes committed against them. The
third stage is the sentencing process and the difference in types and
lengths of sentences given to male and female offenders. There is
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a possibility that these three stages are correlated, the gap in one
stage may lead to the gap in the following stage, and these could
cause individual studies of each stage to be misleading. However,
the female percentage of offenders who were cautioned or arrested in
2017 is 16.63%, which is not significantly different to the percentage
of total offenders who are female according to the Crime Survey for
England and Wales.
Figure 5: Stages of the Gender Gap in Crime
This chapter, therefore, jumps to the third stage, which is the gender
gap in sentencing, and seeks to find whether men and women are
treated differently in the courts. While 16% of offenders are female
and 17% of apprehended offenders are female, women make up only
5% of the prison population and tend to have shorter sentences when
given a custodial sentence. The gender gap in prison population in
England and Wales has persisted and risen over time, in 2010 there
were 19 male prisoners for every female and this increased to 21 by
2016.
The analysis in this chapter aims to answer two key questions:
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whether men and women receive different sentence types for the
same offences and whether they receive different sentence lengths
conditional on going to prison. Previous work in this area has fo-
cused on US data and does not control for many independent factors,
such as offender characteristics, aggravating factors and mitigating
factors. The analysis in this chapter is the first UK study and utilises
a rich, individual-level dataset which includes several confounding
factors which are recorded by the Judge after each Crown Court
case.
Female sentencing has been discussed in the news in recent years,
an example of which is the recent closure of Cornton Vale Womens’
Prison in Scotland. This prison has been closed in an effort to redir-
ect female offenders to rehabilitation facilities. There are, however,
some papers that have tried to find whether women already receive
more lenient treatment in the criminal justice system [Butcher and
Park, 2017, Starr, 2015, Rodriguez et al., 2006, Sorensen et al., 2014].
The tables in Appendix B.1 show sentence outcomes and lengths by
gender and offence type, as recorded in the Crown Court Sentencing
Survey for the years 2011 to 2014. The most striking aspect of these
tables at first glance is how few women are in each table compared
to men. These statistics, of course, do not control for the seriousness
of offences or any other relevant factors but do give an initial idea
of the vast difference in the numbers.
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Record-level data from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey is used
to estimate the effect of gender on sentence type and length within
offence categories using Ordered Logistic Regression (OLOGIT) ana-
lysis. The richness of the dataset allows one to control for several
factors including the number of previous convictions and any aggrav-
ating or mitigating circumstances which affect the Judge’s decision.
The results show that, for all offence types bar sexual offences, wo-
men are significantly less likely to receive a custodial sentence than
men. Similarly, for the length of the sentence, the probability of re-
ceiving a longer sentence is higher for men in most offence categories
than for women. For a burglary offence, for example, women have
a 37% chance of receiving a sentence of 12 months of less, this falls
to only 28% for men1.
These results are consistent with findings from previous papers,
which generally find that women are less likely to receive custodial
sentences and receive shorter ones when they do. A problem that
many papers face is that such a small proportion of the prison pop-
ulation is female, it can therefore be difficult to make robust con-
clusions about the differences between outcomes for men and wo-
men. This problem is overcome by using a large, record-level dataset
which provides many details about both male and female offenders.
1Pearson’s Chi-Squared test is used to test the statistical signi-
ficance of these differences and the results are given in Appendix
B.3
45
Some argue that women receive lesser sentences for reasons such as
less serious crimes, responsibility for children or non-primary roles
in offences. The analysis in this chapter shows that, even when
these factors, and several others, are taken into account, women
still receive more lenient treatment than men. Another possible ex-
planation is judicial bias, which has been studied by Park [2014] in
relation to offender race. He uses rank order tests to find whether
judges choose sentences based on taste based or statistical discrim-
ination and the possibility for this type of analysis with data for
England and Wales is discussed in this chapter.
Figure 6 shows the female prison population for England and Wales
for the years 1950 to 2015. The overall upward trend since the
1950s has sparked interest among academics in female sentencing,
and crime in general, and many Economists have considered this
gender gap in recent years [Butcher and Park, 2017, Starr, 2015,
Park, 2014].
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Figure 6: Female Prison Population
3.2 Literature Review
There has been an upward trend for both the male and female prison
population over the past fifty years and academics have become
more interested in the possibility of gender bias in sentencing. In
order to test whether men and women receive different sentences
for the same crimes, it is necessary to control for other determining
factors. Previous papers have focused on datasets from the US and
some have examined the effect of ethnicity and age on sentencing in
addition to gender.
The first question to ask is whether , in fact, there is a gender gap in
sentencing. Some would argue that sentence type and length should
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be determined by factors such as the type of crime and the number
of previous convictions, however some papers have shown that this
is not always the case. Butcher and Park [2017] use a decompos-
ition method to find that 30% of the gender gap in incarceration
rates cannot be explained by observable characteristics, which is
consistent with the findings in this chapter. The analysis uses data
from Kansas in the years 1998 to 2011 and focuses on two outcome
variables: a dummy for incarceration and, conditional on incarcer-
ation, the sentence length, although the gap in sentence lengths is
largely explained by observable factors. By presenting the senten-
cing guidelines for Kansas, the authors show that there is scope for
judicial discretion since the guidelines offer a range rather than a
specific length for each combination of previous convictions and of-
fence severity and they are also able to adjust sentences according
to aggravating and mitigating factors.
The authors use regression analysis, which controls for case facts and
criminal history, to find that female offenders still receive more leni-
ent sentencing than men. Equation 26 shows the logistic regression
used in their analysis, where Yi is equal to 1 for a custodial sentence,
Fi is a gender dummy and Xi is a vector of control variables.
(26)Yi = α + βFi +Xiγ + i
These regressions are, however, only run for “drug offences” and
“non-drug offences” within which there may be large variation in
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crime type. They also do not control for child care as a mitigation
factor which is likely to be significant in the case of female offenders
but they acknowledge that the unexplained gap found later in the
paper may be partly due to the majority of parents in prison being
female.
Following this, they use a decomposition method to create a counter-
factual distribution of prison terms for women to find whether the
gender gap in sentencing can be explained. They find, using this
method, that 30% of the gap in incarceration rates is unexplained
by observable factors but there is only a very small unexplained
gap in sentence length conditional on incarceration. It is shown
that there is heterogeneity across judges when it comes to female
sentencing and the authors speculate that judges differ in their pun-
ishment philosophies. They find no evidence of chivalry, concluding
that those judges who are more lenient towards women are also more
lenient towards men.
This decomposition method has also been used by Starr [2015] who
finds that women are favoured in sentencing and a large gap in
sentence lengths is unexplained when controlling for other factors,
men receive sentences which are 63% longer on average.
Evidence of gender bias in sentencing has been found in several
other papers, all finding that women are either less likely to receive
a custodial sentence, receive shorter custodial sentences or both.
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Park [2014] uses the rank-order to find whether judges in Kansas
use statistical discrimination or taste-based discrimination. Taste-
based discrimination occurs when a decision is made purely on the
individual’s taste for a particular observable factor, whether that’s
gender, race, age or any other characteristic. Statistical discrimina-
tion, however, occurs when the individual cannot observe a partic-
ular variable so instead they base their decision on something they
can observe which they know is correlated with the unobserved vari-
able. If, for example, a Judge cannot observe the future criminality
of an offender, but they do know that women are less likely to com-
mit crime than men, they may base their decision on gender. Park
finds that judges do not have consistent rankings for each race and
concludes that this is evidence of taste-based discrimination. Both
Sorensen et al. [2014] and Rodriguez et al. [2006] find that women
receive more lenient sentences in US even when controlling for other
factors. Rodriguez et al. [2006] analyses sentencing data from Texas
to find that the prevalence of gender bias in sentencing varies across
different types of crime. Custodial sentence is less likely for women
who commit drug or property offences. For violent crimes, they are
not less likely to receive a custodial sentence, but they are likely to
be shorter when they do.
Other papers have studied the possibility of sentencing bias for
groups other than women and find that they are possibly not the
only group to receive lighter sentences. Mustard [2001] finds that
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black and male offenders are more likely to receive longer prison
sentences than white and female offenders. In addition to race and
gender, having children may also be a characteristic that reduces
the severity of an offenders sentence. Pierce and Freiburger [2011]
find that having children reduces the probability of receiving a cus-
todial sentence if they are charged with child neglect. Tillyer et al.
[2015] finds evidence for both the “chivalry” and “evil woman”2
hypotheses, women with low criminal history receive more lenient
sentencing whereas women with higher criminal records receive more
severe sentences.
Despite evidence that women are treated more leniently by the crim-
inal justice system, some suggest that there should be fewer female
prison sentences as women commit less serious crimes and often
struggle to keep custody of their children when in prison. Corton
Vale, the only womens’ prison in Scotland, is closing with a view to
reduce the number of female prisoners and offer alternative senten-
cing options [BBC, 2016]. Since women generally commit less severe
crimes [Butcher and Park, 2017], there is an argument that female
offenders should receive non-custodial punishments. This view is
2The “chivalry” hypothesis and the “evil woman” hypothesis are
terms used in criminology. The “chivalry” hypothesis was presented
by Crew [1991] and suggests that the male-dominated justice system
sees women as victims and therefore treats them with more leniency.
Erez [1992] presents the “evil woman” hypothesis that women are,
in fact, treated more harshly in the criminal justice system because
men believe that they have not only broken the law but gone against
expected female behaviour.
51
supported by Bagaric and Bagaric [2016] and Gelsthorpe and Mor-
ris [2002], who argue that women commit less serious crimes than
men and most women in prison are not a risk to others, so the
number of women being imprisoned should be reduced.
Another argument against female imprisonment is the strong cor-
relation between being female and being a single mother. At the
end of 2016, there were 2.9 million single parent families in the UK,
86% of which were headed by mothers. The Crown Court Senten-
cing Survey records whether an offender is the main or sole carer for
dependent relatives, including children. Table 29 gives the number
of male and female offenders in each offence category who have re-
sponsibility for dependent relatives as well as the percentage of the
total and a Pearson χ2 significance test of the difference. It is clear
from this table that for all offence types, excluding offences causing
death, the percentage of female offenders who have responsibility
for dependent relatives is significantly higher than the percentage of
male offenders.
It is therefore logical when thinking about female offenders to con-
sider the effects of imprisonment on their children. Cho [2009] uses
propensity score matching to examine the impact of mothers in
prison on educational achievements of children. They find, surpris-
ingly, that childrens’ school work does not suffer when their mothers
go to prison, in fact they find a very slight positive effect. However,
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they hypothesise that this may be the effect of sympathetic teachers
encouraging children with imprisoned mothers and not necessarily
the true effect on children’s education.
In addition to the effects on children, studies have explored the ef-
fects of prison on female employment and welfare. Lalonde and Cho
[2008] study a dataset from Illinois to find whether employment pro-
spects are worsened for women after prison. They find that, in the
short term, having been in prison has no adverse effect on employ-
ment prospects, employment rates simply return to their pre-prison
level. Since pre-prison employment for female offenders tends to be
lower than the national average, they conclude that going to prison
is not the cause of lower employment, rather this group of women
had lower employment levels regardless. Butcher and Lalonde [2006]
analyse the effect of imprisonment on womens’ subsequent social
welfare receipts. Contrary to popular opinion, the authors find that
womens’ welfare receipts do not increase after prison. Rather women
who are imprisoned tend to claim higher levels of benefits anyway
and there is also a tendency for welfare receipts to drop just prior
to imprisonment, so it may appear that they increase after but in
fact they return to their previous levels.
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3.3 Data
The Sentencing Council are responsible for providing and monit-
oring sentencing guidelines in England and Wales and are an in-
dependent body within the Ministry of Justice3. The sentencing
guidelines do not specifically mention gender and therefore should
not directly contribute to the gender gap in sentencing. In an effort
to assess the effectiveness of current guidelines in 2010, the Council
began to request that Judges complete a survey after every case in
Crown Courts across the country. The survey ran until mid-2015
and has provided a rich dataset at the individual offender-level. The
survey covers several aspects of the case, including offender charac-
teristics and previous convictions, and details of the factors which
influenced the Judge’s decision during sentencing.
The tables in Appendix B.1 presents some descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the analysis. The offender characteristics used
are age and gender, both given as factor variables. Age falls into
one of four categories: “18 to 24”, “25 to 34”, “35 to 44” and “45
to 54”. The category “54 and over” has been eliminated from the
analysis since such a small percentage of offenders fell into it, this
lack of variability in the X variables can prevent the model from
3The sentencing guidelines for England and Wales
can be found on the Sentencing Council’s website:
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-sentencing/about-
guidelines/.
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running due to their low predictive power. Gender is recorded as a
binary variable with 0 for men and 1 for women.
The other independent variables common to all offence categories
are “number of previous convictions”, either “none”, “1 to 3” or “4-
9”, and “guilty plea discount”, either “none”, “1% to 10%”, “11% to
20%”, “21% to 32%” or “33% or more”. In each dataset, there are
also offence-specific variables, theses include the seriousness of the
crime, the subcategory offence and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. As noted, where a binary variable has a value of 1
for a very small number of cases4, this variable must unfortunately
be excluded from the regression since a certain level of predictive
power is required from explanatory variables in order to estimate
coefficients.
3.4 Estimation Methodology
The nature of the data collected by the survey means that both the
outcome and length of an offender’s sentence is categorical rather
than continuous. Judges are asked to choose one of the options
shown in Table 7 and this choice is coded accordingly in the data-
set. Details such as gender, age, criminal history and crime char-
acteristics are recorded and coded in a similar way, meaning that
4This analysis uses 10% as a rule of thumb, since this is the per-
centage below which the model failed to run.
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the majority of variables used in this analysis are categorical, also
known as factor variables. Furthermore, the differences between the
values assigned to each option are not representative of the differ-
ences between the options themselves, where “Immediate Custody”
is assigned a value of 4 and “Community Order” is assigned a value
of 2, this does not mean that a custodial sentence is twice as bad
as community service. Therefore, these variables can be described
further as ordinal categorical variables, for which there are specific
modelling techniques.
Table 7: Values for Categorical Dependent Variables
Value Sentence Outcome Sentence Length
1 Other Up to 1 year
2 Community Order 1 to 3 years
3 Suspended Sentence 3 to 5 years
4 Immediate Custody 5 years or more
Before considering regression models that are appropriate for ordinal
dependent variables, it is important to understand why Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), and linear models in general, are inappro-
priate. Linear regression models require normality of errors with
constant variance, which is violated by ordinal categorical variables
due to the fact that they are non-continuous, bounded and cannot
be measured on an interval or ratio scale. Therefore, estimating an
OLS model for an ordinal dependent variable will lead to biased es-
timates, see the analysis carried out by Winship, C. & Mare [1984]
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and McKelvey and Zavoina [1975].
A superior method of estimation in this case is the Ordered Logit
Model (OLOGIT), also known as the Proportional Odds Model. Es-
timating this type of model for a dependent variable with M levels
is analogous to estimating a series of M − 1 binary logistic regres-
sions with grouped values of the dependent variables. This idea is
illustrated more clearly in Table 8, where an example is given for a
dependent variable with four levels, that is M = 4. In this example,
the OLOGIT model estimates three logistic regressions as shown in
the first column and assigns a binary value to the dependent vari-
able according to the values given in the second and third columns.
In the first regression, the binary dependent variable is 0 for a value
of 1 and 1 for values 2, 3 and 4. Effectively, the estimates for the
coefficients in this first regression represent the effect of an increase
in the independent variables on the odds of the dependent variable
having a value of two, three or four rather than one. It follows that
the estimated coefficients for the second and third regressions give
the effects on the odds of the dependent variable having values 3 or
4 and 4 respectively.
Table 8: Ordered Logistic Regression Example
Logistic regression Dep. variable = 0 if... Dep. variable = 1 if...
1 Y = 1 Y = 2, 3, 4
2 Y = 1, 2 Y = 3, 4
3 Y = 1, 2, 3 Y = 4
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Equation 27 gives the OLOGIT model as described by Williams
[2016], where j = 1, ...,M is again the number of levels for the
dependent variable and Xi is a vector of observed explanatory vari-
ables. As described in Table 8, a set of logistic regressions is estim-
ated to find the effect on the odds that the dependent variable has
a value higher or lower than a particular cut off. To estimate an
OLOGIT model, the proportional odds assumption must be met,
which requires that the estimated log odds are the same regardless
of the cut off. As can be seen in Equation 27, α and β do not have
a j subscript, since only one set of coefficients is estimated.
(27)P (Yi > j) =
exp (α +Xiβ)
1 + [exp (α +Xiβ)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
In practice, this assumption is very strong and violation can be
tested for in two ways. The Brant test uses the idea that, if the pro-
portional odds assumption holds, the estimated coefficients should
not be significantly different from one logistic regression to the next.
It calculates a χ2 statistic for each explanatory variable and one for
all, showing which, if any, violate the assumption. If the overall test
is insignificant, OLOGIT is the appropriate model. If, however, the
overall test is significant, the individual tests can be used to identify
which explanatory variables do not meet the assumption, that is
their estimated coefficients differ across regressions. The second way
to test for violation is the Likelihood Ratio Test, which is similar
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to the Brant test but tests the assumption by estimating the model
given by Equation 27 and the generalised model given by Equation
28 and comparing the goodness of fit for each. Again, an insignific-
ant test statistic implies that the proportional odds assumption is
not violated.
Equation 28 gives the model for the Generalised Ordered Logit Re-
gression (GOLOGIT), of which OLOGIT is a special case. As can
be seen in the model, the proportional odds assumption is relaxed
and a separate set of coefficients is estimated for each logistic re-
gression. This model is suitable when the above tests indicate that
the assumption for OLOGIT is not met.
(28)P (Yi > j) =
exp (αj +Xiβj)
1 + [exp (αj +Xiβj)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
The disadvantage of this, however, is that there are now M − 1
sets of coefficients to interpret and work with, rather than just one.
The most commonly used model is a mixture of the two discussed
called the Partially Constrained Generalised Ordered Logit Regres-
sion (PC-GOLOGIT) [Williams, 2006, 2016, Long, 1997]. Equation
29 gives an example of the model given by Williams [2016], where
the estimated coefficients β1 and β2 are constrained and β3 is un-
constrained. This model is often the most appropriate in practice as
it can accommodate both OLOGIT and GOLOGIT models where
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needed.
(29)P (Yi > j) =
exp (αj +X1iβ1 +X2iβ2 +X3iβ3j)
1 + [exp (αj +X1iβ1 +X2iβ2 +X3iβ3j)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
The regression models described above are designed for categorical
dependent variables and therefore lend themselves well to the ana-
lysis in this chapter. The aim of this analysis is to find whether
men and women receive different sentence types and lengths for the
same crime types when controlling for other variables. The con-
tribution of this paper over previous studies is that it controls for
a variety of specific aggravating and mitigating factors, outlined in
Appendix B.1, which influence the Judge’s sentencing decision. The
inclusion of these additional confounding factors helps to achieve a
comprehensive assessment of the research question.
First, to find whether sentence types differ between men and women,
Equation 30 is estimated separately for every crime type as a PC-
GOLOGIT model.
(30)
Outcomei = αi +Genderi + Agei +Offencei
+ PreviousConvictionsi
+ Seriousnessi + AggravatingFactorsij
+MitigatingFactorsik +GPDiscounti + i
The variables in Equation 30 are described in detail in the tables in
Appendix B.1. The dependent variable is the sentencing outcome
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which is categorical. Gender, age, offence, previous convictions, ser-
iousness and guilty plea discount are also categorical variables which
are recorded for each individual offender. Aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors are vectors of factors which positively or negatively affect
the judge’s sentencing decision and these are also described in detail
for each offence type in Appendix B.1.
If it is the case that, all other things being equal, men and women
receive different sentence types for the same crimes, we would expect
to see a negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient for
the female dummy in Equation 30. If these estimated coefficients
are statistically insignificant, we can conclude that it is unlikely that
differences in sentence types are due to gender. Similarly, to find
whether custodial sentence lengths depend on gender, Equation 31 is
estimated separately for each crime type as a PC-GOLOGIT model.
Lengthi = αi +Genderi +Agei +Offencei +PreviousConvictions
+ Seriousnessi + AggravatingFactorsij
+MitigatingFactorsik +GPDiscounti + i
(31)
The sentence length is, of course, only relevant for those offenders
sentenced to immediate custody and is therefore only estimated for
a subset of the individuals. The estimated coefficients should be
interpreted as the effects on sentence length conditional on receiving
a custodial sentence.
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3.5 Results
As explained in the previous section, the OLOGIT models relies
on the assumption of proportional odds and only estimates one set
of coefficients. Since this assumption is violated for every offence
type in the dataset5, the appropriate estimation model is the PC-
GOLOGIT regression, where only those variable which satisfy the
assumption are limited to one estimated coefficient. Using data
from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey, it is possible to control
for independent factors which include the offender’s age and gender,
the number of previous convictions, any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and the percentage discounted in length when a guilty
plea is entered. By using these controls, any significant differences
found between male and female offenders are less likely to be due
to differences in characteristics or circumstances, particularly in the
case of offenders who are the sole carer for children. Unfortunately,
as shown in Table 29, the percentage of offenders who are sole carers
is very low for almost all offence categories. This means that the
variable has very low predictive power and the model failed to run
in the software when it was included. Therefore, this variable is only
included for the offence type “theft and fraud” where 5.6% of male
offenders and 18.8% of female offenders are sole carers.
The detailed output tables for these estimated regressions are presen-
5Both the Brant test and the Likelihood ratio test are carried out
for every offence type and produce insignificant test statistics.
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ted in Appendix B.2, where models for sentence outcome and length
are estimated for each crime category. For arson and criminal dam-
age offences, the offence type regression output is shown in Table 30.
Starting with the variable of interest, the gender dummy, the estim-
ated coefficient is −0.555 for every level of the dependent variable.
It indicates that this particular variable does not violate the propor-
tional odds assumption and it is therefore appropriate to estimate
one coefficient rather than three. The estimate is also statistically
significant which tells us that, taking all other independent vari-
ables into account, being female reduces the odds that an offender
will receive a higher sentence type for arson and criminal damage
offences. Similar results can be found for assault offences in Table
32, burglary offences in Table 34, death offences in Table 36, driving
offences in Table 38, other offences in Table 42 and robbery offences
in Table 44.
For drug offences, shown in Table 40, three different coefficients are
estimated for the gender dummy with only two negative and signi-
ficant. The coefficient in the first column is 0.088 and insignificant,
which implies that being female does not affect the odds that the
sentence type will be higher than level one (community order, sus-
pended sentence or immediate custody), all other things being equal.
Similarly for theft and fraud offences, the estimated coefficient in the
first column is insignificant but the others are negative and signific-
ant. In Table 46, a positive and insignificant coefficient is estimated
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for the gender dummy at every level. A coefficient of 0.415 with
a p-value of 0.164 indicates that gender has no effect on the odds
of a particular type of sentence occurring. However, only 1.35% of
sexual offenders in the dataset are women6 which may mean that
the effect of gender on sentence outcome is not fully realised in the
model for this particular offence type.
In addition to the type of sentencing outcome, PC-GOLOGIT mod-
els are also used to analyse the effect of gender on the length of
immediate custodial sentences. The female dummy has a significant
estimated coefficient for four of the ten offence types and these are
all negative. These offence types are assault in Table 33, burglary
in Table 35, drugs in Table 41, robbery in Table 45 and theft and
fraud in Table 49. These estimates imply that, when an immedi-
ate custodial sentence is given for these offences, female offenders
are less likely to receive longer sentences than men, all other things
being equal. For the remaining offence types, the estimated coeffi-
cients are insignificant which implies that gender does not influence
sentence lengths for these crimes, although these do seem to be the
crime types for which the number of women receiving custodial sen-
tences is very low, sometimes in single digits, so it may be the case
the the effect of being female on sentence length is not fully realised.
Although these estimated coefficients are useful in suggesting the
sign and significance of the effects of gender, the magnitude of the
6See Table 27
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log odds are themselves difficult to interpret. A more intuitive way
of presenting these findings is to calculate the marginal effects, which
give the probability of a certain outcome, holding all other variables
constant. This provides a simpler way to compare effects across
crime types and allows us to interpret how likely each outcome is.
Detailed output tables showing the marginal effects for every crime
type are presented in Appendix B.3 in Tables 50 and 51. It is
clear from Table 50 that, all other variables being equal, female
offenders have a lower probability of receiving a custodial sentence
than men for almost all offence types. They only positive difference
shown is for Sexual offences, which may again be due to the small
number of female offenders in this offence category. The results show
consistently that women are more likely to receive lower sentence
types and less likely to receive custodial sentences. The “Difference”
column gives the χ2 statistic for the statistical significance of the
difference between the probabilities for men and women and the
corresponding p-value.
Table 51 presents the marginal effects for the estimated regression
models for sentence length, conditional on a custodial sentence. All
other variables being equal, the probability that a male or female
offender receives a custodial sentence of a particular length is given
for each offence type. For arson and criminal damage offences, for
example, the probability that a male offender will receive a sentence
up to 1 year long is 25%, whereas for a female the probability is
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only 12 %. From the results in this table, it is clear that for the
majority of offence categories women are less likely than men to
receive longer sentences and more likely to receive shorter sentences.
These probabilities are calculated while controlling for other factors
so the differences are unlikely to be due to different characteristics
or circumstances.
The probabilities presented in Table 50 are illustrated in Figure 7 to
demonstrate the persistence of the gender effect. Excluding sexual
offences, the probability that the sentence type is “otherwise dealt
with” is always higher for women and for men and vice versa for
immediate custodial sentences. This pattern also holds for sentence
lengths in the majority of offence types shown in Figure 8.
A unique feature of this analysis is the inclusion of several aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors which influence the Judges’ decisions. If
the offender’s gender influences this decision, it’s important to find
whether there is an interaction effect between gender and these other
influencing factors. However, when the female dummy is interacted
with each of the factors for each crime type, none of the estimated
coefficients are statistically significant7, insinuating that it is gender
alone and not the combination of gender and another factor, which
is driving the gender gap in sentencing. These insignificant results
are interesting in themself because it suggests that, if women are
7An example of these estimated coefficients for interaction terms
are illustrated for Arson and Criminal Damage in Table 52.
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receiving more lenient sentences than men, it is because they are
female and not because they are female with a particular mitigating
circumstance.
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Figure 7: Marginal Effects for Sentencing Outcomes
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Figure 8: Marginal Effects for Sentence Lengths
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3.6 Conclusions
Despite the various guidelines and regulations surrounding senten-
cing in England and Wales, there is still much discussion around
gender gaps and bias. Some argue that women commit the least
serious offences and pose the least risk to the public, so they should
therefore be offered non-custodial sentences, particularly in cases
where the offender is solely responsible for the care of children. How-
ever, others claim that women are already treated more leniently
than men by the Criminal Justice system, citing the vast gender
gap in the prison population and various news stories which show
women receiving low sentences.
The aim of the analysis in this chapter is to use a unique, individual-
level dataset to find whether there really is a gender gap in senten-
cing in England and Wales when other relevant factors are accounted
for. Controlling for other explanatory variables which influence the
Judge’s decision allows us to isolate the gender gap. For example,
if women are generally awarded shorter sentences because they care
for children, controlling for this should eliminate the gender gap in
the estimated model.
Others in economics have explored the possibility of disparities in
sentencing choices between male and female offenders but none have
used the far-reaching list of relevant factors used by the Crown Court
Sentencing Survey. The econometric analysis method used is a re-
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gression model designed specifically for ordered categorical depend-
ent variables and this model is employed to find the effect of gender
on sentence outcome and length.
The results from the empirical analysis show that the sentencing
outcomes for women are lower than for men even when aggravating
and mitigating factors are controlled for. Conditional on an offender
receiving a custodial sentence, women generally receive significantly
shorter sentences than men. The probability of receiving a custodial
sentence is significantly higher for men than for women for all offence
types except sexual offences. Conditional on receiving a custodial
sentence, the probability of receiving a longer sentence is signific-
antly higher for men than women for all offence types except sexual
and other offences.
Unlike a simple comparison of sentence lengths, these probabilities
control for all other factors and are calculated assuming mean values
of all other variables. It is important to keep in mind that there
may be unobserved variables not considered here which contribute
to the gap in sentencing, but the variables outlined in this dataset
are representative of all factors indicated on the Sentencing Survey
by the Judge.
There is potential for future work on this topic since the established
gender gap in sentencing naturally leads to the question of what
causes the gap. Judicial bias is one potential explanation which has
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been explored in some of the literature using US data. In order
to investigate this further for England and Wales, individual cases
would need to be grouped by Judge in order to analyse any sen-
tencing patterns and to determine whether taste-based or statistical
discrimination exists, similar to the analysis carried out by Park
[2014].
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4 THE SEVERITY OF ROAD TRAFFIC
ACCIDENTS
4.1 Introduction
In 2015, 22,144 people were seriously injured and 1,730 people were
killed in road traffic accidents in Great Britain [Department for
Transport, 2015]. In addition to the human cost of road traffic ac-
cidents, there are medical costs and lost output which contributed
to a total cost of £35,550 million. Table 9 shows the breakdown of
this cost by severity and cost type.
The aim of the research in this chapter is to analyse factors which af-
fect severity of accidents in Norfolk and Suffolk by using individual-
level accident data to identify groups of drivers who are most at risk
of being involved in a traffic accident. Several variables are found
to significantly effect the severity of an accident, including gender,
wearing a seatbelt and visibility. Drivers found to be most at risk
of being involved in an accident are those aged 17-39 and female
drivers over the age of 70.
These results would be useful for policy-makers when considering
which groups and situations to target with new interventions. It
allows us to focus on drivers most at risk as well as run campaigns
increasing awareness of behaviour that is likely to increase the sever-
ity of road traffic accidents.
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Table 9: Reproduced from Department for Transport Statistics
£ million (2015 prices)
Cost Elements
Casualty related costs Accident related costs
Accident Lost Medical Human Police Insurance Damage Total
Severity Output and Costs Costs and to
Ambulance Admin Property
Fatal 1,073 9 2,107 32 1 19 3,241
Serious 528 317 3,599 46 4 110 4,604
Slight 387 164 1,846 70 15 383 2,865
All injury 1,989 491 7,552 147 19 512 10,710
accidents
Damage only 0 0 0 81 125 4,370 4,577
accidents
Not reported 2,534 1,323 14,964 0 53 1,388 20,263
All accidents 4,523 1,814 22,516 229 197 6,270 35,550
4.2 Literature Review
Road traffic accidents have featured in many papers in the econom-
ics literature; why they happen and what we can do to prevent them
are key questions for policy-makers. There are several topics within
the literature which are relevant to this chapter, some which have
received very little attention from Economists. Firstly, in order to
decide how best to prevent car accidents, it is important to under-
stand what causes them in the first place. The word “accident”
implies that there is a certain degree of randomness in their occur-
rence as they are not the result of an individual’s behaviour but
rather an unwanted side effect [Fridstrom et al., 1995]. However,
there are many factors which are likely to contribute to the probab-
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ility of having an accident and these are explored in the following
papers.
In a recent government report, the authors analyse accident data for
Great Britain during the years 2000 to 2014, in order to investigate
whether there had been a significant change in the number of fatal
accidents during these years [Department for Transport, 2014]. By
comparing the observed frequency of fatal accidents with the fre-
quencies expected under the Poisson distribution, they show that
the number of “Fatal” road accidents in Great Britain does indeed
follow this distribution, which allows them to use statistical tests
when comparing observations in different years. The authors only
show that fatal accidents follow this distribution, the distribution
of all accidents is examined later in this chapter and are shown to
also follow a Poisson distribution, making it possible to test the
significance in frequency changes by calculating Poisson confidence
intervals. Given this information, the authors are able to calculate
95% confidence intervals for the fatal accident frequency in each
year. Whether these confidence intervals overlap or not is a fair
estimation of the significance or insignificance in the change in the
number of accidents.
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Figure 9: “Fatal” Road Accidents in Great Britain, 2000-2014, Reproduced from
Department for Transport [2014]
The objective for policy-makers in this area is to find ways to pre-
vent traffic accidents, or at least to reduce their severity. Several
different interventions are used across the country and many have
been evaluated in the literature. Most of these interventions can be
placed in one of the following three categories; enforcement, engin-
eering and education and each attempts to reduce traffic accidents.
Paola et al. [2010] use road accident data for Italy to estimate the
effectiveness of the introduction of a penalty point system in 2003 on
reducing traffic offences and accidents. They take advantage of this
national policy change by using a regression discontinuity design to
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measure the causal effect. They find that this change in policy was
very effective in reducing both accidents and offences.
In a similar study, Hashimoto [1979] aims to measure the impact of
police surveillance on the prevention of road traffic accidents. They
divide accidents into two categories, one where the driver was at
fault and one where the pedestrian was at fault, they then discard
accidents where the pedestrian was at fault in order to focus on the
effects of surveillance on driver behaviour. He calculates the prob-
ability of vulnerable behaviour by drivers (behaviour which could
result in a collision) and the conditional probability of a collision
occurring, given that vulnerable behaviour occurs. He finds that
the effectiveness of police surveillance depends on the type of colli-
sion. It has a positive impact for collisions which occur at pedestrian
crossings between a vehicle and a pedestrian and collisions that oc-
cur when the driver is turning right. It is less effective for rear-end
collisions, where the cause is often carelessness by the driver. The
author identifies two positive outcomes of police surveillance, (i) im-
proving the behaviour of the driver (which is temporary) and (ii)
increasing the driver’s alertness (which is a more durable effect).
Van Houten and Nau [1981] compare the effectiveness of two high-
way interventions on reducing speeding on two Highways in Nova
Scotia. The first is a large sign which displays the percentage of
drivers who didn’t speed during the previous week. The second
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was increased police surveillance and ticketing, which included vis-
ible road-side radars. The analysis finds that the first intervention is
very successful in reducing occurrences of speeding, while the second
is not successful. This is an interesting result as police surveillance
and ticketing required far more time and investment than displaying
the percentage of drivers who didn’t speed.
Drink-driving is also in important topic in accident prevention, Mer-
cer [1985] looks at data from British Columbia to analyse the rela-
tionship between the number of drink-driving road checks, the num-
ber of drivers impaired and the number of alcohol-related traffic ac-
cidents. By looking at correlations between these three events, he
finds that drink-driving road checks are only successful in reducing
the number of drink-driving related traffic accidents when they are
accompanied by wide-spread media coverage. However, they do not
find the extent of media coverage necessary to achieve this reduction
in accidents. Goss et al. [2008] find that police patrols have a slight
impact on reducing collisions caused by drink driving, although the
report highlights that academic literature in this area is very poor.
Speeding is often cited as a main cause of traffic accidents, Van Ben-
them [2015] examines the choice of a rational driver when deciding
at which speed to travel, by considering both the private and public
costs of increased speed. By considering many factors such as fuel
cost, pollution and the risk of an accident, he concludes that the
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optimal speed of travel on highways in the US is around 55mph and
therefore recommends that lowering the speed limit would reduce
the burden of these social costs.
There are also several papers which study the effectiveness of speed
cameras in reducing the frequency of road traffic accidents, which
generally agree that they are successful. Hirst et al. [2005] calculate
that for every 1mph speed reduction resulting for a speed camera,
there are 4% fewer accidents on that road for roads where the speed
limit is between 30-35mph, while Mountain et al. [2004] finds that a
speed camera on a 30mph road can reduce accidents for a distance
of 1km in each direction by 20%. Corrall, however, suggests that
speed cameras should be installed more widely in order to assess
their effectiveness more accurately, rather than focusing on “Killed
and Seriously Injured” (KSI) hotspots. These papers only analyse
the relationship for a narrow range of speed limits so the results
cannot be generalised to roads where vehicles are travelling more
quickly.
Li et al. [2013] use propensity score matching, rather than a simple
before-after analysis, for the introduction of speed cameras in the
UK in 1991. They find that speed cameras are most effective in
reducing accidents up to to a distance of 200m from the site. They
also find a lack of increased accidents before and after the speed
camera, which they take to imply that drivers are consistently re-
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ducing their speed, rather than decelerating and accelerating again
after the camera.
However, Blincoe et al. [2006] investigate attitudes towards speed
cameras in Norfolk by analysing questionnaire results from drivers,
split into four groups according to their driving and speeding beha-
viour. The research found that their is a prevalent speeding culture
and many drivers are unhappy about the use of speed cameras. A
limitation of the use of speed cameras seems to be that, according
to UK guidelines, cameras must be highly visible to drivers, so it is
very easy to slow down as you approach and speed up again when
you have passed. There may, of course, have been a self-selection
issue here as only 31% of drivers who were sent applications chose
to respond to the questionnaire.
A common complaint by the driving population is that speed cam-
eras are mainly used to generate revenue for the government. Tay
[2010] tries to find whether this is the case by analysing the effect-
iveness of ticketing over and above police presence, to find whether
raising revenue is really effective in reducing traffic accidents. The
author estimates a Poisson regression model and tests whether the
reduction in accidents due to ticketing is statistically significant.
He finds that both speed camera operating times and issuing speed-
ing tickets significantly reduce the number of accidents and advises
policy makers to expand these programmes in order to reduce them
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further.
It is generally assumed that increasing car safety reduces the severity
of car accidents. But Peltzman [1975] argues that drivers’ lives
saved by these improved safety devices are offset by an increase
in the number of pedestrian deaths and non fatal accidents. The
mechanism here is that, due to increased safety measures in cars,
drivers are willing to take more risks when driving and there are an
increased number of young and drunk drivers, both of whom have
an increased probability of having an accident.
However, Peltzman’s findings are rebutted two years later by Robertson
[1977], who claims that Peltzman failed to consider data which sup-
port the success of car safety measures in reducing the number of
accident related deaths. He corrects several apparent flaws in Peltz-
man’s analysis and comes to the conclusion that the introduction
of increased safety measures in the US in 1965 did reduce fatal ac-
cidents for drivers and motorcyclists and had no effect on pedes-
trian deaths. More recently, Traynor [2009] confirms this result by
showing that policies concerning restricted teen driving and drink-
driving significantly reduced the number of fatal accidents in the
US between the years 1999 and 2003. He does, however, find that
enforced wearing of seatbelts has a statistically insignificant effect
on accident fatalities which may be due to the fact that wearing a
seatbelt protects drivers and passengers whilst involved in a crash
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rather than preventing a crash. This result is not confirmed by the
analysis in this chapter, it is found that wearing a seatbelt signific-
antly reduces the probability of being involved in a fatal accident.
4.3 Data
The analysis in this chapter utilises an accident-level dataset for
road traffic accidents in Norfolk and Suffolk in the years 2005 to
2014. The datasets are extracted from Accident Report Forms and
contain information recorded at the time of an accident. These data
are converted to driver-level for some parts of the analysis in order to
identify driver characteristics. For every accident which is attended
by the police, an Accident Report Form is completed which gives
characteristics of the driver(s) involved and a detailed description
of the environmental factors such as the type of road and weather
conditions, these are outlined in Appendix C.1.
Driver characteristics included in the dataset are gender, age, eth-
nicity, breath test result, whether they were wearing a seatbelt and
whether or not they hold a UK driving licence. In addition to these
are several variables describing the environment and characteristics
of the accident itself including the condition of the road, visibility,
number of casualties, time of day, day of the week, road class and
type, speed limit and weather conditions. The outcome variable
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for this analysis is the severity of an accident, which is recorded
categorically as 1, 2 or 3 for the categories slight, severe and fatal
respectively.
In order to find whether the number of accidents has changed over
time, it is not enough to say that the number of accidents is lower in
one year than the previous year, it is necessary to identify significant
differences so as not to confuse natural variation in the data with
changes in accident frequency.
In a report by the Department for Transport [Department for Trans-
port, 2014], it is shown that the occurrence of fatal accidents follows
a Poisson distribution by calculating the expected number of fatal
accidents per day and comparing this with the observed number
of accidents. A similar result can be shown for all road accidents
in Norfolk and Suffolk by calculating the expected number of oc-
currences under the Poisson distribution and testing the statistical
significance of the deviations, the distribution for which is illustrated
in Figure 10.8
8See Table of χ2 significance tests in Appendix C.2
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Figure 10: Comparison of Simulated Poisson distribution with Observed Acci-
dents
The Poisson Distribution is a discrete probability distribution, for a
fixed time period it gives the probability that an event will occur a
given number of times. In this case, it gives the probability that a
certain number of accidents will occur during one day. An assump-
tion is made that the occurrence of one accident does not affect the
probability of a future accident occurring. The Poisson confidence
interval is given in Equation 32 where k is the observed number of
accidents and α is the significance level.
(32)
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Given the number of accidents that actually occurred during a par-
ticular year, month or day, 95% confidence intervals can be calcu-
lated. We can be 95% sure that the number of accidents would fall
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within this range for this particular time period. It follows then that
if these confidence intervals overlap for two time periods, we can-
not say for certain that there is a statistically significant difference
between the two frequencies. The frequency and Poisson confidence
intervals for Norfolk and Suffolk are shown in Figure 11 and it is
clear that there are very few statistically significant changes from
one year to the next for accidents or KSI accidents.
Figure 11: Road Traffic Accidents in Norfolk and Suffolk
4.4 Estimation Methodology
The severity level of an accident is recorded by the police as one of
three categories: slight, severe or fatal and this severity level is coded
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accordingly in the dataset. As such, the outcome variable for this
analysis is categorical rather than continuous. Further than this, the
numerical value assigned to each severity level is used to maintain
order rather than magnitude, a severe accident with a value of 2 is
not twice as bad as a slight accident with a value of 1. Therefore,
the outcome variable is an ordinal categorical variable and must be
treated differently to a continuous variable.
The OLS model is inappropriate for this type of variable since it
requires that the error terms are normal with constant variance.
This is not the case for ordered categorical variables as they are
non-continuous, bounded and cannot be measured on an interval or
ratio scale, leading to biased estimates as shown by Winship, C. &
Mare [1984] McKelvey and Zavoina [1975]. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to use a group of models specifically designed for this type of
dependent variable, known as Ordered Logistic Regression Models
(OLOGIT) or Proportional Odds Models. For this type of model,
the dependent variable has M discrete levels and M − 1 binary lo-
gistic regressions are estimated using grouped values of the depend-
ent variables. Table 10 illustrates an example where the dependent
variable has three levels and the model estimates two logistic re-
gressions. For the first regression, the dependent variable is equal
to 0 when Y = 1 and one when Y = 2 or 3, for the second it is
equal to 0 when Y = 1 or 2 and one when Y = 3. Accordingly, the
estimated coefficients are the effect of a change in the confounding
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factors on the odds that Y = 2 or 3 in the first regression and Y = 3
in the second.When using this type of model, it is necessary to first
estimate an OLOGIT model and test whether heteroskedasticity in
the errors is causing the proportional odds assumption to be viol-
ated. If heteroskedasticity is present, the next step is to estimate a
Heterogeneous Choice Model (HCM). However, if the proportional
odds assumption is still violated when the HCM is estimated, the
Generalised Ordered Logistic Regression model (GOLOGIT) should
be used to account for this.
Table 10: Ordered Logistic Regression Example
Logistic Regression Dep. var = 0 if... Dep. var = 1 if...
1 Y = 1 Y = 2 or 3
2 Y = 1 or 2 Y = 3
Ordered Logistic Regression Model
Equation 33 gives the OLOGIT model as described by Williams
[2016], where j = 1, ...,M is again the number of levels for the
dependent variable and Xi is a vector of observed explanatory vari-
ables. As described in Table 10, a set of logistic regressions is used
to find the effect on the odds that the dependent variable has a value
higher or lower than a particular cut off. To estimate an OLOGIT
model, the proportional odds assumption must be met, which re-
quires that the estimated log odds are the same regardless of the
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cut off. As can be seen in Equation 33, α and β do not have a j
subscript, since only one set of coefficients is estimated.
(33)P (Yi > j) =
exp (α +Xiβ)
1 + [exp (α +Xiβ)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
In practice, this assumption is very strong and violation can be
tested for in two ways. The Brant test uses the idea that, if the pro-
portional odds assumption holds, the estimated coefficients should
not be significantly different from one logistic regression to the next.
It calculates a χ2 statistic for each explanatory variable and one for
all, showing which, if any, violate the assumption. If the overall test
is insignificant, OLOGIT is the appropriate model. If, however, the
overall test is significant, the individual tests can be used to identify
which explanatory variables do not meet the assumption, that is
their estimated coefficients differ across regressions. The second way
to test for violation is the Likelihood Ratio Test, which is similar
to the Brant test but tests the assumption by estimating the model
given by Equation 33 and the generalised model given by Equation
34 and comparing the goodness of fit for each. Again, an insignific-
ant test statistic implies that the proportional odds assumption is
not violated.
Estimated coefficients for factor variables are interpreted as the
change in log odds when the value of the variables deviates from
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the baseline. For example, the baseline for Ethnicity is “White”, so
the estimated coefficient for “Asian” represents how much more or
less likely an Asian driver is to have a serious accident than a White
driver.
Generalised Ordered Logistic Regression Model
Equation 34 gives the model for the Generalised Ordered Logit Re-
gression (GOLOGIT), of which OLOGIT is a special case. As can
be seen in the model, the proportional odds assumption is relaxed
and a separate set of coefficients is estimated for each logistic re-
gression. This model is suitable when the above tests indicate that
the assumption for OLOGIT is not met.
(34)P (Yi > j) =
exp (αj +Xiβj)
1 + [exp (αj +Xiβj)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
The disadvantage of this, however, is that there are now M − 1
sets of coefficients to interpret and work with, rather than just one.
The most commonly used model is a mixture of the two discussed
called the Partially Constrained Generalised Ordered Logit Regres-
sion (PC-GOLOGIT) [Williams, 2006, 2016, Long, 1997]. Equation
35 gives an example of the model given by Williams [2016], where
the estimated coefficients β1 and β2 are constrained and β3 is un-
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constrained. This model is often the most appropriate in practice as
it can accommodate both OLOGIT and GOLOGIT models where
needed.
(35)P (Yi > j) =
exp (αj +X1iβ1 +X2iβ2 +X3iβ3j)
1 + [exp (αj +X1iβ1 +X2iβ2 +X3iβ3j)]
, j
= 1, 2, ...,M − 1
Heterogeneous Choice Model
The Heterogeneous Choice Model (HCM) is explained in Williams
[2006], Williams [2010] and Williams [2016] and allows for heteroske-
dasticity. If an OLOGIT model is estimated and the error variances
are assumed to be constant, the standard errors will be wrong and
the estimated parameters will be biased [Williams, 2010]. Williams
[2010] explains that an ordered categorical dependent variable in an
OLOGIT regression is treated as a collapsed version of an underly-
ing continuous variable, which means that the estimated coefficients
are approximations of the true coefficients and have a relationship
with the error variance. When this variance is constant, we have
homoskedasticity and proportional odds, as the coefficients are the
same for pairs of outcomes. However, when these error variances are
not constant, there is heteroskedasticity and the proportional odds
assumption may no longer be met.
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One way of dealing with this problem is to estimate an HCM, using
the variables highlighted by the LR and Brant tests. By specify-
ing which variables are likely to be causing heteroskedasticity, the
estimated model allows the error variance for these variables to vary.
4.5 Results
Ordered Logistic Regression
The first estimated regression model is the OLOGIT model, the
results for which are shown in Table 55 in Appendix C.3. Factors
estimated to increase the odds of having a more serious accident
at the 5% significance level are a positive breath test, not wearing
a seatbelt, mixed ethnicity, driving in the dark, increased number
of casualties, driving on a road with a higher speed limit, driving
on a weekday, increased number of OAPS and increased number of
pedestrians. Factors estimated to reduce the odds of having a more
serious accident are being female, not having a driving licence, frosty
or icy conditions, being on a slip road and raining with high winds.
However, for these estimated coefficients to carry any weight, the
proportional odds assumption must not be violated. Table 56 in
Appendix C.3 shows the Likelihood ratio test, which indicates that
the assumption is violated since the χ2 statistic is statistically sig-
nificant at 34.71 with a p-value equal to 0.015. Similarly, the Brant
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test in Table 57 has a significant χ2 test statistic of 30.77 with the
p-value 0.014, also indicating that at least one variable in the OLO-
GIT model violates the assumption.
These results imply that the effect of a change in the independent
variable is not the same for an increase from slight to severe as it
is for severe to fatal, all pairs of groups do not have the same rela-
tionship. The Brant test can be used to identify which independent
variables may be violating this assumption, as these too will have
significant estimates. These variables can be specified in an es-
timation model which allows heteroskedasticity, the Heterogeneous
Choice Model. Table 57 shows that the variables with a significant
test statistic are the number of vehicles, gender, breath test result
and visibility.
Heterogeneous Choice Model
The regression output for the HCM model is shown in Table 58 in
Appendix C.39. Driver age and number of casualties involved in the
accident have significant Lnsigma estimates, which indicates that
these independent variables may be causing heteroskedasticity in
the OLOGIT model. This result differs from the results found by
Quddus et al. [2010], who conclude that the number of vehicles and
9The variable “Road Class” has been dropped for both the HCM
and GOLOGIT models as it prevented them from running
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the number of casualties are likely to be causing heteroskedasticity
in the model. However, although this estimation model controls for
heteroskedasticity, it does not control for other possible causes of
violation of the proportional odds assumption. In order to account
for this violation, it is necessary to use a GOLOGIT model.
Generalised Ordered Logistic Regression Model
The OLOGIT model is a special case of the GOLOGIT model when
every independent variable is constricted to meeting the propor-
tional odds assumption, therefore the results of the constrained GO-
LOGIT model in Table 59 in Appendix C.3 are almost identical to
the OLOGIT results in Table 55. As shown by the LR and Brant
tests, this model is too restrictive and does not allow for different
estimated coefficients at different levels. To allow for this, the pro-
portional odds assumption is relaxed in an unconstrained model and
the estimated coefficients are allowed to differ between levels for the
same variable, the results for which are shown in Table 60. The
ideal model, however, is a mixture of the two where estimates are
constrained when the difference between them is not statistically
significant and the results for this partially constrained model are
presented in Table 61 in Appendix C.3. An LR test now gives an
insignificant test statistic indicating that the final model does not
violate the parallel lines assumption.
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The independent variables for which the estimated coefficient is stat-
istically significant at the 5% level are the number of gender, a pos-
itive breath test, wearing a seatbelt, not having a driving licence,
mixed ethnicity10, frost or ice on the road, dark with no lighting,
a higher number of casualties, having an accident on a slip road,
increased speed limit, rain with high winds and having an accident
on a weekday, higher number of OAPs and higher number of pedes-
trians.
The estimated coefficients are in the form of log odds, which can
be difficult to interpret . Table 64 in Appendix C.3 presents the
marginal effects which give the probability of a particular outcome
occurring for each possible value of a variable. Figure 12 shows
that for any individual who has a road accident, there is an 85%
chance that it will be slight, 13% chance that it will be severe and
2% chance that it will be fatal.
10It is possible that the small sample size for this group has resulted
in a significant estimate rather than a causal relationship as it seems
unlikely that mixed ethnicity would affect the severity of an accident.
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Figure 12: Marginal Effects
The robustness of the model is tested by estimating the partially
constrained GOLOGIT model for the years 2005-2009 and 2010-
2014. The main drawback of the GOLOGIT model is that it can
estimate unusually high coefficients and negative p-values when a
category has very few observations. This problem has occurred in
the 2005 - 2009 model and has affected the estimates for several
variables, for example, the second estimated coefficient for Ethnicity
= Black is 5,870,000,000. However, the majority of estimates appear
to be robust to the time sample. The estimated coefficients are also
similar to those estimated in previous models, as shown in Table 62
in Appendix C.3.
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While the analysis in this chapter identifies factors which have an ef-
fect in isolation, the analysis in the next chapter uses classification
and regression tree analysis (CART) to identify groups of factors
which interact to have a significant effect. Due to the large number
of identified groups, it is not possible to include all of them as inter-
actions in the PC-Gologit model, however Table 65 illustrates the
estimated coefficients when two of the groups are included. These
are “OAPS & casualties” and “OAPs, casualties and pedestrians”.
The addition of these interactions does not affect the sign or signi-
ficance of the other estimations. The estimated coefficient for the
first group is insignificant, whereas the estimated coefficient for the
second group is negative and significant. The proportional odds as-
sumption does not hold for this group as the estimated coefficient
for the first model is −4.778 and for the second model is −7.698.
Chi Squared Goodness of Fit Test
The Chi-squared Goodness of Fit test is used to test whether the
observed proportion of accidents involving a particular age group
is significantly different from the proportion expected. However,
simply comparing the driving age distribution in Norfolk and Suffolk
with the age distribution of drivers involved in accident may give
misleading results. Drivers in different age groups also tend to drive
different average distances over a year and it is reasonable to expect
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that the chances of having an accident are higher when a driver
spends more time driving.
It is necessary, therefore, to weight the expected proportion of acci-
dents by the average distance driven by an age group in that year.
The figures for England for the years 2005 - 2013 are given in Table
1111.
Table 11: Average Annual Distances in England
Average miles/
person/year 17-20 21-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+
2005 1,801 3,805 5,745 6,307 5,871 4,114 1,861
2006 1,595 3,943 5,943 6,235 5,891 4,110 1,741
2007 1,828 4,235 5,579 6,428 5,795 4,115 1,702
2008 1,820 3,563 5,373 6,208 5,611 3,846 1,776
2009 1,719 3,608 4,874 5,593 5,295 3,957 1,783
2010 1,399 3,338 5,237 5,992 5,662 4,004 1,765
2011 1,338 3,375 5,045 5,987 5,585 4,158 1,872
2012 1,508 2,968 4,837 5,795 5,521 4,314 1,957
2013 1,249 3,274 4,643 5,659 5,321 4,116 1,905
Assuming that these distances are a good approximation for the
average distances driven in Norfolk and Suffolk, the driving popu-
lation is used to calculate the total number of miles driven per year
for each age group, and this, as a proportion of the total number of
miles driven in Norfolk and Suffolk, is the proportion of accidents
which would be expected to involve a driver from that age group.
Figure 22a shows that drivers aged 17-20 have consistently been
11These distances are calculated using the Na-
tional Travel Survey dataset which can be found at
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-travel-
survey-statistics.
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involved in far more accidents than expected given the average dis-
tance driven by this age group. These large differences are shown
to be statistically significant in Table 67, as the χ2 statistic is ex-
tremely large and the p-value is equal to zero for every year. Figure
22b shows the expected and observed accident percentages for male
and female drivers aged 17-20. Observed accidents are, again, shown
to be significantly higher each year than expected, but it is also clear
that female drivers in this age group are expected to and observed to
have fewer accidents than males. This is due to the fact that female
drivers in this age group drive for a shorter distance, on average,
during each year than male drivers in the same age group.
Figure 23a shows that drivers aged 21-29 have also consistently ex-
ceeded the expected proportion of accidents during the years 2005 -
2013 and the difference is significant. Figure 23b shows that, again,
observed accidents are shown to be higher each year than expec-
ted, but it is also clear that female drivers in this age group are
expected to and observed to have fewer accidents than males. This
is due to the fact that female drivers in this age group drive for a
shorter distance, on average, during each year than male drivers in
the same age group. Table 68 shows the χ2 statistics are statistically
significant for all years.
Figure 24a shows that drivers aged 30-39 are also involved in a
larger proportion of road accidents than expected, but by less than
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the younger age groups. The differences shown in Figure 24b are
larger, now, for male drivers than for females in this age group.
The χ2 tests in Table 69 show that the difference between observed
and expected accident proportions are not statistically significant in
2005, 2006 or 2008 for all drivers. The difference for male drivers
is not statistically significant in 2006 and for female drivers, the
difference is insignificant in 2006 and 2008.
Figure 25a shows that drivers aged 40-49 are involved in fewer ac-
cidents than expected, given the average annual distance driven in
this age group. Again, female driver are expected to and observed
to be involved in fewer accidents than males, this is shown in Figure
25b. Despite being relatively small, Table 70 shows that all differ-
ences between expected and observed proportions are statistically
significant for this age group.
Drivers aged 50-59 are shown in Figure 26a to have far fewer acci-
dents than expected, this trend is consistent throughout the time
period. Figure 26b shows that these differences are larger for male
drivers than for females, but all differences are, again, shown to be
statistically significant in Table 71.
Figure 27a shows that drivers aged 60-69 have fewer accidents than
expected, but it is clear from Figure 27b that this difference is driven
by male drivers in this age group. Female drivers show very little
difference between expected and observed accidents and these dif-
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ferences are shown to be insignificant for the years 2005 - 2011. The
difference for females is, however, significant for the years 2012 and
2013, mainly due to the factor that the number of female drivers in
this age group increased during these years and, therefore, the num-
ber of expected accidents has also increased. All other differences
in Table 72 are significant.
Figure 28a misleadingly implies that drivers over 70 years old con-
sistently have more than the expected number of accidents each
year. However, Figure 28b shows that this is solely driven by the
number of accidents involving female drivers in this age group. The
differences for male drivers are shown in Table 73 to be insignificant
for most years, but significant for female drivers.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter uses econometric analysis to study the severity of traffic
accidents in Norfolk and Suffolk during the years 2005 - 2014. OLO-
GIT models are used to estimate the effect of independent variables
on the severity of an accident, as severity is an ordered, categor-
ical variable. Using a Likelihood Ratio test and a Brant test, it is
shown that the baseline model violates the proportional odds as-
sumption and contains variables which may be causing heteroske-
dasticity. These problems can be tackled by using a Heterogeneous
100
Choice Model or a Partially-Constrained Generalised Ordered Lo-
gistic Model, which estimate similar coefficients. These results show
that several independent variables have a statistically significant ef-
fect on the severity of accidents, the largest of which are a positive
breath test, not wearing a seatbelt and crashing on a slip road.
Three variables are found to have different effects depending on the
level of severity: number of vehicles, driving in the dark with lights
lit and driving in the dark with no lights. Log odds and marginal
effects are reported in order to facilitate interpretation of the mag-
nitude of these estimates.
Two example interaction terms are introduced to the estimated
model in Table 65 to illustrate the relationship between this regres-
sion model and the CART analysis presented in the next chapter.
The first of these two groups involves the factors “OAPs” and “cas-
ualties”. The results from the CART analysis, illustrated on page
118, show that for the groups of drivers involved in accidents in
which the number of OAPs is fewer than or equal to 1 and the num-
ber of casualties is more than 5, 37 out of 54 were severely injured as
opposed to slightly or fatally. When the interaction between OAPs
and casualties is included in the regression in Table 65, the estim-
ated coefficient is insignificant. This is not surprising, since the
interaction term is showing the combined effect of a higher number
of OAPs and a higher number of casualties, which is not what is be-
ing shown in the CART analysis. For the second group, the results
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from CART show that for groups of drivers involved in accidents in
which the number of OAPs is fewer than or equal to 1, the number
of casualties is fewer than or equal to 5 and the number of pedestri-
ans is greater than 0, 32 out of 47 are severely injured rather than
slightly or fatally. It is also important to remember that not all
of the interactions found by CART are included in the regression,
which may affect the estimated coefficients. These results highlight
the difference between these two methods of analysis and this is
discussed further in the next chapter.
In addition to regression analysis, a Chi-Squared Goodness of fit
test is carried out for the age group and gender of drivers involved
in traffic accidents. By using the average distances driven by certain
groups, it is possible to estimate the proportion of accidents that
are expected to involve certain drivers and compare this with the
observed proportions in order to identify those groups that are most
at risk of being involved in a crash. Simply looking at an age group
as a whole can be misleading, particularly in the case of drivers
aged 70+, who appear at first to exceed their expected accident
proportion every year in the analysis period. However, when split
by gender, it becomes clear that male drivers in this age group
actually have fewer accidents than expected, while female drivers
are involved in more than double the number of accidents expected
given their average distance driven. The groups identified as most
at risk are all drivers aged 17 to 39 and female drivers aged 70+.
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All other groups are involved in significantly fewer accidents given
their average distances.
The results found in this chapter indicate that there is a strong need
for targetted policies to discourage drivers from acting in such a way
that increases the probability of being killed or seriously injured if
they are involved in an accident. The second part of the analysis
identifies specific demographic groups, namely those ages 17 to 39
and females over the age of 70, who are involved in the highest
number of accidents per mile driven. These groups could also be
targetted by campaigns to increase their awareness of road safety in
the hope that this reduces the number of road traffic accidents.
103
5 IDENTIFYING GROUPS AT RISK OF KSI
ACCIDENTS USING CLASSIFICATION
AND REGRESSION TREE ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
The aim of the research in this chapter is to identify driver char-
acteristics and environmental factors which affect the severity of a
road traffic accident. Several combinations of variables are found to
make severe and fatal accidents more likely and these are represen-
ted as leaves on the final decision tree. This type of model would
be beneficial to the police as they can identify groups of drivers
and circumstances which are most at risk of KSI accidents. Acci-
dent prevention policy can then be targetted and may be more cost
effective than blanket policies.
Classification and regression tree (CART) analysis has been adop-
ted by other disciplines such as medicine and psychology, but is
not explored much in economics. This type of analysis lends itself
well to datasets with several categorical variables and is also good at
handling interactions in addition to heterogeneity. CART are, there-
fore, well suited to economic analysis since these are often traits of
real-world datasets. The output of CART is an intuitive decision
tree which can be easily interpreted by both academics and non-
academics, an example of which is shown in Figure 13. The analysis
contributes to the economics literature by employing a novel tech-
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nique, which is not used in many papers, to identify groups who are
most are at risk of KSI accidents.
Figure 13: Example Classification Tree
5.2 Literature Review
The use of CART relies heavily on the algorithm with which the
model is built and the analysis in this chapter uses the C5.0 al-
gorithm developed by Quinlan [1993], which is discussed in detail
in subsection 5.4. This method of analysis, however, seems to be
missing from the economics literature and has not been used in any
similar analyses.
Due to the versatility and user-friendly nature of this method of ana-
lysis, it is used in the medical literature, particularly when designing
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predictive models of mortality rates. Austin [2007] uses a dataset for
hospital patients in Ontario and compares the results of CART ana-
lysis with a traditional logistic regression. He finds, however, that
the predictions of the logistic regression are more accurate than the
classification tree.
In Psychology, Tonkin et al. [2012] compare the use of CART with
logistic regressions when building predictive models for case linkage.
They use two different samples, one for burglaries in Finland and
one for car thefts in the UK, and run a binary logistic regression and
CART for each. Like Austin [2007], the authors also find that the
tree is less robust than the logistic regression when discriminating
between outcome types for the burglary dataset, but the predictive
accuracy of the tree model performs well when compared to logistic
regression for car theft data.
5.3 Data
This chapter uses a driver-level dataset compiled by Norfolk and
Suffolk police from road traffic accidents during the years 2005 to
2014. Police reports are used to record the driver characteristics
and environmental factors surrounding an accident and the details
of these variables are described in Appendix C.1. The dataset in-
cludes driver characteristics such as gender, age, ethnicity, breath
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test result, whether they were wearing a seatbelt and whether or
not they hold a UK driving licence. Additionally, several variables
are included to describe the environment and characteristics of the
accident itself including the condition of the road, visibility, number
of casualties, time of day, day of the week, road class and type, speed
limit and weather conditions. The outcome variable for this analysis
is the severity of an accident, which is recorded categorically as 1, 2
or 3 for the categories slight, severe and fatal respectively.
Figures 14 to 17 show the location of KSI accidents in Norfolk and
Suffolk for these years. These maps have been produced using Geo-
graphical Systems Information (GIS) software.
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Figure 14: Fatal Accidents in Norfolk: 2005 - 2014 (Accident data for Norfolk
and Suffolk)
Figure 15: Serious Accidents in Norfolk: 2005 - 2014 (Accident data for Norfolk
and Suffolk)
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Figure 16: Fatal Accidents in Suffolk: 2005 - 2014 (Accident data for Norfolk
and Suffolk)
Figure 17: Serious Accidents in Suffolk: 2005 - 2014 (Accident data for Norfolk
and Suffolk)
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5.4 Estimation Methodology
Classification and regression tree modelling (CART) is a method
of analysis used in data-mining which seeks to predict the outcome
of future events based on the characteristics of past events. There
are several algorithm options, all of which create splits in the group
of observations and create a tree. There are several advantages to
using this type of model, particularly when analysing categorical
variables, as is often the case when the data are derived from forms
or surveys. The repeated splitting of observations into groups is
most natural for categorical variables which can be split into clearly
defined categories. An additional benefit of CART over traditional
regressions is that they work well with interactions, for example a
fatal accident may be more likely if a driver is both a certain age
and driving a certain speed. These interactions can be difficult to
include in regressions since there are so many possibilities to con-
sider. In a CART model, however, the nature of the tree means that
interactions are automatically included if they are optimal without
having to specify them.
The classification tree estimated in this chapter uses the C5.0 al-
gorithm, a descendant of C4.5 which was developed by Quinlan
[1993]. Like many decision tree algorithms, it is based on informa-
tion entropy and each node contains a test which splits the data in
such a way that the normalised information gain is maximised. As
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explained by Salzberg [1994], in his review of Quinlan’s book, the
optimal test at any node in the tree would be one which splits the
observations so that each subset contains only one class. However,
since this almost never occurs in practice, the role of the splitting
algorithm is to come as close to this as possible.
The C5.0 algorithm is explained by Quinlan [1993] and starts with
a training dataset, a subset of the original dataset on which the
model is built in order to predict the outcomes of the remaining
observations. Any random subset of this training set is denoted S
and the class of an observation is Cj. Information theory states
that the information conveyed by a message is measured in bits, as
in Equation 36. If |S| denotes the number of observations in subset
S and freq(Cj, S) denotes the number of observations in subset S
which belong to class Cj, then the information conveyed by any
random observation is given by Equation 37.
(36)−log2(probability) bits
(37)−log2freq(Cj, S)|S| bits
The aim of the splitting algorithm is to maximise the information
gain in the subset, S, with respect to the class, Cj, to which observa-
tions belong. This is also known as the entropy of the subset and is
calculated using Equation 38, weighting the information conveyed
by an observation by the probability that it belongs to class Cj.
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Therefore, if the training set, T , is split into subsets using a test, X,
the expected information requirement can be found as a weighted
sum over all subsets, which is given by Equation 39. Equation 40
illustrates the overall information gain from splitting T into subsets
using test X.
(38)info(S) =
k∑
j=1
freq(Cj, S)
|S| × −log2
freq(Cj, S)
|S| bits
(39)infoX(T ) =
n∑
i=1
|Ti|
T
× info(T )
(40)gain(X) = info(T )− infoX(T )
The role of the C5.0 algorithm is to calculate this information gain
for all possible tests, X, and choose the one by which it is maximised.
Once a test has been chosen, the algorithm will repeat this process
at each node until the subset contains observations from a single
class or a single observation. Since this may result in a very large
tree, various rules are often put in place to halt the algorithm at an
earlier stage.
For this analysis, the accident-level dataset was converted to driver-
level in order to analyse the effect of driver characteristics in addition
to factors surrounding the accident on the severity of an accident.
Although classification trees are used to predict the outcome of fu-
ture events, the primary purpose of the analysis in this chapter is
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to identify groups and situations where the risk of more severe road
traffic accidents is higher and this is done by building a model which
has predictive power for a test dataset.
The driver-level dataset for Norfolk and Suffolk contains 76, 334
records, for which the accident severity, driver characteristics and
other confounding factors are recorded. In order to avoid selection
bias, half of the dataset is selected at random to create the training
set on which to build the model and the other half is reserved for
testing when the model is complete. The training set, therefore,
contains 38,167 observations which belong to one of three severity
classes: slight, severe or fatal.
As discussed by Quinlan [1993], the test which maximises the in-
formation gain is chosen at each stage in order to create the next
set of branches. A test for a continuous variable often comes in
the form of an inequality and for a categorical variable, branches
represent one or more classes within that category.
5.5 Results
One of the advantages of the software is the choice of settings and
adjustments which can be made when designing the tree. The first
decision to make is the proportion of the data which should be used
as the training set and consequently how large the test set should
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be, which is the set of observations on which the model will be
tested. A percentage error will be calculated to show the proportion
of observations for which the outcome variable class in incorrectly
predicted. As shown in Figure 18, the percentage of observations
used in the training set affects both the size of the tree produced
and the percentage of incorrectly predicted observation classes. As
the size of the training set increases, so too does the size of the
tree and the percentage error falls. There is, therefore, a trade-off
between producing a small tree which is easy to interpret and over-
fitting the model to the dataset in order to achieve a low percentage
error. The majority of papers who use this analysis method settle
on using 50% of the dataset in order to strike a balance between
these two objectives and this is the training set size which is used
in this chapter.
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Figure 18: The Effect of the Size of the Training Set
Quinlan [1993] explains that repetitive splitting of observations in
a non-trivial way will always result in single-class leaves eventu-
ally, but the aim of designing a model is to produce a tree which is
small enough to interpret with the minimum percentage error pos-
sible. With this in mind, Table 12 illustrates the tree size and the
percentage error when the minimum number of cases per leaf is re-
stricted. This is a form of “pre-pruning”, where a decision is made
about the size of the tree before it is run. By increasing the number
of minimum cases to eight, the size of the tree becomes manageable
without much of an effect on the percentage error.
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Table 12: Minimum Cases
Minimum Cases Tree Size Percentage Error
1 273 16.1%
2 210 16.1%
3 198 16.2%
4 108 16.1%
5 95 15.9%
6 57 16.4%
7 46 16.5%
8 27 16.3%
The result of this process is the classification tree on page 119 which,
when tested on the test dataset, correctly predicts the severity of ac-
cidents for 83.7% of observations. At each node is a variable, either
categorical or continuous, and it is followed by a set of branches, each
with a result of the test which leads to the next node. For example,
the first node is concerned with the number of old aged pension-
ers (OAPs) involved in the accident and splits into two branches
depending whether there were fewer than or equal to one OAP in-
volved or more than one. These tests continue along each branch
until a leaf is reached, which is represented as an oval. Each leaf
gives the class to which the majority of observations in the subset
belong and the ratio to other classes. The interpretation for the
first branch is as follows: in an accident where 0 or 1 OAPs are
involved and there are more than 5 casualties, 37 out of 54 drivers
were involved in a severe accident and therefore any drivers who
meet these conditions in the future would also be predicted to have
a severe accident rather than slight or fatal.
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Table 13: Evaluation on Test Data
Classified as
Fatal Severe Slight
Actual
Fatal 19 20 772
Severe 6 120 5465
Slight 13 61 32481
Errors: 16.3%
The accuracy of the decision tree is illustrated in Table 13 which
shows that, when used to predict the outcome of the observations in
the test dataset, 16.3% are incorrectly predicted. The observations
along the diagonal show cases which are correctly predicted, for
example there were 19 cases which were classified as fatal and were,
in fact, fatal. Off the diagonal are the cases which are incorrectly
predicted, for example there are 13 cases which were classified as
fatal but were really slight. The error percentage is calculated as
the percentage of total predictions which are incorrect, which is
illustrated in Equation 41.
(41)
[
(20 + 772 + 6 + 5465 + 13 + 61)
(19 + 20 + 772 + 6 + 120 + 5465 + 13 + 61 + 32481)
]
∗ 100
= 16.3%
As mentioned above, the predictive power of this type of model is
useful in some contexts, however the objective of this chapter is to
identify those groups of characteristics and environmental factors
which put drivers at most risk of being involved in a KSI accident.
As illustrated by the classification tree, there is only one leaf contain-
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ing observations where the majority are fatal and these observations
share the following characteristics: more than one OAP involved,
one or no cycles involved, more than two casualties, zero pedestri-
ans, speed limit over 40mph, either a dual carriageway, one way
street or a single carriageway, more than five casualties and more
than five vehicles.
There are several important points to keep in mind when inter-
preting the results of a classification tree. The first is that this is
not the only combination of factors which will result in a fatal ac-
cident, there may be drivers in other leaves who fall into the same
class. The classification merely shows that the majority of this group
were involved in a fatal accident and also share these characterist-
ics. Another point to keep in mind is that the results do refer to
combinations of factors, which is different to the marginal effects
of individual variables found in regression analysis. For example, a
speed limit which is over 40mph only increases the probability of an
accident being fatal when combined with the other relevant factors.
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5.6 Conclusions
The aim of this analysis is to identify combinations of factors which
increase the risk that drivers will experience severe or fatal injuries
when involved in an accident. This is a novel approach in the eco-
nomics literature and has not been used to identify factors which
affect the severity of road accidents.
Unlike the regression analysis in the previous chapter, CART iden-
tifies groups of factors which affect the severity of accidents rather
than single variables in isolation. As discussed in the literature, this
method is not necessarily superior to traditional regression analysis,
rather it offers a different way of looking at the relationships by
classifying them in a non-linear way.
Several combinations of factors are found to increase the risk of
severe or fatal accidents, indicating that there are specific groups
which could be the focus of policies aimed at reducing the severity
of future accidents.
Expansion of this work could be carried out if similar datasets are
made available for other police force areas in England and Wales.
The model can be tested on them to find whether it works well
when applied to other geographical areas. A more generalisable
model could be developed if the training set included observations
from different areas.
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A RISK PREFERENCES OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS AND THE GENDER
PARTICIPATION GAP IN CRIME
A.1 Variable Descriptions
Table 14: Offence Categories
Offence Group Includes
Robbery Robbery
Attempted robbery
Snatch Theft Snatch theft from the person
Theft from the person
(TFTP)
Other theft from the person
Attempted theft from the person
Domestic Burglary Attempted burglary to non-connected domestic
garage/outhouse
Burglary in a dwelling (nothing taken)
Burglary in a dwelling (something taken)
Attempted burglary in a dwelling
Theft from a dwelling
(TFAD)
Theft in a dwelling
Theft from a meter
Domestic burglary in an
outhouse (DBOH)
Burglary from non-connected domestic garage/outhouse -
nothing taken
Burglary from non-connected domestic
garage/outhouse - something taken
Vehicle-related thefts Theft of car/van
Theft from car/van
Theft of motorbike, motor scooter or moped
Theft from motorbike, motorscooter or moped
Attempted theft of/from car/van
Attempted theft of/from motorcycle, motorscooter or
moped
Theft of pedal cycle
Theft from outside
dwelling (TFOD)
Theft from outside dwelling
Other personal theft Other personal theft
Criminal Damage Arson
Criminal damage to a motor vehicle (£20 or under)
Criminal damage to a motor vehicle (over £20)
Criminal damage to the home (£20 or under)
Criminal damage to the home (over £20)
Other criminal damage (£20 or under)
Other criminal damage (over £20)
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A.2 Regression Output
Table 16: Earnings Risk Regression
Earnings Risk Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Female -0.213*** 0.004 -58.95 0.000
Age=16-24 -0.398*** 0.006 -67.95 0.000
Age=25-39 -0.390*** 0.006 -64.02 0.000
Age=40+ 0.042*** 0.006 6.60 0.000
Drug Influence -0.161*** 0.004 -45.52 0.000
Drink Influence 0.276*** 0.004 74.41 0.000
Rel=Family -1.107*** 0.007 -152.23 0.000
Rel=Friend -1.381*** 0.007 -201.30 0.000
Rel=Acquain. -0.542*** 0.007 -81.25 0.000
Rel=F. Spouse -1.306*** 0.007 -196.20 0.000
Race=Black -0.239*** 0.006 -38.56 0.000
Race=Asian -0.365*** 0.007 -51.18 0.000
Weapon 0.803*** 0.007 119.02 0.000
Contact -0.148*** 0.005 -29.91 0.000
Force -0.149*** 0.004 -36.15 0.000
Threaten 0.534*** 0.004 135.20 0.000
Sexual -0.351*** 0.009 -39.40 0.000
Knew Offender 0.036*** 0.007 5.47 0.000
Street Gang -0.013* 0.007 -1.79 0.074
Time=Night 0.537*** 0.003 172.55 0.000
Weekend -0.235*** 0.003 -72.31 0.000
Constant -144.529*** 1.687 -85.65 0.000
Observations 1,648,827
Prob>F 0.000
R Squared 0.1306
Year Dummies Yes
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A.3 Tests for Multicollinearity
Table 17: Variance Inflation Factors
Variable Log Earnings Earnings Risk
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Female 1.26 0.80 1.12 0.90
Age = 16 - 24 3.17 0.32 3.62 0.28
Age = 25 - 39 3.25 0.31 3.94 0.25
Age = 40+ 2.43 0.41 3.39 0.30
Drug Influence 1.34 0.74 1.29 0.77
Drink Influence 1.34 0.75 1.36 0.73
Rel=Family 4.81 0.21 2.35 0.43
Rel=Friend 7.15 0.14 2.87 0.35
Rel=Acquain. 9.88 0.10 4.5 0.22
Rel=F. Spouse 3.82 0.26 2.99 0.33
Race=Black 1.12 0.89 1.05 0.95
Race=Asian 1.12 0.89 1.05 0.95
Weapon 1.31 0.76 1.11 0.90
Contact 1.16 0.86 1.08 0.93
Force 3.34 0.30 1.63 0.61
Threaten 2.78 0.36 1.62 0.62
Sexual 1.22 0.82 1.07 0.94
Knew Offender 1.18 0.85 1.12 0.90
Street Gang 1.16 0.86 1.11 0.90
Time=Night 1.38 0.72 1.24 0.81
Weekend 1.29 0.77 1.2 0.83
Mean VIF 2.69 1.87
12
12If VIF < 10, multicollinearity does not require further investigation.
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A.4 Robustness Checks
Table 18: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
Log Crime 2001 - 2007 2008 - 2014
Differential
Prediction (Male) 11.418*** (0.204) 11.131 (0.189)
Prediction (Female) 9.791*** (0.220) 9.493 (0.201)
Difference 1.627*** (0.300) 1.638 (0.276)
Decomposition
Endowments -0.160*** (0.297) -0.054 (0.256)
Coefficients 1.806*** (0.094) 1.725 (0.121)
Interaction -0.019*** (0.084) -0.033 (0.108)
A.5 Residual Distribution for Linear Regressions
Figure 19: Residuals for Gender Earnings Gap Regression in Table 4
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Figure 20: Residuals for Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition - Male
Figure 21: Residuals for Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition - Female
131
B THE GENDER GAP IN SENTENCING
B.1 Variable Descriptions
Table 19: Arson and Criminal Damage
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 2871 85.02%
Female 506 14.98%
Total 3377 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 1,002 118 1,120 89.46% 10.54% 33.17%
25 to 34 864 131 995 86.83% 13.17% 29.46%
35 to 44 553 123 676 81.80% 18.20% 20.02%
45 to 54 337 101 438 76.94% 23.06% 12.97%
Type of Offence
Arson endangering life 946 277 1223 77.35% 22.65% 36.22%
Arson not endangering life 620 125 745 83.22% 16.78% 22.06%
Criminal damage
endangering life (excl. arson)
310 31 341 90.91% 9.09% 10.10%
Other 756 59 815 92.76% 7.24% 24.13%
Sentence Outcome
Other 337 68 405 83.21% 16.79% 11.99%
Community Order 478 114 592 80.74% 19.26% 17.53%
Suspended Sentence 454 96 550 82.55% 17.45% 16.29%
Immediate Custody 1,602 228 1,830 87.54% 12.46% 54.19%
Sentence Length
Up to 1 year 431 22 453 95.14% 4.86% 25.80%
1 - 3 years 656 147 803 81.69% 18.31% 45.73%
3 - 5 years 328 37 365 89.86% 10.14% 20.79%
years or more 120 15 135 88.89% 11.11% 7.69%
Previous Convictions
None 1,206 302 1,508 79.97% 20.03% 44.66%
1 to 3 668 83 751 88.95% 11.05% 22.24%
4 to 9 496 39 535 92.71% 7.29% 15.84%
Aggravating Factors
Pre-planning or
premeditation
565 69 634 89.12% 10.88% 18.77%
Member of a group or gang 233 20 253 92.09% 7.91% 7.49%
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Damage of high value 497 76 573 86.74% 13.26% 16.97%
Offence motivated by/ 50 4 54 92.59% 7.41% 1.60%
demonstrating hostility to
race/religion
Victim particularly
vulnerable
238 22 260 91.54% 8.46% 7.70%
Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
827 152 979 84.47% 15.53% 28.99%
Act of revenge 505 69 574 87.98% 12.02% 17.00%
Damage to emergency
equipment or a public
amenity
115 3 118 97.46% 2.54% 3.49%
Significant public or private
fear caused
346 48 394 87.82% 12.18% 11.67%
Offender was on bail 255 21 276 92.39% 7.61% 8.17%
More than one victim 258 29 287 89.90% 10.10% 8.50%
Mitigating Factors
Age 705 132 837 84.23% 15.77% 24.79%
Genuine remorse 947 219 1,166 81.22% 18.78% 34.53%
Offender responding well to
existing order/sentence
181 43 224 80.80% 19.20% 6.63%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
397 123 520 76.35% 23.65% 15.40%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
86 46 132 65.15% 34.85% 3.91%
Currently in, or prospects of
work/training
224 13 237 94.51% 5.49% 7.02%
Loss of job or reputation 120 11 131 91.60% 8.40% 3.88%
Physical or mental illness 627 228 855 73.33% 26.67% 25.32%
Difficult/deprived
background
295 131 426 69.25% 30.75% 12.61%
Offence out of character 567 162 729 77.78% 22.22% 21.59%
Cooperation with authorities 279 78 357 78.15% 21.85% 10.57%
Provocation 90 27 117 76.92% 23.08% 3.46%
Guilty plea discount
None 53 5 58 91.38% 8.62% 1.72%
1% - 10% 147 19 166 88.55% 11.45% 4.92%
11% - 20% 134 13 147 91.16% 8.84% 4.35%
21% - 32% 252 52 304 82.89% 17.11% 9.00%
33% or more 1,589 294 1,883 84.39% 15.61% 55.76%
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Table 20: Assault
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 45,667 90.21%
Female 4,956 9.79%
Total 50,623 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 18,515 1,777 20,292 91.24% 8.76% 40.08%
25 to 34 15,293 1,637 16,930 90.33% 9.67% 33.44%
35 to 44 7,257 982 8,239 88.08% 11.92% 16.27%
45 to 54 3,602 446 4,048 88.98% 11.02% 8.00%
Over 54 1,000 114 1,114 89.77% 10.23% 2.20%
Type of offence
Affray 7,759 594 8,353 92.89% 7.11% 16.50%
Assault 5,053 677 5,730 88.18% 11.82% 11.32%
Cruelty/Neglect of a child 421 552 973 43.27% 56.73% 1.92%
Harassment 1,225 92 1,317 93.01% 6.99% 2.60%
GBH 12,456 1,170 13,626 91.41% 8.59% 26.92%
ABH 15,848 1,634 17,482 90.65% 9.35% 34.53%
Violent Disorder 1,011 29 1,040 97.21% 2.79% 2.05%
Sentence Outcome
Other 8,439 1,646 10,085 83.68% 16.32% 19.92%
Suspended Sentence 14,434 2,017 16,451 87.74% 12.26% 32.50%
Immediate Custody 22,794 1,293 24,087 94.63% 5.37% 47.58%
Sentence Length
Up to 1 year 9,724 580 10,304 94.37% 5.63% 42.78%
1 - 3 years 9,179 497 9,676 94.86% 5.14% 40.17%
3 years or more 3,570 200 3,770 94.69% 5.31% 15.65%
Previous convictions
None 20,077 2,866 22,943 87.51% 12.49% 45.32%
1 to 3 11,877 879 12,756 93.11% 6.89% 25.20%
4 to 9 5,409 343 5,752 94.04% 5.96% 11.36%
10 or more 1,948 118 2,066 94.29% 5.71% 4.08%
Factors indicating greater
harm
Injury/fear of injury which is
serious in context of the
offence
8,529 632 9,161 93.10% 6.90% 18.10%
Victim particularly
vulnerable
4,832 490 5,322 90.79% 9.21% 10.51%
Sustained or repeated assault
on same person
8,556 678 9,234 92.66% 7.34% 18.24%
134
Factors indicating lesser
harm
Injury/fear of injury which is
less serious in context of the
offence
5,581 767 6,348 87.92% 12.08% 12.54%
Factors indicating higher
culpability
Race/religion 606 84 690 87.83% 12.17% 1.36%
Disability 36 10 46 78.26% 21.74% 0.09%
Sexual orientation 70 4 74 94.59% 5.41% 0.15%
Transgender identity 5 0 5 100.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Other aggravating factors
Significant degree of
premeditation
2,999 257 3,256 92.11% 7.89% 6.43%
Threatened/actual use of a
weapon
14,015 1,462 15,477 90.55% 9.45% 30.57%
Intention to cause more
serious harm
1,703 105 1,808 94.19% 5.81% 3.57%
Deliberately causes more
harm than necessary
1,520 107 1,627 93.42% 6.58% 3.21%
Targetting of vulnerable
victim(s)
2,703 195 2,898 93.27% 6.73% 5.72%
Leading role in group or gang 2,038 164 2,202 92.55% 7.45% 4.35%
Offence motivated
by/demonstrating hostility to
age or sex
141 13 154 91.56% 8.44% 0.30%
Factors indication lower
culpability
Subordinate role in group or
gang
1,110 165 1,275 87.06% 12.94% 2.52%
Greater degree of provocation 2,374 349 2,723 87.18% 12.82% 5.38%
Lack of premeditation 6,672 833 7,505 88.90% 11.10% 14.82%
Mental disorder/learning
disability where linked to the
commission of the offence
811 197 1,008 80.46% 19.54% 1.99%
Excessive self defence 1,443 186 1,629 88.58% 11.42% 3.22%
Factors increasing
seriousness
Location 14,014 1,044 15,058 93.07% 6.93% 29.74%
Timing 7,762 521 8,283 93.71% 6.29% 16.36%
On-going effect on victim 7626 631 8257 92.36% 7.64% 16.31%
Offence against those in the
public sector/service to
public
2,146 179 2,325 92.30% 7.70% 4.59%
Presence of others 7,852 592 8,444 92.99% 7.01% 16.68%
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Gratuitous degradation 817 72 889 91.90% 8.10% 1.76%
Victim compelled to leave
home (domestic violence in
particular)
750 55 805 93.17% 6.83% 1.59%
Failure to comply with
current court orders
2,764 183 2,947 93.79% 6.21% 5.82%
On licence 940 29 969 97.01% 2.99% 1.91%
Attempt to conceal/dispose
of evidence
285 39 324 87.96% 12.04% 0.64%
Failure to respond to
warnings/concerns
684 66 750 91.20% 8.80% 1.48%
Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
9,140 926 10,066 90.80% 9.20% 19.88%
Abuse of power/trust 1,083 148 1,231 87.98% 12.02% 2.43%
Exploiting contact
arrangements
75 2 77 97.40% 2.60% 0.15%
Previous violence/threats 2,280 130 2,410 94.61% 5.39% 4.76%
Established evidence of
community impact
257 15 272 94.49% 5.51% 0.54%
Steps taken to prevent
reporting/assisting
prosecution
204 17 221 92.31% 7.69% 0.44%
TICs 28 1 29 96.55% 3.45% 0.06%
Factors reducing
seriousness
No previous relevant
convictions
8,818 1,434 10,252 86.01% 13.99% 20.25%
Single blow 5,458 695 6,153 88.70% 11.30% 12.15%
Remorse 12,141 1,571 13,712 88.54% 11.46% 27.09%
Good character/exemplary
conduct
5,429 943 6,372 85.20% 14.80% 12.59%
Determination/demonstration
to address
addiction/behaviour
2,893 502 3,395 85.21% 14.79% 6.71%
Serious medical conditions 923 215 1,138 81.11% 18.89% 2.25%
Isolated incident 5,588 801 6,389 87.46% 12.54% 12.62%
Age/lack of maturity
affecting responsibility
2,964 397 3,361 88.19% 11.81% 6.64%
Lapse of time not fault of
offender
1,054 118 1,172 89.93% 10.07% 2.32%
Mental disorder/learning
disability where not linked to
the commission of the offence
1,193 296 1,489 80.12% 19.88% 2.94%
Sole/primary carer for
dependent relative
941 597 1,538 61.18% 38.82% 3.04%
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Guilty plea discount
None 387 63 450 86.00% 14.00% 0.89%
1% - 10% 1,777 153 1,930 92.07% 7.93% 3.81%
11% - 20% 1,503 140 1,643 91.48% 8.52% 3.25%
21% - 32% 3,196 298 3,494 91.47% 8.53%
33% or more 16,601 1,766 18,367 90.38% 9.62% 36.28%
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Table 21: Burglary
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 25,614 95.45%
Female 1,222 4.55%
Total 26,836 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 9,727 361 10,088 96.42% 3.58% 37.59%
25 to 34 9,171 508 9,679 94.75% 5.25% 36.07%
35 to 44 5,079 267 5,346 95.01% 4.99% 19.92%
45 to 54 1,431 76 1,507 94.96% 5.04% 5.62%
Over 54 206 10 216 95.37% 4.63% 0.80%
Type of offence
Aggravated Burglary 597 26 623 95.83% 4.17% 2.32%
Domestic Burglary 19,161 1,005 20,166 95.02% 4.98% 75.15%
Non-domestic Burglary 5,324 164 5,488 97.01% 2.99% 20.45%
Other burglary 532 27 559 95.17% 4.83% 2.08%
Sentence outcome
Other 2,156 209 2,365 91.16% 8.84% 8.81%
Suspended Sentence 4,146 318 4,464 92.88% 7.12% 16.63%
Immediate Custody 19,312 695 20,007 96.53% 3.47% 74.55%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 5,031 202 5,233 96.14% 3.86% 26.16%
1 - 3 years 10,750 385 11,135 96.54% 3.46% 55.66%
3 - 5 years 2,620 81 2,701 97.00% 3.00% 13.50%
5 years or more 742 24 766 96.87% 3.13% 3.83%
Factors indicating greater
harm
Theft of/damage to property
causing significant degree of
loss
4,406 138 4,544 96.96% 3.04% 16.93%
Soiling/ransacking/vandalism
of property
2,278 58 2,336 97.52% 2.48% 8.70%
Victim on/returns to
premises while offender
present
5,865 356 6,221 94.28% 5.72% 23.18%
Significant
physical/psychological injury
or trauma
1,630 97 1,727 94.38% 5.62% 6.44%
Violence used/ threatened
particularly involving a
weapon
937 47 984 95.22% 4.78% 3.67%
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Context of general public
disorder
231 14 245 94.29% 5.71% 0.91%
Factors indicating lesser
harm
No physical/psychological
injury or trauma
2,391 103 2,494 95.87% 4.13% 9.29%
No violence used/threatened
and a weapon not produced
3,137 132 3,269 95.96% 4.04% 12.18%
Nothing stolen or of very low
value
2,689 145 2,834 94.88% 5.12% 10.56%
Limited damage/disturbance
to property
2,880 142 3,022 95.30% 4.70% 11.26%
Factors indicating higher
culpability
Deliberately targeted 4,608 319 4,927 93.53% 6.47% 18.36%
Significant degree of planning 3,724 149 3,873 96.15% 3.85% 14.43%
Equipped for burglary 3,361 42 3,403 98.77% 1.23% 12.68%
Weapon present on entry or
carried
715 20 735 97.28% 2.72% 2.74%
Member of group or gang 5,074 184 5,258 96.50% 3.50% 19.59%
Factors indicating lower
culpability
Offender exploited by others 370 68 438 84.47% 15.53% 1.63%
Offence committed on
impulse/limited intrusion
1,857 102 1,959 94.79% 5.21% 7.30%
Mental disorder/learning
disability where linked to the
commission of the offence
217 18 235 92.34% 7.66% 0.88%
Factors increasing
seriousness
Previous relevant convictions 13,379 484 13,863 96.51% 3.49% 51.66%
Offence committed on bail 1,133 63 1,196 94.73% 5.27% 4.46%
Other aggravating factors
Child at home/returns 939 41 980 95.82% 4.18% 3.65%
Committed at night 4,939 164 5,103 96.79% 3.21% 19.02%
Abuse of power/trust 483 58 541 89.28% 10.72% 2.02%
Gratuitous degradation 130 13 143 90.91% 9.09% 0.53%
Steps taken to prevent
reporting/assisting
prosecution
92 3 95 96.84% 3.16% 0.35%
Victim compelled to leave
home (domestic violence in
particular)
168 16 184 91.30% 8.70% 0.69%
Established evidence of
community impact
395 9 404 97.77% 2.23% 1.51%
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Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
2,813 170 2,983 94.30% 5.70% 11.12%
Failure to comply with
current court orders
2,017 93 2,110 95.59% 4.41% 7.86%
On licence 2,039 36 2,075 98.27% 1.73% 7.73%
TICs 1,282 30 1,312 97.71% 2.29% 4.89%
Factors reducing
seriousness or reflecting
personal mitigation
Subordinate role in group or
gang
927 111 1,038 89.31% 10.69% 3.87%
Injuries caused recklessly 32 3 35 91.43% 8.57% 0.13%
Nothing stolen or of very low
value
1,649 91 1,740 94.77% 5.23% 6.48%
Made voluntary reparation 158 4 162 97.53% 2.47% 0.60%
No previous relevant
convictions
1,524 156 1,680 90.71% 9.29% 6.26%
Remorse 3,731 232 3,963 94.15% 5.85% 14.77%
Good character/exemplary
conduct
629 64 693 90.76% 9.24% 2.58%
Determination/demonstration
to address
addiction/behaviour
1,604 140 1,744 91.97% 8.03% 6.50%
Serious medical conditions 242 24 266 90.98% 9.02% 0.99%
Age/lack of maturity
affecting responsibility
1,260 60 1,320 95.45% 4.55% 4.92%
Lapse of time not fault of
offender
159 15 174 91.38% 8.62% 0.65%
Mental disorder/learning
disability where not linked to
the commission of the offence
384 44 428 89.72% 10.28% 1.59%
Sole/primary carer for
dependent relatives
228 65 293 77.82% 22.18% 1.09%
Guilty plea discount
None 189 8 197 95.94% 4.06% 0.73%
1% - 10% 1332 57 1389 95.90% 4.10% 5.18%
11% - 20% 2351 86 2437 96.47% 3.53% 9.08%
21% - 32% 3086 136 3222 95.78% 4.22% 12.01%
33% or more 13403 625 14028 95.54% 4.46% 52.27%
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Table 22: Death
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 2,503 90.95%
Female 249 9.05%
Total 2,752 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 721 49 770 93.64% 6.36% 27.98%
25 to 34 735 71 806 91.19% 8.81% 29.29%
35 to 44 488 60 548 89.05% 10.95% 19.91%
45 to 54 364 42 406 89.66% 10.34% 14.75%
Type of offence
Attempted murder 186 14 200 93.00% 7.00% 7.27%
Causing death by careless
driving when under the
influence of drink or drugs
348 62 410 84.88% 15.12% 14.90%
Causing death by dangerous
driving
272 18 290 93.79% 6.21% 10.54%
Making threats to kill 498 32 530 93.96% 6.04% 19.26%
Manslaughter 316 30 346 91.33% 8.67% 12.57%
Murder of persons aged one
year or over
712 63 775 91.87% 8.13% 28.16%
Sentence Outcome
Other 241 57 298 80.87% 19.13% 10.83%
Suspended Sentence 252 42 294 85.71% 14.29% 10.68%
Immediate Custody 2,010 150 2,160 93.06% 6.94% 78.49%
Sentence Length
Up to 5 years 762 57 819 93.04% 6.96% 37.92%
5 years or over 1,162 90 1,252 92.81% 7.19% 57.96%
Seriousness
1 390 29 419 93.08% 6.92% 15.23%
2 433 42 475 91.16% 8.84% 17.26%
3 273 45 318 85.85% 14.15% 11.56%
Previous Convictions
None 1,556 200 1,756 88.61% 11.39% 63.81%
1 to 3 144 7 151 95.36% 4.64% 5.49%
3 or more 431 17 448 96.21% 3.79% 16.28%
Aggravating Factors
Pre-planning or
premeditation
526 43 569 92.44% 7.56% 20.68%
Victim particularly
vulnerable
507 62 569 89.10% 10.90% 20.68%
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Mental or physical suffering
inflicted on the victim
274 25 299 91.64% 8.36% 10.86%
Abuse of power/trust 109 21 130 83.85% 16.15% 4.72%
Use of weapon 72 5 77 93.51% 6.49% 2.80%
Concealment, destruction or
dismemberment of the body
263 14 277 94.95% 5.05% 10.07%
Driving off to avoid detection
or apprehension
60 0 60 100.00% 0.00% 2.18%
Serious injury to others in
addition to the death(s)
195 17 212 91.98% 8.02% 7.70%
Offender was on bail or
licence
194 1 195 99.49% 0.51% 7.09%
More than one victim 144 12 156 92.31% 7.69% 5.67%
Mitigating factors
Age 734 82 816 89.95% 10.05% 29.65%
Genuine remorse 897 117 1,014 88.46% 11.54% 36.85%
Offender responding well to
existing order/sentence
27 3 30 90.00% 10.00% 1.09%
Provocation 155 16 171 90.64% 9.36% 6.21%
Good driving record 296 56 352 84.09% 15.91% 12.79%
Lack of premeditation 548 83 631 86.85% 13.15% 22.93%
Acted to an extent in
self-defence
47 5 52 90.38% 9.62% 1.89%
Mental disorder/learning
disability
277 59 336 82.44% 17.56% 12.21%
Giving assistance 50 9 59 84.75% 15.25% 2.14%
Effect on the offender 233 49 282 82.62% 17.38% 10.25%
Actions of the victim or a
third party
69 10 79 87.34% 12.66% 2.87%
Guilty plea discount
1% - 10% 144 9 153 94.12% 5.88% 5.56%
11% - 20% 205 16 221 92.76% 7.24% 8.03%
21% - 32% 227 8 235 96.60% 3.40% 8.54%
33% or more 737 80 817 90.21% 9.79% 29.69%
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Table 23: Driving
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 7,493 95.68%
Female 338 4.32%
Total 7,831 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 3,195 97 3,292 97.05% 2.95% 42.04%
25 to 34 2,674 115 2,789 95.88% 4.12% 35.61%
35 to 44 1,019 70 1,089 93.57% 6.43% 13.91%
45 to 54 446 41 487 91.58% 8.42% 6.22%
Over 54 159 15 174 91.38% 8.62% 2.22%
Type of Offence
Aggravated vehicle taking 1,213 47 1,260 96.27% 3.73% 16.09%
Careless driving 322 25 347 92.80% 7.20% 4.43%
Dangerous driving 5,119 210 5,329 96.06% 3.94% 68.05%
Making false statements to
obtain or failure to produce
revoked license
34 2 36 94.44% 5.56% 0.46%
Other driving offence 805 54 859 93.71% 6.29% 10.97%
Sentence Outcome
Other 444 36 480 92.50% 7.50% 6.13%
Community Order 1,022 85 1,107 92.32% 7.68% 14.14%
Suspended Sentence 2,349 142 2,491 94.30% 5.70% 31.81%
Immediate Custody 3,678 75 3,753 98.00% 2.00% 47.92%
Sentence Length
Up to 1 year 2,517 56 2,573 97.82% 2.18% 68.56%
12 to 18 months 820 8 828 99.03% 0.97% 10.57%
18 months or more 281 10 291 96.56% 3.44% 3.72%
Previous Convictions
None 2,559 180 2,739 93.43% 6.57% 34.98%
1 to 3 2,221 75 2,296 96.73% 3.27% 29.32%
4 to 9 951 15 966 98.45% 1.55% 12.34%
10 or more 633 12 645 98.14% 1.86% 8.24%
Aggravating Factors
Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
1,959 112 2,071 94.59% 5.41% 26.45%
Disregard of warnings 1,394 46 1,440 96.81% 3.19% 18.39%
Aggressive driving 2,684 87 2,771 96.86% 3.14% 35.39%
Carrying out other tasks
while driving
84 9 93 90.32% 9.68% 1.19%
Injury to others 1,092 73 1,165 93.73% 6.27% 14.88%
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Damage to other vehicles or
property
2,200 100 2,300 95.65% 4.35% 29.37%
Poorly maintained or
dangerously loaded vehicle
98 3 101 97.03% 2.97% 1.29%
Tiredness 54 7 61 88.52% 11.48% 0.78%
Driving when knowingly
suffering from a medical
condition which significantly
impairs driving
62 7 69 89.86% 10.14% 0.88%
Offender was on bail or
licence
911 18 929 98.06% 1.94% 11.86%
More than one victim 450 22 472 95.34% 4.66% 6.03%
Mitigating Factors
Age 1,961 105 2,066 94.92% 5.08% 26.38%
Genuine remorse 2,506 160 2,666 94.00% 6.00% 34.04%
Offender responding well to
existing order/sentence
367 18 385 95.32% 4.68% 4.92%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
599 47 646 92.72% 7.28% 8.25%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
659 105 764 86.26% 13.74% 9.76%
Currently in, or prospects of
work/training
1,374 51 1,425 96.42% 3.58% 18.20%
Loss of job or reputation 688 25 713 96.49% 3.51% 9.10%
Physical or mental illness 451 58 509 88.61% 11.39% 6.50%
Difficult/deprived
background
295 33 328 89.94% 10.06% 4.19%
Offence out of character 1,298 117 1,415 91.73% 8.27% 18.07%
Co-operation with authorities 604 37 641 94.23% 5.77% 8.19%
Good driving record 817 65 882 92.63% 7.37% 11.26%
Genuine emergency 37 6 43 86.05% 13.95% 0.55%
Guilty Plea Discount
None 95 3 98 96.94% 3.06% 1.25%
1% - 10% 383 16 399 95.99% 4.01% 5.10%
11% - 20% 331 15 346 95.66% 4.34% 4.42%
21% - 32% 846 36 882 95.92% 4.08% 11.26%
33% or more 4414 186 4600 95.96% 4.04% 58.74%
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Table 24: Drugs
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 33,925 90.92%
Female 3,388 9.08%
Total 37,313 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 10,656 762 11,418 93.33% 6.67% 30.60%
25 to 34 12,413 1,262 13,675 90.77% 9.23% 36.65%
35 to 44 6,525 833 7,358 88.68% 11.32% 19.72%
45 to 54 3,362 428 3,790 88.71% 11.29% 10.16%
Over 54 969 103 1,072 90.39% 9.61% 2.87%
Type of Offence
Bringing in/taking out
controlled drug
1,038 215 1,253 82.84% 17.16% 3.36%
Conspiracy to supply 2,197 160 2,357 93.21% 6.79% 6.32%
Other drug offences 190 102 292 65.07% 34.93% 0.78%
Permitting premises to be
used
378 333 711 53.16% 46.84% 1.91%
Possession 2,699 291 2,990 90.27% 9.73% 8.01%
Possession with intent to
supply
13,065 976 14,041 93.05% 6.95% 37.63%
Production/being concerned
in production/cultivation
8,322 630 8,952 92.96% 7.04% 23.99%
Supply 6,036 681 6,717 89.86% 10.14% 18.00%
Sentence outcome
Other 1,167 192 1,359 85.87% 14.13% 3.64%
Community Order 4,114 884 4,998 82.31% 17.69% 13.39%
Suspended Sentence 9,809 1,248 11,057 88.71% 11.29% 29.63%
Immediate Custody 18,835 1,064 19,899 94.65% 5.35% 53.33%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 3,848 267 4,115 93.51% 6.49% 11.03%
1 - 3 years 8,944 525 9,469 94.46% 5.54% 25.38%
3 to 5 years 3,684 168 3,852 95.64% 4.36% 10.32%
More than 5 years 2,180 93 2,273 95.91% 4.09% 6.09%
Previous convictions
None 19,165 2,398 21,563 88.88% 11.12% 57.79%
1 to 3 8,639 503 9,142 94.50% 5.50% 24.50%
4 to 9 2,221 116 2,337 95.04% 4.96% 6.26%
5 or more 914 56 970 94.23% 5.77% 2.60%
Drug/Class of drug
associated with the
offence
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Cannabis or Cannabis 14,079 1,312 15,391 91.48% 8.52% 41.25%
Cocaine 8,222 620 8,842 92.99% 7.01% 23.70%
Heroin 4,365 542 4,907 88.95% 11.05% 13.15%
Other Class A 981 84 1,065 92.11% 7.89% 2.85%
Other Class B 1,983 269 2,252 88.06% 11.94% 6.04%
Class C 336 74 410 81.95% 18.05% 1.10%
Factors increasing
seriousness
Previous relevant convictions 9,039 520 9,559 94.56% 5.44% 25.62%
Permitted under 18 year old
to deliver etc.
43 4 47 91.49% 8.51% 0.13%
Offence committed on bail 663 26 689 96.23% 3.77% 1.85%
18 years or over supplies in
the vicinity of school etc.
10 1 11 90.91% 9.09% 0.03%
Other aggravating factors
Sophisticated nature of
concealment/attempts to
avoid detection
849 48 897 94.65% 5.35% 2.40%
Attempt to conceal/dispose
of evidence
567 34 601 94.34% 5.66% 1.61%
Exposure of others to more
than usual danger
81 14 95 85.26% 14.74% 0.25%
Presence of weapon 203 5 208 97.60% 2.40% 0.56%
High purity or high potential
yield
2,726 149 2,875 94.82% 5.18% 7.71%
Failure to comply with
current court orders
991 48 1,039 95.38% 4.62% 2.78%
On licence 672 15 687 97.82% 2.18% 1.84%
Targeting premises of
vulnerable people
44 3 47 93.62% 6.38% 0.13%
On-going/large scale
evidenced by specialist
equipment
1,399 62 1,461 95.76% 4.24% 3.92%
Presence of others, especially
children and/or non-users
507 125 632 80.22% 19.78% 1.69%
Use of premises with
unlawful access to utility
supply
850 59 909 93.51% 6.49% 2.44%
Level of profit element 2,367 127 2,494 94.91% 5.09% 6.68%
Premises adapted to
facilitate drug activity
1,139 56 1,195 95.31% 4.69% 3.20%
Location of premises 318 36 354 89.83% 10.17% 0.95%
Length of time premises used 407 36 443 91.87% 8.13% 1.19%
Charged as importation of
very small amount
11 0 11 100.00% 0.00% 0.03%
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Nature of likely supply 879 66 945 93.02% 6.98% 2.53%
Possession of drug in
school/licensed premises
50 3 53 94.34% 5.66% 0.14%
Possession of drug in prison 116 75 191 60.73% 39.27% 0.51%
Volume of activity permitted 427 40 467 91.43% 8.57% 1.25%
Established evidence of
community impact
389 25 414 93.96% 6.04% 1.11%
Factors reducing
seriousness or reflecting
personal mitigation
Lack of sophistication as to
nature of concealment
2,511 330 2,841 88.38% 11.62% 7.61%
Involvement due to pres-
sure/intimidation/coercion
1,761 472 2,233 78.86% 21.14% 5.98%
Mistaken belief regarding
type of drug
101 17 118 85.59% 14.41% 0.32%
Isolated incident 2,130 410 2,540 83.86% 16.14% 6.81%
Low purity 782 65 847 92.33% 7.67% 2.27%
No previous relevant
convictions
7,450 1,006 8,456 88.10% 11.90% 22.66%
Offender’s vulnerability
exploited
1402 490 1892 74.10% 25.90% 5.07%
Remorse 5,744 838 6,582 87.27% 12.73% 17.64%
Good character/exemplary
conduct
3,433 587 4,020 85.40% 14.60% 10.77%
Determination/demonstration
to address
addiction/behaviour
3,037 313 3,350 90.66% 9.34% 8.98%
Serious medical conditions 888 132 1,020 87.06% 12.94% 2.73%
Age/lack of maturity
affecting responsibility
1,947 171 2,118 91.93% 8.07% 5.68%
Mental disorder/learning
disability
442 67 509 86.84% 13.16% 1.36%
Sole/primary carer for
dependent relatives
911 458 1,369 66.54% 33.46% 3.67%
Offender addicted to same
drug
3,787 365 4,152 91.21% 8.79% 11.13%
Offender using cannabis to
help diagnosed medical
condition
457 33 490 93.27% 6.73% 1.31%
Guilty plea discount
None 1817 182 1999 90.90% 9.10% 5.36%
1% - 10% 1351 101 1452 93.04% 6.96% 3.89%
11% - 20% 1835 124 1959 93.67% 6.33% 5.25%
21% - 32% 4247 390 4637 91.59% 8.41% 12.43%
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33% or more 20176 2039 22215 90.82% 9.18% 59.54%
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Table 25: Other
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 16,083 88.50%
Female 2,089 11.50%
Total 18,172 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 4,535 517 5,052 89.77% 10.23% 27.80%
25 to 34 5,263 679 5,942 88.57% 11.43% 32.70%
35 to 44 3,262 487 3,749 87.01% 12.99% 20.63%
45 to 54 2,116 310 2,426 87.22% 12.78% 13.35%
Over 54 907 96 1,003 90.43% 9.57% 5.52%
Type of offence
Absconding from lawful
custody
527 12 539 97.77% 2.23% 2.97%
Blackmail 330 30 360 91.67% 8.33% 1.98%
Breach of ASBO 409 45 454 90.09% 9.91% 2.50%
Breach of protective order 2,591 73 2,664 97.26% 2.74% 14.66%
False imprisonment 385 35 420 91.67% 8.33% 2.31%
Intimidating a juror or
witness
506 82 588 86.05% 13.95% 3.24%
Kidnapping 365 50 415 87.95% 12.05% 2.28%
Other offences 2,313 594 2,907 79.57% 20.43% 16.00%
Perverting the course of
public justice
1,659 668 2,327 71.29% 28.71% 12.81%
Possession of offensive
weapons without lawful
authority or reasonable
excuse
4,451 366 4,817 92.40% 7.60% 26.51%
Possession/distribution of
prohibited weapons or
ammunition
2,313 101 2,414 95.82% 4.18% 13.28%
Unauthorised use of
trademark
234 33 267 87.64% 12.36% 1.47%
Sentence outcome
Other 838 140 978 85.69% 14.31% 5.38%
Community Order 2,053 329 2,382 86.19% 13.81% 13.11%
Suspended Sentence 4,293 840 5,133 83.64% 16.36% 28.25%
Immediate Custody 8,899 780 9,679 91.94% 8.06% 53.26%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 5,252 459 5,711 91.96% 8.04% 59.00%
1 to 3 years 2,232 244 2,476 90.15% 9.85% 25.58%
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More than 3 years 1,286 68 1,354 94.98% 5.02% 13.99%
Seriousness
1 525 41 566 92.76% 7.24% 3.11%
2 1,006 90 1,096 91.79% 8.21% 6.03%
3 958 86 1,044 91.76% 8.24% 5.75%
4 822 73 895 91.84% 8.16% 4.93%
Previous convictions
None 5,882 1,262 7,144 82.33% 17.67% 39.31%
1 to 3 4,277 261 4,538 94.25% 5.75% 24.97%
4 to 9 2,095 132 2,227 94.07% 5.93% 12.26%
10 or more 1,190 86 1,276 93.26% 6.74% 7.02%
Aggravating factors
Pre-planning or
premeditation
2,303 337 2,640 87.23% 12.77% 14.53%
Member of group or gang 1,194 146 1,340 89.10% 10.90% 7.37%
Intimidation or force used 1,874 120 1,994 93.98% 6.02% 10.97%
Victim particularly
vulnerable
1,689 180 1,869 90.37% 9.63% 10.29%
Use of drugs, alcohol or
another substance to
facilitate the offence
1,063 89 1,152 92.27% 7.73% 6.34%
Background of intimidation
or coercion
1,062 57 1,119 94.91% 5.09% 6.16%
Threats to prevent victim
reporting the incident
328 22 350 93.71% 6.29% 1.93%
Financial or other gain 850 118 968 87.81% 12.19% 5.33%
Professionalism 273 16 289 94.46% 5.54% 1.59%
Motivated by hostility
towards an individual/group
605 105 710 85.21% 14.79% 3.91%
Detrimental impact on the
administration of justice
910 224 1,134 80.25% 19.75% 6.24%
Offender was on bail or
licence
941 61 1,002 93.91% 6.09% 5.51%
Mitigating factors
Age 3,326 588 3,914 84.98% 15.02% 21.54%
Genuine remorse 4,236 824 5,060 83.72% 16.28% 27.85%
Offender responding well to
existing order/sentence
671 67 738 90.92% 9.08% 4.06%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
1,383 185 1,568 88.20% 11.80% 8.63%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
913 478 1,391 65.64% 34.36% 7.65%
Currently in, or prospects of
work/training
1,516 163 1,679 90.29% 9.71% 9.24%
Loss of job or reputation 938 221 1,159 80.93% 19.07% 6.38%
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Physical or mental illness 1,557 389 1,946 80.01% 19.99% 10.71%
Difficult/deprived
background
890 302 1,192 74.66% 25.34% 6.56%
Offence out of character 2,714 716 3,430 79.13% 20.87% 18.88%
Co-operation with authorities 1,450 295 1,745 83.09% 16.91% 9.60%
Guilty plea discount
None 273 23 296 92.23% 7.77% 1.63%
1% - 10% 988 101 1089 90.73% 9.27% 5.99%
11% - 20% 800 87 887 90.19% 9.81% 4.88%
21% - 32% 1628 182 1810 89.94% 10.06% 9.96%
33% or more 8616 1124 9740 88.46% 11.54% 53.60%
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Table 26: Robbery
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 11,548 93.47%
Female 807 6.53%
Total 12,355 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 6,556 372 6,928 94.63% 5.37% 56.07%
25 to 34 3,318 273 3,591 92.40% 7.60% 29.07%
35 to 44 1,268 126 1,394 90.96% 9.04% 11.28%
45 to 54 355 35 390 91.03% 8.97% 3.16%
Over 54 51 1 52 98.08% 1.92% 0.42%
Type of offence
Assault with intent to rob 161 19 180 89.44% 10.56% 1.46%
Other robbery 43 4 47 91.49% 8.51% 0.38%
Robbery 11,344 784 12,128 93.54% 6.46% 98.16%
Sentence outcome
Other 371 59 430 86.28% 13.72% 3.48%
Suspended Sentence 1,132 173 1,305 86.74% 13.26% 10.56%
Immediate Custody 10,045 575 10,620 94.59% 5.41% 85.96%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 911 67 978 93.15% 6.85% 9.21%
1 to 3 years 4,376 323 4,699 93.13% 6.87% 44.25%
3 to 5 years 2,601 130 2,731 95.24% 4.76% 25.72%
More than 5 years 1,925 45 1,970 97.72% 2.28% 15.94%
Seriousness
1 1,389 87 1,476 94.11% 5.89% 11.95%
2 5,558 380 5,938 93.60% 6.40% 48.06%
3 2,500 208 2,708 92.32% 7.68% 21.92%
Previous convictions
None 3,328 302 3,630 91.68% 8.32% 29.38%
1 to 3 3,498 210 3,708 94.34% 5.66% 30.01%
4 to 9 1,964 106 2,070 94.88% 5.12% 16.75%
10 or more 1,191 75 1,266 94.08% 5.92% 10.25%
Aggravating factors
Member of group or gang 5,656 370 6,026 93.86% 6.14% 48.77%
Targeting of vulnerable
victim(s)
5,238 402 5,640 92.87% 7.13% 45.65%
Use of a weapon (including
body and shod feet)
4,543 230 4,773 95.18% 4.82% 38.63%
Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
2,780 221 3,001 92.64% 7.36% 24.29%
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Offender was on bail or
licence
1,665 64 1,729 96.30% 3.70% 13.99%
Degree of force or violence 2,819 171 2,990 94.28% 5.72% 24.20%
Wearing of a disguise 2,232 43 2,275 98.11% 1.89% 18.41%
Value of items taken 1,462 46 1,508 96.95% 3.05% 12.21%
More than one victim 1,808 81 1,889 95.71% 4.29% 15.29%
Offence committed at
night/hours of darkness
3,783 211 3,994 94.72% 5.28% 32.33%
Mitigating factors
Age 3,993 263 4,256 93.82% 6.18% 34.45%
Genuine remorse 3,592 291 3,883 92.51% 7.49% 31.43%
Offender responding well to
existing order/sentence
391 67 458 85.37% 14.63% 3.71%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
969 130 1,099 88.17% 11.83% 8.90%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
292 71 363 80.44% 19.56% 2.94%
Currently in, or prospects of
work/training
627 35 662 94.71% 5.29% 5.36%
Loss of job or reputation 221 11 232 95.26% 4.74% 1.88%
Physical or mental illness 665 87 752 88.43% 11.57% 6.09%
Difficult/deprived
background
1,197 209 1,406 85.14% 14.86% 11.38%
Offence out of character 1,674 169 1,843 90.83% 9.17% 14.92%
Co-operation with authorities 891 69 960 92.81% 7.19% 7.77%
Voluntary return of stolen
property
134 7 141 95.04% 4.96% 1.14%
Unplanned/opportunistic 1,872 167 2,039 91.81% 8.19% 16.50%
Peripheral involvement 295 48 343 86.01% 13.99% 2.78%
Guilty plea discount
None 139 11 150 92.67% 7.33% 1.21%
1% - 10% 857 61 918 93.36% 6.64% 7.43%
11% - 20% 692 741 1433 48.29% 51.71% 11.60%
21% - 32% 1477 1571 3048 48.46% 51.54% 24.67%
33% or more 5878 406 6284 93.54% 6.46% 50.86%
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Table 27: Sexual
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 6,712 98.65%
Female 92 1.35%
Total 6,804 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 1,272 15 1,287 98.83% 1.17% 18.92%
25 to 34 1,551 22 1,573 98.60% 1.40% 23.12%
35 to 44 1,333 33 1,366 97.58% 2.42% 20.08%
45 to 54 1,264 13 1,277 98.98% 1.02% 18.77%
Over 54 1,292 9 1,301 99.31% 0.69% 19.12%
Type of offence
Other sexual offences 1,959 57 2,016 97.17% 2.83% 29.63%
Rape 1,393 5 1,398 99.64% 0.36% 20.55%
Sexual activity with a child 827 5 832 99.40% 0.60% 12.23%
Sexual assault 1,663 19 1,682 98.87% 1.13% 24.72%
Indecent photos of children 724 6 730 99.18% 0.82% 10.73%
Sentence outcome
Other 1,201 16 1,217 98.69% 1.31% 17.89%
Suspended Sentence 917 17 934 98.18% 1.82% 13.73%
Immediate Custody 4,594 59 4,653 98.73% 1.27% 68.39%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 700 16 716 97.77% 2.23% 15.39%
1 to 3 years 1,404 24 1,428 98.32% 1.68% 30.69%
3 to 5 years 698 4 702 99.43% 0.57% 15.09%
More than 5 years 1,485 12 1,497 99.20% 0.80% 32.17%
Seriousness
1 1,970 30 2,000 98.50% 1.50% 29.39%
2 1,837 24 1,861 98.71% 1.29% 27.35%
3 1,652 28 1,680 98.33% 1.67% 24.69%
4 1,253 10 1,263 99.21% 0.79% 18.56%
Previous convictions
None 4,755 75 4,830 98.45% 1.55% 70.99%
1 to 3 1,003 4 1,007 99.60% 0.40% 14.80%
4 to 9 227 0 227 100.00% 0.00% 3.34%
10 or more 100 0 100 100.00% 0.00% 1.47%
Aggravating factors
Planning or pre-meditation 1,222 18 1,240 98.55% 1.45% 18.22%
A sustained assault or
repeated assaults on the
same victim
1,909 18 1,927 99.07% 0.93% 28.32%
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Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
800 8 808 99.01% 0.99% 11.88%
Offender was on bail or
license
298 1 299 99.67% 0.33% 4.39%
Abuse of power/trust 2,310 28 2,338 98.80% 1.20% 34.36%
Victim was particularly
vulnerable
2,343 26 2,369 98.90% 1.10% 34.82%
Background of intimidation
or coercion
517 7 524 98.66% 1.34% 7.70%
Abduction or detention 296 2 298 99.33% 0.67% 4.38%
Threats to prevent victim
reporting the incident
417 7 424 98.35% 1.65% 6.23%
Physical harm caused 447 3 450 99.33% 0.67% 6.61%
More than one victim 1,011 7 1,018 99.31% 0.69% 14.96%
Mitigating factors
Age 1,986 17 2,003 99.15% 0.85% 29.44%
Genuine remorse 1,934 32 1,966 98.37% 1.63% 28.89%
Offender responding well to
exiting order/sentence
90 1 91 98.90% 1.10% 1.34%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
648 2 650 99.69% 0.31% 9.55%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
255 12 267 95.51% 4.49% 3.92%
Currently in, or prospects of,
work/training
444 3 447 99.33% 0.67% 6.57%
Loss of job or reputation 997 12 1,009 98.81% 1.19% 14.83%
Physical or mental illness 647 10 657 98.48% 1.52% 9.66%
Difficult/deprived
background
364 15 379 96.04% 3.96% 5.57%
Offence out of character 1,681 23 1,704 98.65% 1.35% 25.04%
Co-operation with authorities 783 13 796 98.37% 1.63% 11.70%
Victim engaged in consensual
sexual activity
567 11 578 98.10% 1.90% 8.50%
Reasonable belief that the
victim was ages 16 or over
25 0 25 100.00% 0.00% 0.37%
Minimal contact 365 2 367 99.46% 0.54% 5.39%
Guilty plea discount
None 176 1 177 99.44% 0.56% 2.60%
1% - 10% 360 7 367 98.09% 1.91% 5.39%
11% - 20% 374 5 379 98.68% 1.32% 5.57%
21% - 32% 616 624 1240 49.68% 50.32% 18.22%
33% or more 2907 47 2954 98.41% 1.59% 43.42%
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Table 28: Theft and Fraud
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 12,161 71.87%
Female 4,759 28.13%
Total 16,920 100.00%
Male Female Total Male % Female % % of total
offences
Age
18 to 24 2,388 499 2,887 82.72% 17.28% 17.06%
25 to34 4,012 1,324 5,336 75.19% 24.81% 31.54%
35 to 44 2,820 1,380 4,200 67.14% 32.86% 24.82%
45 to 54 1,922 1,059 2,981 64.48% 35.52% 17.62%
Over 55 1,019 497 1,516 67.22% 32.78% 8.96%
Type of offence
Dishonest representation for
obtaining benefit
1,280 1,685 2,965 43.17% 56.83% 17.52%
Other fraud 3,840 1,028 4,868 78.88% 21.12% 28.77%
Other theft, dishonesty and
fraud
1,056 129 1,185 89.11% 10.89% 7.00%
Receiving stolen goods 541 66 607 89.13% 10.87% 3.59%
Theft from person 1,531 393 1,924 79.57% 20.43% 11.37%
Theft from shops and stalls 1,564 444 2,008 77.89% 22.11% 11.87%
Theft in breach of trust 2,056 963 3,019 68.10% 31.90% 17.84%
With intent knowingly
possess false/improperly
obtained passport/another
ID document
293 51 344 85.17% 14.83% 2.03%
Sentence outcome
Other 447 191 638 70.06% 29.94% 3.77%
Community Order 1,946 840 2,786 69.85% 30.15% 16.47%
Suspended Sentence 3,710 2,300 6,010 61.73% 38.27% 35.52%
Immediate Custody 6,058 1,428 7,486 80.92% 19.08% 44.24%
Sentence length
Up to 1 year 3,365 868 4,233 79.49% 20.51% 56.55%
1 to 3 years 2,148 490 2,638 81.43% 18.57% 35.24%
3 to 5 years 493 62 555 88.83% 11.17% 7.41%
Seriousness
1 1,510 404 1,914 78.89% 21.11% 11.31%
2 3,364 1,274 4,638 72.53% 27.47% 27.41%
3 3,519 1,855 5,374 65.48% 34.52% 31.76%
4 2,282 822 3,104 73.52% 26.48% 18.35%
5 1,486 404 1,890 78.62% 21.38% 11.17%
Previous convictions
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None 5,854 3,220 9,074 64.51% 35.49% 53.63%
1 to 3 2,310 543 2,853 80.97% 19.03% 16.86%
4 to 9 1,182 234 1,416 83.47% 16.53% 8.37%
10 or more 1,550 310 1,860 83.33% 16.67% 10.99%
Aggravating factors
Pre-planning or
premeditation
4,358 1,267 5,625 77.48% 22.52% 33.24%
Member of a group or gang 2,233 440 2,673 83.54% 16.46% 15.80%
Targeting of vulnerable
victim(s)
2,233 440 2,673 83.54% 16.46% 15.80%
Offender was under the
influence of alcohol/drugs
634 144 778 81.49% 18.51% 4.60%
Offender was on bail 1,158 210 1,368 84.65% 15.35% 8.09%
Victim particularly
vulnerable
995 557 1552 64.11% 35.89% 9.17%
High value (including
sentimental value) of the
property to the victim or
substantial consequent
1967 683 2650 74.23% 25.77% 15.66%
High level of gain 1,935 1,034 2,969 65.17% 34.83% 17.55%
Intimidation or force 335 47 382 87.70% 12.30% 2.26%
More than one victim 1,286 341 1,627 79.04% 20.96% 9.62%
Mitigating factors
Age 2,873 1,514 4,387 65.49% 34.51% 25.93%
Genuine remorse 3,776 2,209 5,985 63.09% 36.91% 35.37%
Offender responding well to
exiting order/sentence
491 136 627 78.31% 21.69% 3.71%
Offender can/is addressing
needs/addiction
1,070 405 1,475 72.54% 27.46% 8.72%
Offender is main carer/has
responsibilities
1,179 1,570 2,749 42.89% 57.11% 16.25%
Currently in, or prospects of,
work/training
1,444 459 1,903 75.88% 24.12% 11.25%
Loss of job or reputation 1,524 894 2,418 63.03% 36.97% 14.29%
Physical or mental illness 1,101 849 1,950 56.46% 43.54% 11.52%
Difficult/deprived
background
502 500 1,002 50.10% 49.90% 5.92%
Offence out of character 2,606 1,543 4,149 62.81% 37.19% 24.52%
Co-operation with authorities 1,337 741 2,078 64.34% 35.66% 12.28%
Voluntary return of stolen
items
571 389 960 59.48% 40.52% 5.67%
Impact on sentence of
offender’s dependency
302 226 528 57.20% 42.80% 3.12%
Offender motivated by
desperation or need
739 432 1171 63.11% 36.89% 6.92%
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Guilty plea discount
None 149 56 205 72.68% 27.32% 1.21%
1% - 10% 804 283 1087 73.97% 26.03% 6.42%
11% - 20% 730 236 966 75.57% 24.43% 5.71%
21% - 32% 1466 501 1967 74.53% 25.47% 11.63%
33% or more 6601 2787 9388 70.31% 29.69% 55.48%
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Table 29: Offenders with Sole Responsibility for Dependent Relatives
Offence Survey Question Male
Of-
fend-
ers
Female
Of-
fend-
ers
χ2test
p-
value
Male
pris-
oners
Female
pris-
oners
χ2test
p-
value
Arson Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
86 46 0.000 32 10 0.000
3.00% 9.09% 3.01% 4.39%
Assault Sole/primary
carer for
dependent
relatives
941 597 0.000 241 86 0.000
2.06% 12.05% 1.06% 6.65%
Burglary Sole/primary
carer for
dependent
relatives
228 65 0.000 103 19 0.000
0.89% 5.32% 0.53% 2.73%
Death - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
Driving Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
659 105 0.000 184 9 0.000
8.79% 31.07% 5.00% 12.00%
Drugs Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
829 325 0.000 314 84 0.000
2.44% 9.59% 1.67% 7.89%
Other Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
913 478 0.000 287 118 0.000
5.68% 22.88% 3.23% 15.13%
Robbery Offender is main 292 71 0.000 195 33 0.000
carer/has
responsibilities
2.53% 8.80% 1.94% 5.74%
Sexual Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
255 12 0.000 255 3 0.000
3.80% 13.04% 5.55% 5.08%
Theft
and
Fraud
Offender is main
carer/has
responsibilities
1179 1570 0.000 339 268 0.000
9.69% 32.99% 5.60% 18.77%
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B.2 Generalised Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 30: Arson and Criminal Damage - Sentence Outcome
Variable Outcome
Other Community Order Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.051 0.715 0.051 0.715 0.051 0.715
Age=35 to 44 0.175 0.278 0.175 0.278 0.175 0.278
Age=45 to 54 -0.091 0.622 -0.091 0.622 -0.091 0.622
Female -0.555 0.000 -0.555 0.000 -0.555 0.000
Offence=Arson
endangering life
0.774 0.093 -0.656 0.001 -1.394 0.000
Offence=Arson not
endangering life
-1.461 0.000 -2.348 0.000 -2.917 0.000
Offence=Other -2.761 0.000 -3.316 0.000 -3.316 0.000
Previous
Convictions=1-3
1.222 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.828 0.000
Previous
Convictions=4-9
1.330 0.000 1.330 0.000 1.330 0.000
Premeditation 1.262 0.000 1.262 0.000 1.262 0.000
Damage of High Value 0.885 0.000 0.885 0.000 0.885 0.000
Alcohol 0.576 0.000 0.576 0.000 0.576 0.000
Revenge 0.609 0.000 0.609 0.000 0.609 0.000
Fear Caused 0.962 0.000 0.962 0.000 0.962 0.000
Age -0.147 0.278 -0.147 0.278 -0.147 0.278
Remorse 0.511 0.022 -0.152 0.306 -0.593 0.000
Addressing Addiction 0.924 0.008 -0.609 0.000 -1.387 0.000
Illness -0.565 0.000 -0.565 0.000 -0.565 0.000
Difficult Background 1.737 0.005 -0.063 0.754 0.292 0.101
Out of Character 0.151 0.557 -0.220 0.214 -0.848 0.000
Cooperation -0.292 0.067 -0.292 0.067 -0.292 0.067
GP Discount = 1% -
10%
1.593 0.000 1.593 0.000 1.593 0.000
GP Discount = 11% -
20%
1.933 0.000 1.933 0.000 1.933 0.000
GP Discount = 21% -
32%
1.756 0.000 1.756 0.000 1.756 0.000
GP Discount = 33% or
more
1.675 0.000 1.675 0.000 1.675 0.000
Constant 1.135 0.005 0.821 0.031 0.211 0.568
Pseudo R squared 0.2938
Obs 1985
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Table 31: Arson and Criminal Damage - Sentence Length
Variable Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years 3 - 5 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.325 0.032 0.325 0.032 0.325 0.032
Age=35 to 44 0.334 0.048 0.334 0.048 0.334 0.048
Age=45 to 54 0.461 0.020 0.461 0.020 0.461 0.020
Female 0.996 0.001 -0.211 0.329 0.186 0.625
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.805 0.000 0.132 0.422 0.316 0.280
Previous Convictions=4-9 -0.893 0.000 -0.061 0.737 0.323 0.317
Premeditation 0.666 0.000 0.463 0.002 1.314 0.000
Damage of High Value 0.637 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.637 0.000
Alcohol 0.889 0.000 0.457 0.001 0.037 0.886
Revenge 0.538 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.538 0.000
Fear Caused 0.701 0.003 0.831 0.000 1.424 0.000
Age 0.211 0.163 0.211 0.163 0.211 0.163
Remorse 0.116 0.367 0.116 0.367 0.116 0.367
Addressing Addiction -0.237 0.217 -0.237 0.217 -0.237 0.217
Illness 0.652 0.001 0.014 0.932 -0.465 0.146
Difficult Background 0.668 0.007 -0.087 0.665 0.159 0.655
Out of Character 0.089 0.576 0.089 0.576 0.089 0.576
Cooperation -0.144 0.471 -0.144 0.471 -0.144 0.471
GP Discount = 1% - 10% 0.167 0.802 0.167 0.802 0.167 0.802
GP Discount = 11% - 20% 0.702 0.288 0.702 0.288 0.702 0.288
GP Discount = 21% - 32% 0.203 0.752 0.203 0.752 0.203 0.752
GP Discount = 33% or more -0.134 0.832 -0.134 0.832 -0.134 0.832
Constant 0.306 0.637 -2.149 0.001 -4.649 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.1229
Obs 1255
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Table 32: Assault - Sentence Outcome
Variable Outcome
Other Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.060 0.157 0.060 0.157
Age=35 to 44 0.219 0.006 -0.001 0.991
Age=45 to 54 -0.082 0.231 -0.082 0.231
Age = 54+ 0.183 0.328 -0.415 0.006
Female -0.571 0.000 -0.884 0.000
Offence = Assault -1.307 0.000 -0.218 0.078
Offence = Cruelty/Neglect of a child 1.265 0.000 1.265 0.000
Offence = Harassment -0.507 0.045 0.239 0.284
Offence = GBH 1.800 0.000 1.471 0.000
Offence = ABH -0.018 0.871 -0.018 0.871
Offence = Violent Disorder 1.488 0.000 1.488 0.000
Seriousness = 2 -1.140 0.000 -0.758 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -2.277 0.000 -1.331 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.856 0.202 1.084 0.019
Previous Convictions=4-9 -0.277 0.682 1.777 0.000
Previous Convictions = 10 or more -0.075 0.915 2.299 0.000
GP Discount = 1% - 10% 0.302 0.097 -0.171 0.290
GP Discount = 11% - 20% 0.493 0.011 -0.085 0.604
GP Discount = 21% - 32% 0.398 0.022 -0.056 0.721
GP Discount = 33% or more 0.393 0.013 0.126 0.395
Injury 0.393 0.000 0.393 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.654 0.000 0.654 0.000
Repeated Assault 0.502 0.000 0.502 0.000
Injury Less Seriuos -0.170 0.009 -0.002 0.975
Weapon 0.635 0.000 0.635 0.000
Lack of Premeditation -0.309 0.000 -0.489 0.000
Previous Relevant Convictions 1.525 0.022 -0.400 0.386
Location 0.190 0.000 0.190 0.000
Timing 0.045 0.403 0.045 0.403
Ongoing Effect 0.533 0.000 0.533 0.000
Presence of Others 0.239 0.000 0.239 0.000
Alcohol 0.278 0.000 0.089 0.047
No Previous Convictions -0.217 0.000 -0.217 0.000
Single Blow -0.306 0.000 -0.306 0.000
Remorse -0.204 0.001 -0.834 0.000
Character -0.252 0.001 -0.600 0.000
Isolated Incident -0.271 0.000 -0.610 0.000
Constant 1.868 0.000 -0.458 0.020
Pseudo R squared 0.2931
Obs 15,996
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Table 33: Assault - Sentence Length
Variable Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.187 0.005 -0.036 0.649
Age=35 to 44 0.290 0.000 0.290 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.333 0.001 0.333 0.001
Age = 54+ 0.057 0.818 0.733 0.005
Female -0.422 0.000 -0.422 0.000
Offence = Assault -2.481 0.000 0.034 0.936
Offence = Cruelty/Neglect of a child 2.925 0.000 2.925 0.000
Offence = Harassment -0.627 0.113 -0.627 0.113
Offence = GBH 2.985 0.000 3.953 0.000
Offence = ABH -0.218 0.295 -0.218 0.295
Offence = Violent Disorder 1.906 0.000 1.906 0.000
Seriousness = 2 -1.826 0.000 -0.370 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -2.269 0.000 -1.133 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.325 0.651 -0.769 0.285
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.226 0.754 -0.689 0.340
Previous Convictions = 10 or more 0.270 0.710 -0.825 0.260
GP Discount = 1% - 10% -0.515 0.013 -0.515 0.013
GP Discount = 11% - 20% -0.464 0.037 -0.960 0.000
GP Discount = 21% - 32% -0.603 0.004 -0.931 0.000
GP Discount = 33% or more -1.075 0.000 -1.075 0.000
Injury 0.314 0.000 -0.017 0.839
Vulnerable Victim 0.457 0.000 0.084 0.412
Repeated Assault 0.306 0.000 0.306 0.000
Injury Less Seriuos 0.004 0.965 0.436 0.000
Weapon 0.550 0.000 1.063 0.000
Lack of Premeditation -0.299 0.000 -0.299 0.000
Previous Relevant Convictions 0.470 0.511 0.470 0.511
Location 0.080 0.204 0.080 0.204
Timing 0.121 0.112 -0.175 0.047
Ongoing Effect 0.280 0.000 0.531 0.000
Presence of Others 0.095 0.110 0.095 0.110
Alcohol -0.030 0.570 -0.030 0.570
No Previous Convictions -0.228 0.009 -0.228 0.009
Single Blow -0.643 0.000 -0.643 0.000
Remorse -0.019 0.740 -0.019 0.740
Character -0.166 0.095 -0.166 0.095
Isolated Incident -0.123 0.181 -0.123 0.181
Constant 0.438 0.149 -4.208 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.3303
Obs 8267
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Table 34: Burglary - Sentence Outcome
Variable Outcome
Other Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.415 0.000 0.415 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.249 0.000 0.249 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.389 0.024 -0.030 0.776
Female -0.793 0.000 -0.793 0.000
Offence = Domestic -2.646 0.000 -2.646 0.000
Offence = Non-domestic -3.512 0.000 -3.761 0.000
Offence = Other -3.166 0.000 -3.166 0.000
Seriousness = 2 -1.168 0.000 -1.168 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -2.144 0.000 -1.500 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.951 0.000 0.951 0.000
Previous Convictions=4-9 1.171 0.000 1.516 0.000
Previous Convictions = 10 or more 1.311 0.000 1.714 0.000
GP Discount -0.002 0.515 -0.002 0.515
Theft of High Value 0.617 0.000 0.251 0.000
Vandalism 0.361 0.000 0.361 0.000
Victim Returned 0.813 0.000 0.458 0.000
No Injury -0.310 0.000 -0.310 0.000
No Violence 0.086 0.274 0.086 0.274
Low Value -0.422 0.000 -0.422 0.000
Limited Damage -0.236 0.000 -0.236 0.000
Deliberately Targetted 0.420 0.000 0.420 0.000
Significant Planning 0.868 0.000 0.469 0.000
Gang 0.065 0.265 0.065 0.265
Night 0.211 0.000 0.211 0.000
Alcohol -0.017 0.792 -0.017 0.792
Failure to Comply 0.915 0.000 0.915 0.000
Remorse 1.387 0.000 1.387 0.000
Constant 5.536 0.000 3.701 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.2337
Obs 13,333
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Table 35: Burglary - Sentence Length
Variable Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years 3 - 5 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.297 0.000 0.585 0.000 0.712 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.651 0.000 1.031 0.000 0.907 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.502 0.000 0.976 0.000 1.065 0.000
Female -0.619 0.000 -0.619 0.000 -0.619 0.000
Offence = Domestic -3.529 0.000 -4.772 0.000 -5.532 0.000
Offence = Non-domestic -5.499 0.000 -6.592 0.000 -7.078 0.000
Offence = Other -4.034 0.000 -4.034 0.000 -4.034 0.000
Seriousness = 2 -2.457 0.000 -1.529 0.000 -1.887 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -2.966 0.000 -1.637 0.000 -1.984 0.006
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.581 0.000 0.179 0.070 0.480 0.009
Previous Convictions=4-9 1.040 0.000 1.040 0.000 1.040 0.000
Previous Convictions = 10 or more 1.228 0.000 1.228 0.000 1.228 0.000
GP Discount -0.050 0.000 -0.019 0.000 -0.029 0.000
Theft of High Value 0.295 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.295 0.000
Vandalism 0.266 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.266 0.000
Victim Returned 0.398 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.398 0.000
No Injury -0.361 0.000 -0.361 0.000 -0.361 0.000
No Violence 0.223 0.014 -0.252 0.039 -0.353 0.254
Low Value -0.556 0.000 -0.556 0.000 -0.556 0.000
Limited Damage -0.227 0.003 -0.227 0.003 -0.227 0.003
Deliberately Targetted 0.151 0.027 0.423 0.000 0.425 0.005
Significant Planning 0.310 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.908 0.000
Gang -0.113 0.030 -0.113 0.030 -0.113 0.030
Night 0.181 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.181 0.000
Alcohol -0.117 0.043 -0.117 0.043 -0.117 0.043
Failure to Comply -0.210 0.006 -0.297 0.004 0.297 0.167
Remorse -0.184 0.001 -0.184 0.001 -0.184 0.001
Constant 6.802 0.000 2.416 0.000 0.485 0.113
Pseudo R squared 0.2931
Obs 10135
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Table 36: Death - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 -0.092 0.789 -0.092 0.789
Age=35 to 44 -0.227 0.520 -0.227 0.520
Age=45 to 54 -0.157 0.658 -0.157 0.658
Female -1.002 0.003 -1.002 0.003
Seriousness = 2 -1.256 0.018 -2.363 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -3.037 0.000 -3.037 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.622 0.301 0.622 0.301
Previous Convictions=4-9 2.481 0.018 2.481 0.018
Premeditation 1.393 0.188 1.393 0.188
Vulnerable Victim 0.968 0.062 0.968 0.062
Suffering Inflicted 15.049 0.985 15.049 0.985
Concealment 3.073 0.004 3.073 0.004
Age 0.131 0.639 0.131 0.639
Remorse -0.432 0.181 -0.432 0.181
Good Driving Record -0.925 0.000 -0.925 0.000
Lack of Premeditation -0.425 0.107 -0.425 0.107
Mental Illness 0.111 0.832 0.111 0.832
Effect on Offender -0.197 0.449 -0.197 0.449
GP Discount = 11% - 20% 1.428 0.027 1.428 0.027
GP Discount = 21% - 32% 0.734 0.178 0.734 0.178
GP Discount = 33% or more 0.455 0.352 0.455 0.352
Constant 4.287 0.000 3.415 0.000
Pseudo R Squared 0.2877
Obs 584
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Table 37: Death - Sentence Length
Variable Length
5 years or more
Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.416 0.274
Age=35 to 44 -0.173 0.708
Age=45 to 54 -0.086 0.856
Female -1.366 0.076
Seriousness = 2 -2.317 0.000
Seriousness = 3 -1.687 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -1.455 0.009
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.340 0.351
Premeditation 2.577 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.160 0.725
Suffering Inflicted 2.609 0.010
Concealment 0.781 0.060
Age -0.689 0.062
Remorse -0.447 0.128
Good Driving Record -1.391 0.000
Lack of Premeditation 0.622 0.092
Mental Illness 1.155 0.049
Effect on Offender -0.430 0.256
GP Discount = 11% - 20% -0.116 0.844
GP Discount = 21% - 32% -0.496 0.373
GP Discount = 33% or more -1.198 0.019
Constant 1.816 0.003
Pseudo R Squared 0.3707
Obs 426
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Table 38: Driving - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Community Order Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 -0.047 0.525 -0.047 0.525 -0.047 0.525
Age=35 to 44 -0.050 0.836 0.035 0.791 -0.364 0.001
Age=45 to 54 -0.358 0.006 -0.358 0.006 -0.358 0.006
Age = 54+ -0.375 0.282 0.308 0.294 -0.369 0.167
Female -0.758 0.000 -0.758 0.000 -0.758 0.000
Offence = Careless Driving -5.455 0.000 -3.297 0.000 -2.446 0.000
Offence = Dangerous Driving -0.053 0.892 0.490 0.000 -0.093 0.328
Offence = Other -1.761 0.000 -0.425 0.005 -0.043 0.740
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.720 0.000 0.720 0.000 0.720 0.000
Previous Convictions=4-9 1.545 0.000 1.545 0.000 1.545 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 1.827 0.000 1.827 0.000 1.827 0.000
GP Discount 0.028 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.012 0.002
Alcohol 0.528 0.000 0.528 0.000 0.528 0.000
Disregard of Warnings 0.736 0.000 0.736 0.000 0.736 0.000
Aggressive Driving 0.884 0.000 0.884 0.000 0.884 0.000
Injury to Others 1.204 0.000 1.204 0.000 1.204 0.000
Damage 0.428 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.428 0.000
On Bail 0.197 0.596 0.540 0.001 0.953 0.000
Age -0.305 0.000 -0.305 0.000 -0.305 0.000
Remorse 0.043 0.830 -0.295 0.002 -0.770 0.000
Prospect of Work -0.074 0.725 -0.387 0.000 -1.333 0.000
Out of Character -0.164 0.487 -0.203 0.074 -0.609 0.000
Good Driving Record -0.873 0.000 -0.138 0.278 -0.270 0.050
Constant 2.867 0.000 0.050 0.776 -1.018 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.2764
Obs 5533
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Table 39: Driving - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 -0.013 0.904 0.426 0.009
Age=35 to 44 -0.097 0.503 -0.097 0.503
Age=45 to 54 -0.029 0.897 -0.029 0.897
Age = 54+ 0.035 0.938 0.035 0.938
Female -0.622 0.082 -0.146 0.721
Offence = Careless Driving -0.545 0.503 1.240 0.251
Offence = Dangerous Driving -0.292 0.007 -0.292 0.007
Offence = Other 0.109 0.526 1.997 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.160 0.256 0.160 0.256
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.638 0.000 0.638 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 1.066 0.000 1.066 0.000
GP Discount -0.031 0.000 -0.031 0.000
Alcohol 0.243 0.009 -0.034 0.821
Disregard of Warnings 0.150 0.127 0.150 0.127
Aggressive Driving 0.724 0.000 0.724 0.000
Injury to Others 0.864 0.000 1.341 0.000
Damage 0.189 0.041 0.189 0.041
On Bail 0.177 0.088 0.177 0.088
Age -0.327 0.011 0.266 0.197
Remorse 0.091 0.428 0.091 0.428
Prospect of Work -0.409 0.022 -1.080 0.000
Out of Character -0.328 0.151 -0.328 0.151
Good Driving Record -0.420 0.151 -0.420 0.151
Constant -0.883 0.000 -3.440 0.000
Pseudo R Squared 0.1157
Obs 2821
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Table 40: Drugs - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Community Order Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.152 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.152 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.457 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.175 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.219 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.219 0.000
Age = 54+ 0.139 0.436 0.357 0.001 0.093 0.299
Female 0.088 0.427 -0.714 0.000 -1.021 0.000
Offence = Possession 2.760 0.000 0.735 0.000 -0.482 0.000
Offence = Production 1.821 0.000 0.414 0.000 -0.494 0.000
Offence = Supplying 2.059 0.000 0.473 0.000 -0.462 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.476 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.476 0.000
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.730 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.730 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 1.004 0.000 1.004 0.000 1.004 0.000
Cannabis 0.167 0.099 0.167 0.099 0.167 0.099
Class C 1.272 0.000 1.704 0.000 2.231 0.000
Other Class B 1.445 0.000 1.702 0.000 2.350 0.000
Other Class A 0.742 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.506 0.000
Cocaine 0.901 0.000 1.021 0.000 1.309 0.000
Heroin -0.075 0.637 0.112 0.343 0.323 0.005
Drug Category = 1 -1.354 0.000 -1.354 0.000 -1.354 0.000
Drug Category = 2 -2.016 0.000 -2.016 0.000 -2.016 0.000
Drug Category = 3 -1.175 0.000 -1.255 0.000 -1.705 0.000
Previous Relevant Convictions 0.040 0.693 0.040 0.693 0.040 0.693
High Purity 1.715 0.000 1.715 0.000 1.715 0.000
Lack of Sophistication -0.666 0.000 -0.693 0.000 -0.913 0.000
No Previous Relevant Convictions 0.095 0.320 0.027 0.555 -0.172 0.000
Remorse 0.437 0.000 0.042 0.381 -0.470 0.000
Good Character -0.257 0.023 0.001 0.982 -0.253 0.000
Determination to Address 0.243 0.064 -0.469 0.000 -1.369 0.000
Medical Conditions -0.500 0.001 -0.194 0.028 -1.007 0.000
Constant 1.352 0.000 0.120 0.324 -0.805 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.2274
Obs 27243
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Table 41: Drugs - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years 3 - 5 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.300 0.000 0.664 0.000 1.249 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.406 0.000 0.888 0.000 1.456 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.709 0.000 1.034 0.000 1.513 0.000
Age = 54+ 0.574 0.000 1.378 0.000 1.685 0.000
Female -0.711 0.000 -0.711 0.000 -0.711 0.000
Offence = Possession -0.232 0.002 -1.477 0.000 -1.921 0.000
Offence = Production -0.064 0.435 -1.741 0.000 -1.754 0.000
Offence = Supplying -0.291 0.002 -1.526 0.000 -1.737 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.225 0.114 0.021 0.879 0.074 0.619
Previous Convictions=4-9 -0.458 0.003 -0.123 0.421 -0.005 0.977
Previous Convictions=10 + -0.535 0.003 -0.134 0.442 -0.181 0.413
Cannabis 0.712 0.001 1.544 0.000 1.694 0.000
Class C 4.025 0.000 4.025 0.000 4.025 0.000
Other Class B 4.074 0.000 4.074 0.000 4.074 0.000
Other Class A 2.059 0.000 3.215 0.000 3.416 0.000
Cocaine 3.228 0.000 3.736 0.000 3.977 0.000
Heroin 0.782 0.000 1.809 0.000 1.927 0.000
Drug Category = 1 -5.084 0.000 -5.084 0.000 -5.084 0.000
Drug Category = 2 -4.750 0.000 -4.750 0.000 -4.750 0.000
Drug Category = 3 -4.915 0.000 -4.915 0.000 -4.915 0.000
Previous Relevant Convictions 0.247 0.077 0.247 0.077 0.247 0.077
High Purity 0.936 0.000 1.189 0.000 1.242 0.000
Lack of Sophistication -0.540 0.000 -0.931 0.000 -0.901 0.000
No Previous Relevant Convictions 0.105 0.137 -0.273 0.000 -0.288 0.002
Remorse -0.042 0.564 -0.447 0.000 -0.650 0.000
Good Character 0.027 0.657 0.027 0.657 0.027 0.657
Determination to Address 0.106 0.374 -0.495 0.000 -0.774 0.000
Medical Conditions -0.178 0.311 -0.219 0.179 -1.286 0.000
Constant -0.671 0.004 -3.437 0.000 -5.467 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.2347
Obs 14,116
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Table 42: Other - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Community Sentence Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.209 0.086 0.209 0.086 0.209 0.086
Age=35 to 44 -0.511 0.040 0.046 0.763 -0.123 0.362
Age=45 to 54 -0.194 0.165 -0.194 0.165 -0.194 0.165
Age = 54+ -1.233 0.000 0.053 0.842 -0.330 0.135
Female -0.350 0.037 -0.350 0.037 -0.350 0.037
Offence = Breach
of protective order
0.341 0.152 -0.356 0.016 -0.242 0.059
Offence =
Perverting the
course of justice
2.860 0.005 1.718 0.000 0.617 0.018
Offence =
Possession of
offensive weapons
1.705 0.000 0.267 0.107 -0.690 0.000
Offence = Posses-
sion/distribution
of prohibited
weapons
0.754 0.000 0.754 0.000 0.754 0.000
Previous
Convictions=1-3
0.841 0.000 0.841 0.000 0.841 0.000
Previous
Convictions=4-9
1.390 0.000 1.390 0.000 1.390 0.000
Previous
Convictions=10 +
2.763 0.000 1.221 0.000 1.587 0.000
Seriousness -1.042 0.000 -0.761 0.000 -0.417 0.000
GP Discount 0.007 0.120 0.007 0.120 0.007 0.120
Premeditation 2.525 0.011 1.596 0.000 0.741 0.000
Intimidation 0.487 0.001 0.487 0.001 0.487 0.001
Vulnerable Victim 0.417 0.001 0.417 0.001 0.417 0.001
Age -0.541 0.037 0.133 0.385 -0.224 0.092
Remorse -0.108 0.631 -0.348 0.006 -0.864 0.000
Illness -0.596 0.000 -0.596 0.000 -0.596 0.000
Out of Character -0.271 0.066 -0.271 0.066 -0.271 0.066
Constant 3.396 0.005 1.324 0.015 1.004 0.023
Pseudo R squared 0.1681
Obs 2521
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Table 43: Other - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 to 3 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.227 0.285 0.227 0.285
Age=35 to 44 0.079 0.742 0.079 0.742
Age=45 to 54 0.391 0.132 0.391 0.132
Age = 54+ 0.077 0.837 0.077 0.837
Female 0.291 0.375 0.291 0.375
Offence = Breach of
protective order
-0.832 0.000 -3.340 0.000
Offence = Perverting the
course of justice
-0.095 0.816 -0.095 0.816
Offence = Possession of
offensive weapons
-0.367 0.173 -2.113 0.005
Offence =
Possession/distribution of
prohibited weapons
1.906 0.000 1.906 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.504 0.042 -0.504 0.042
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.218 0.404 0.218 0.404
Previous Convictions=10 + -0.211 0.473 -2.313 0.004
Seriousness -0.842 0.000 -0.842 0.000
GP Discount -0.032 0.000 -0.032 0.000
Premeditation 1.049 0.000 1.049 0.000
Intimidation 0.773 0.000 0.773 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.592 0.001 0.592 0.001
Age 0.001 0.998 0.001 0.998
Remorse -0.079 0.720 -0.079 0.720
Illness -0.230 0.455 -0.230 0.455
Out of Character 0.028 0.939 -1.052 0.048
Constant -0.922 0.230 -1.106 0.209
Pseudo R squared 0.2641
Obs 1379
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Table 44: Robbery - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.433 0.000 0.433 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.069 0.810 0.717 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.237 0.386 0.237 0.386
Age = 54+ -0.707 0.366 -0.707 0.366
Female -0.805 0.000 -0.805 0.000
Offence = Other 1.013 0.249 1.013 0.249
Offence = Robbery 0.760 0.014 0.760 0.014
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.813 0.000 0.813 0.000
Previous Convictions=4-9 1.363 0.000 1.363 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 1.441 0.000 1.441 0.000
Seriousness -0.381 0.000 -0.381 0.000
GP Discount 0.005 0.271 0.005 0.271
Gang 0.309 0.001 0.309 0.001
Vulnerable Victim 0.880 0.000 0.880 0.000
Weapon 1.054 0.000 1.719 0.000
Alcohol 0.199 0.053 0.199 0.053
On Bail 1.366 0.000 1.366 0.000
Degree of Violence 1.515 0.000 1.515 0.000
Disguise 0.919 0.000 0.919 0.000
Value of Items 0.836 0.000 0.836 0.000
Multiple Victims 0.581 0.000 0.581 0.000
Night 0.570 0.000 0.570 0.000
Age -0.589 0.000 -0.589 0.000
Remorse -0.060 0.728 -0.823 0.000
Difficult Background -0.425 0.000 -0.425 0.000
Out of Character -0.307 0.099 -0.729 0.000
Unplanned -0.228 0.200 -0.657 0.000
Constant 2.426 0.000 0.776 0.040
Pseudo R squared 0.3108
Obs 7402
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Table 45: Robbery - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 - 3 years 3 - 5 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.476 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.476 0.000
Age=35 to 44 0.717 0.000 0.717 0.000 0.717 0.000
Age=45 to 54 0.688 0.000 0.688 0.000 0.688 0.000
Age = 54+ -0.779 0.303 1.153 0.029 1.258 0.016
Female -0.443 0.000 -0.443 0.000 -0.443 0.000
Offence = Other -0.817 0.170 -0.817 0.170 -0.817 0.170
Offence = Robbery 0.449 0.225 0.222 0.429 -0.665 0.060
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.162 0.020 0.162 0.020 0.162 0.020
Previous Convictions=4-9 0.486 0.000 0.486 0.000 0.486 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 0.559 0.000 0.559 0.000 0.559 0.000
Seriousness -0.838 0.000 -0.811 0.000 -1.120 0.000
GP Discount -0.025 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.046 0.000
Gang 0.227 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.227 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.318 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.318 0.000
Weapon 2.163 0.000 1.452 0.000 1.170 0.000
Alcohol 0.211 0.056 -0.140 0.045 -0.458 0.000
On Bail 0.445 0.000 0.445 0.000 0.445 0.000
Degree of Violence 1.122 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.919 0.000
Disguise 0.966 0.000 0.966 0.000 0.966 0.000
Value of Items 0.848 0.000 0.848 0.000 0.848 0.000
Multiple Victims 0.838 0.000 0.838 0.000 0.838 0.000
Night 0.190 0.070 0.158 0.017 -0.118 0.215
Age -0.138 0.179 -0.574 0.000 -0.381 0.000
Remorse -0.292 0.000 -0.292 0.000 -0.292 0.000
Difficult Background -0.235 0.004 -0.235 0.004 -0.235 0.004
Out of Character -0.357 0.000 -0.357 0.000 -0.357 0.000
Unplanned -0.470 0.000 -0.825 0.000 -1.267 0.000
Constant 2.979 0.000 0.406 0.224 0.090 0.838
Pseudo R squared 0.2248
Obs 6361
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Table 46: Sexual - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.245 0.047 0.245 0.047
Age=35 to 44 0.286 0.030 0.286 0.030
Age=45 to 54 0.584 0.000 0.584 0.000
Age = 54+ 0.488 0.000 0.488 0.000
Female 0.415 0.164 0.415 0.164
Offence = Rape 4.237 0.000 4.237 0.000
Offence = Sexual Activity with a Child 0.944 0.000 0.944 0.000
Offence = Sexual Assault 0.159 0.138 0.159 0.138
Offence = Indecent Photos of Children 0.022 0.834 0.022 0.834
Previous Convictions=1-3 0.296 0.011 0.296 0.011
Previous Convictions=4-9 1.268 0.000 1.268 0.000
Previous Convictions=10 + 0.859 0.029 0.859 0.029
Seriousness -0.523 0.000 -0.523 0.000
GP Discount 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000
Premeditation 0.696 0.000 1.018 0.000
Repeated Assault 0.718 0.000 1.219 0.000
Alcohol 0.225 0.103 0.225 0.103
Abuse of Power 0.758 0.000 0.758 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.718 0.000 0.718 0.000
Multiple Victims -0.039 0.750 -0.039 0.750
Age -0.069 0.521 -0.282 0.004
Remorse -0.293 0.005 -0.641 0.000
Loss of Job 0.042 0.684 0.042 0.684
Out of Character -0.463 0.000 -0.463 0.000
Cooperation -0.389 0.001 -0.670 0.000
Constant 1.705 0.000 0.718 0.000
Pseudo r squared 0.2502
Obs 4017
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Table 47: Sexual - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 to 3 years 3 to 5 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.093 0.501 0.093 0.501 0.093 0.501
Age=35 to 44 -0.099 0.599 0.607 0.001 0.384 0.073
Age=45 to 54 0.013 0.946 0.657 0.000 0.309 0.156
Age = 54+ -0.031 0.865 0.695 0.000 0.573 0.007
Female -0.505 0.138 -0.505 0.138 -0.505 0.138
Offence = Rape 3.126 0.000 4.140 0.000 3.795 0.000
Offence = Sexual
Activity with a Child
1.017 0.000 0.667 0.000 -0.285 0.145
Offence = Sexual
Assault
-0.050 0.674 -0.050 0.674 -0.050 0.674
Offence = Indecent
Photos of Children
-0.218 0.160 -0.218 0.160 -0.218 0.160
Previous
Convictions=1-3
0.117 0.309 0.117 0.309 0.117 0.309
Previous
Convictions=4-9
-0.114 0.588 -0.114 0.588 -0.114 0.588
Previous
Convictions=10 +
0.013 0.968 0.013 0.968 0.013 0.968
Seriousness -0.585 0.000 -0.800 0.000 -0.928 0.000
GP Discount -0.015 0.000 -0.015 0.000 -0.015 0.000
Premeditation 0.378 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.378 0.000
Repeated Assault 0.698 0.000 1.103 0.000 1.187 0.000
Alcohol -0.157 0.394 0.201 0.241 0.567 0.004
Abuse of Power 0.750 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.750 0.000
Vulnerable Victim 0.393 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.393 0.000
Multiple Victims 0.133 0.433 0.846 0.000 0.844 0.000
Age -0.254 0.016 -0.254 0.016 -0.254 0.016
Remorse -0.006 0.955 -0.006 0.955 -0.006 0.955
Loss of Job -0.304 0.060 -0.837 0.000 -0.587 0.007
Out of Character -0.650 0.000 -0.650 0.000 -0.650 0.000
Cooperation 0.041 0.765 0.041 0.765 0.041 0.765
Constant 2.527 0.000 -0.457 0.060 -1.454 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.3090
Obs 2470
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Table 48: Theft and Fraud - Sentence Outcome
Outcome
Other Community Order Suspended Sentence
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.130 0.412 0.325 0.000 0.151 0.028
Age=35 to 44 0.293 0.104 0.453 0.000 0.174 0.020
Age=45 to 54 0.139 0.479 0.533 0.000 0.223 0.006
Age = 54+ -0.464 0.034 0.759 0.000 0.154 0.131
Female -0.149 0.261 -0.259 0.000 -0.575 0.000
Offence = Dishonest
representation
0.662 0.001 0.504 0.000 -0.518 0.000
Offence = Receiving
stolen goods
-0.328 0.003 -0.328 0.003 -0.328 0.003
Offence = Theft from
person
-0.924 0.000 -0.669 0.000 -0.155 0.055
Offence = Theft from
shops and stalls
-1.654 0.000 -1.053 0.000 -0.354 0.000
Offence = Theft in
breach of trust
0.807 0.000 0.613 0.000 -0.015 0.828
Offence = With intent
knowingly possess false
2.021 0.000 2.021 0.000 2.021 0.000
Previous
Convictions=1-3
0.496 0.000 0.496 0.000 0.496 0.000
Previous
Convictions=4-9
1.010 0.000 1.010 0.000 1.010 0.000
Previous
Convictions=10 +
2.130 0.000 1.371 0.000 1.486 0.000
Seriousness -0.853 0.000 -0.782 0.000 -0.530 0.000
GP Discount 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.000
Premeditation 0.733 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.733 0.000
Gang 0.980 0.001 0.057 0.516 0.161 0.020
Vulnerable Victims 1.180 0.000 1.180 0.000 1.180 0.000
High Value 0.916 0.000 0.916 0.000 0.916 0.000
High Gain 1.233 0.000 1.233 0.000 1.233 0.000
Age -0.163 0.001 -0.163 0.001 -0.163 0.001
Remorse 0.172 0.181 -0.222 0.000 -0.618 0.000
Main Carer of
Children
-0.070 0.675 0.069 0.372 -0.815 0.000
In Work -0.214 0.200 -0.353 0.000 -1.670 0.000
Loss of Job 0.084 0.169 0.084 0.169 0.084 0.169
Illness -0.147 0.380 -0.131 0.120 -0.592 0.000
Out of Character -0.609 0.000 -0.115 0.093 -0.430 0.000
Cooperation -0.386 0.000 -0.386 0.000 -0.386 0.000
Constant 5.672 0.000 2.702 0.000 0.506 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.2764
Obs 12,383
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Table 49: Theft and Fraud - Sentence Length
Length
Up to 1 year 1 to 3 years
Coef P-value Coef P-value
Age=25 to 34 0.670 0.000 0.670 0.000
Age=35 to 44 1.075 0.000 1.075 0.000
Age=45 to 54 1.199 0.000 1.199 0.000
Age = 54+ 1.327 0.000 1.327 0.000
Female -0.511 0.000 -0.511 0.000
Offence = Dishonest representation -1.169 0.000 -1.169 0.000
Offence = Receiving stolen goods -0.489 0.023 -0.489 0.023
Offence = Theft from person -0.863 0.000 -1.727 0.000
Offence = Theft from shops and stalls -2.007 0.000 -2.007 0.000
Offence = Theft in breach of trust -0.144 0.133 -1.086 0.000
Offence = With intent knowingly possess false -0.852 0.000 -0.852 0.000
Previous Convictions=1-3 -0.053 0.551 -0.053 0.551
Previous Convictions=4-9 -0.061 0.587 -0.061 0.587
Previous Convictions=10 + 0.039 0.719 0.039 0.719
Seriousness -0.809 0.000 -1.119 0.000
GP Discount -0.023 0.000 -0.023 0.000
Premeditation 0.405 0.000 0.405 0.000
Gang 0.052 0.518 0.052 0.518
Vulnerable Victims 0.492 0.000 0.492 0.000
High Value 0.879 0.000 0.879 0.000
High Gain 0.838 0.000 0.838 0.000
Age -0.065 0.466 -0.065 0.466
Remorse -0.004 0.962 -0.528 0.001
Main Carer of Children -0.394 0.001 -0.394 0.001
In Work -0.673 0.000 -0.673 0.000
Loss of Job 0.010 0.926 0.010 0.926
Illness -0.346 0.006 -0.346 0.006
Out of Character -0.264 0.009 -0.264 0.009
Cooperation -0.030 0.795 -0.030 0.795
Constant 1.313 0.000 -1.089 0.000
Pseudo R squared 0.2651
Obs 5609
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B.3 Marginal Effects
Table 50: Marginal Effects for Sentencing Outcomes
(a) Arson and Criminal Damage
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.067 0.005 0.000 0.058 0.077
10.430*** 0.001
1#Female 0.099 0.011 0.000 0.078 0.120
2#Male 0.140 0.007 0.000 0.126 0.154
13.580*** 0.000
2#Female 0.174 0.011 0.000 0.153 0.195
3#Male 0.165 0.008 0.000 0.150 0.180
12.340*** 0.000
3#Female 0.177 0.008 0.000 0.160 0.193
4#Male 0.627 0.009 0.000 0.610 0.645
13.020*** 0.000
4#Female 0.550 0.020 0.000 0.511 0.589
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.129 0.002 0.000 0.124 0.133
44.540*** 0.000
1#Female 0.179 0.007 0.000 0.165 0.192
2#Male 0.339 0.004 0.000 0.332 0.346
57.410*** 0.000
2#Female 0.427 0.011 0.000 0.406 0.449
3#Male 0.532 0.003 0.000 0.526 0.539
153.840*** 0.000
3#Female 0.394 0.011 0.000 0.373 0.415
(b) Assault
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.066 0.002 0.000 0.063 0.070
43.380*** 0.000
1#Female 0.117 0.008 0.000 0.102 0.133
2#Male 0.168 0.003 0.000 0.162 0.174
63.930*** 0.000
2#Female 0.231 0.008 0.000 0.214 0.247
3#Male 0.766 0.003 0.000 0.760 0.772
54.620*** 0.000
3#Female 0.652 0.015 0.000 0.622 0.682
(c) Burglary
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Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.097 0.011 0.000 0.075 0.119
6.850*** 0.009
1#Female 0.181 0.032 0.000 0.119 0.243
2#Male 0.132 0.013 0.000 0.106 0.157
9.520*** 0.002
2#Female 0.179 0.021 0.000 0.139 0.220
3#Male 0.771 0.015 0.000 0.741 0.801
8.290*** 0.004
3#Female 0.640 0.043 0.000 0.555 0.724
(d) Death
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.043 0.002 0.000 0.040 0.047
17.670*** 0.000
1#Female 0.064 0.005 0.000 0.053 0.074
2#Male 0.115 0.004 0.000 0.107 0.122
22.830*** 0.000
2#Female 0.184 0.015 0.000 0.155 0.213
3#Male 0.322 0.006 0.000 0.311 0.333
68.150*** 0.000
3#Female 0.352 0.007 0.000 0.338 0.366
4#Male 0.520 0.005 0.000 0.510 0.531
29.920*** 0.000
4#Female 0.401 0.022 0.000 0.358 0.443
(e) Driving
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.036 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.038
0.660 0.417
1#Female 0.034 0.003 0.000 0.028 0.039
2#Male 0.126 0.002 0.000 0.122 0.130
150.860*** 0.000
2#Female 0.222 0.008 0.000 0.207 0.237
3#Male 0.301 0.003 0.000 0.296 0.306
72.400*** 0.000
3#Female 0.379 0.009 0.000 0.362 0.397
4#Male 0.537 0.003 0.000 0.532 0.542
380.180*** 0.000
4#Female 0.365 0.008 0.000 0.349 0.382
(f) Drugs
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Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.041 0.004 0.000 0.034 0.049
3.540* 0.060
1#Female 0.055 0.008 0.000 0.039 0.071
2#Male 0.146 0.007 0.000 0.133 0.160
4.000** 0.046
2#Female 0.180 0.018 0.000 0.146 0.214
3#Male 0.256 0.008 0.000 0.240 0.272
5.410** 0.020
3#Female 0.276 0.012 0.000 0.252 0.299
4#Male 0.556 0.009 0.000 0.539 0.574
4.300** 0.038
4#Female 0.489 0.031 0.000 0.428 0.551
(g) Other
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.018 0.024
21.770*** 0.000
1#Female 0.042 0.005 0.000 0.033 0.052
2#Male 0.096 0.003 0.000 0.090 0.102
31.930*** 0.000
2#Female 0.142 0.008 0.000 0.125 0.158
3#Male 0.883 0.003 0.000 0.877 0.890
29.330*** 0.000
3#Female 0.816 0.012 0.000 0.792 0.839
(h) Robbery
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.180 0.005 0.000 0.169 0.190
2.330 0.127
1#Female 0.135 0.029 0.000 0.079 0.192
2#Male 0.162 0.005 0.000 0.151 0.172
1.400 0.237
2#Female 0.148 0.012 0.000 0.124 0.172
3#Male 0.659 0.006 0.000 0.647 0.670
2.050 0.152
3#Female 0.717 0.040 0.000 0.638 0.796
(i) Sexual
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Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.025 0.031
1.200 0.272
1#Female 0.032 0.003 0.000 0.026 0.037
2#Male 0.144 0.003 0.000 0.137 0.150
12.500*** 0.000
2#Female 0.169 0.006 0.000 0.157 0.180
3#Male 0.350 0.004 0.000 0.341 0.359
39.240*** 0.000
3#Female 0.409 0.008 0.000 0.394 0.425
4#Male 0.479 0.004 0.000 0.470 0.487
105.570*** 0.000
4#Female 0.391 0.007 0.000 0.377 0.405
(j) Theft and Fraud
Table 51: Marginal Effects for Sentence Lengths
(a) Arson and Criminal Damage
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.248 0.012 0.000 0.225 0.271
15.520*** 0.000
1#Female 0.123 0.029 0.000 0.065 0.180
2#Male 0.478 0.015 0.000 0.449 0.506
13.550*** 0.000
2#Female 0.639 0.041 0.000 0.559 0.719
3#Male 0.217 0.012 0.000 0.193 0.241
1.940 0.164
3#Female 0.171 0.030 0.000 0.112 0.230
4#Male 0.057 0.007 0.000 0.044 0.070
0.220 0.642
4#Female 0.067 0.020 0.001 0.028 0.106
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.403 0.004 0.000 0.395 0.411
13.880*** 0.000
1#Female 0.462 0.016 0.000 0.431 0.492
2#Male 0.437 0.005 0.000 0.427 0.446
10.520*** 0.001
2#Female 0.415 0.008 0.000 0.399 0.430
3#Male 0.160 0.003 0.000 0.154 0.167
16.440*** 0.000
3#Female 0.123 0.009 0.000 0.106 0.141
(b) Assault
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Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.281 0.004 0.000 0.274 0.288
24.180*** 0.000
1#Female 0.367 0.017 0.000 0.333 0.402
2#Male 0.553 0.004 0.000 0.544 0.562
15.790*** 0.000
2#Female 0.517 0.010 0.000 0.497 0.536
3#Male 0.129 0.003 0.000 0.123 0.135
33.760*** 0.000
3#Female 0.090 0.007 0.000 0.076 0.103
4#Male 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.039
33.030*** 0.000
4#Female 0.027 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.030
(c) Burglary
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.595 0.019 0.000 0.559 0.632
4.230** 0.040
1#Female 0.764 0.080 0.000 0.608 0.921
2#Male 0.405 0.019 0.000 0.368 0.441
4.230** 0.040
2#Female 0.236 0.080 0.003 0.079 0.392
(d) Death
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.700 0.008 0.000 0.684 0.716
3.990** 0.046
1#Female 0.802 0.051 0.000 0.703 0.902
2#Male 0.228 0.008 0.000 0.213 0.242
7.130*** 0.008
2#Female 0.133 0.035 0.000 0.065 0.202
3#Male 0.073 0.005 0.000 0.064 0.082
0.140 0.708
3#Female 0.065 0.022 0.003 0.022 0.107
(e) Driving
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.212 0.003 0.000 0.206 0.217
68.750*** 0.000
1#Female 0.300 0.011 0.000 0.279 0.321
2#Male 0.475 0.004 0.000 0.468 0.483
34.670*** 0.000
2#Female 0.485 0.004 0.000 0.477 0.493
3#Male 0.198 0.003 0.000 0.192 0.205
82.350*** 0.000
3#Female 0.145 0.006 0.000 0.133 0.157
4#Male 0.115 0.002 0.000 0.110 0.119
106.190*** 0.000
4#Female 0.070 0.004 0.000 0.062 0.079
(f) Drugs
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Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.778 0.010 0.000 0.759 0.798
0.720 0.396
1#Female 0.740 0.044 0.000 0.654 0.826
2#Male 0.171 0.009 0.000 0.152 0.189
0.720 0.395
2#Female 0.199 0.034 0.000 0.133 0.265
3#Male 0.051 0.005 0.000 0.042 0.060
0.710 0.400
3#Female 0.061 0.012 0.000 0.037 0.084
(g) Other
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.094 0.003 0.000 0.088 0.101
12.640*** 0.000
1#Female 0.129 0.010 0.000 0.109 0.149
2#Male 0.499 0.006 0.000 0.488 0.510
21.330*** 0.000
2#Female 0.533 0.009 0.000 0.515 0.551
3#Male 0.279 0.005 0.000 0.268 0.289
14.640*** 0.000
3#Female 0.240 0.010 0.000 0.220 0.261
4#Male 0.129 0.004 0.000 0.122 0.135
18.600*** 0.000
4#Female 0.097 0.007 0.000 0.083 0.112
(h) Robbery
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.196 0.007 0.000 0.182 0.209
1.940 0.164
1#Female 0.261 0.047 0.000 0.169 0.352
2#Male 0.407 0.009 0.000 0.389 0.424
0.350 0.553
2#Female 0.401 0.012 0.000 0.377 0.426
3#Male 0.162 0.007 0.000 0.148 0.175
2.180 0.140
3#Female 0.141 0.015 0.000 0.111 0.171
4#Male 0.236 0.006 0.000 0.224 0.247
2.600 0.107
4#Female 0.197 0.024 0.000 0.149 0.245
(i) Sexual
185
Difference
Margin S.E P Value 95% Conf. Interval χ2 P Value
1#Male 0.570 0.006 0.000 0.558 0.581
37.360*** 0.000
1#Female 0.650 0.012 0.000 0.627 0.673
2#Male 0.368 0.006 0.000 0.356 0.380
34.950*** 0.000
2#Female 0.308 0.010 0.000 0.289 0.327
3#Male 0.062 0.003 0.000 0.056 0.068
41.730*** 0.000
3#Female 0.042 0.003 0.000 0.036 0.048
(j) Theft and Fraud
B.4 Interations
Table 52: Interaction Terms for Arson and Criminal Damage
Coef P-value
Premeditation#Gender -0.311 0.543
Damage of High Value#Gender -0.458 0.293
Alcohol#Gender 0.072 0.819
Revenge#Gender 0.392 0.432
Fear Caused#Gender -0.296 0.635
Age#Gender 0.134 0.684
Remorse#Gender 0.173 0.604
Addressing Addiction#Gender -0.297 0.381
Illness#Gender 0.196 0.521
Difficult Background#Gender -0.199 0.577
Out of Character#Gender 0.610* 0.060
Cooperation#Gender -0.486 0.211
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C THE SEVERITY OF ROAD TRAFFIC
ACCIDENTS
C.1 Variable Descriptions
Table 53: Variable Descriptions
Variable Frequency Percentage Variable Frequency Percentage
Vehicles Casualties
1 19,240 25.88 1 53,621 72.12
2 38,232 51.42 2 13,468 18.12
3 12,284 16.52 3 4,552 6.12
4 3,387 4.56 4 1,651 2.22
5 745 1.00 5 600 0.81
6 281 0.38 6 298 0.40
7 122 0.16 7 85 0.11
8 35 0.05 8 39 0.05
9 10 0.01 9 3 0.00
10 11 0.01 10 1 0.00
Driver Sex 11 9 0.01
Male 49,328 67.66 12 4 0.01
Female 23,582 32.34 16 7 0.01
Driver Age 17 4 0.01
17-20 8,691 13.45 22 2 0.00
21-29 13,344 20.64 27 1 0.00
30-39 12,358 19.12 42 2 0.00
40-49 12,312 19.05 Pedestrians
50-59 8,372 12.95 0 66,723 89.75
60-69 5,431 8.40 1 7,339 9.87
70+ 4,132 6.39 2 245 0.33
Breath Test 3 20 0.03
Negative 49,937 96.99 4 3 0.00
Positive 1,550 3.01 5 16 0.02
Hit and run 26 1 0.00
No 70,701 95.47 Cycles
Yes 3,358 4.53 0 66,863 89.93
Seatbelt 1 7,276 9.79
Yes 11,204 96.85 2 152 0.20
No 364 3.15 3 5 0.01
UK Licence 6 51 0.07
Full 18,913 80.32 OAPs
Provisional 917 3.89 0 61,841 83.18
Unlicenced 3,716 15.78 1 10,513 14.14
Ethnicity 2 1,646 2.21
White 20,017 97.20 3 242 0.33
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Asian 206 1.00 4 82 0.11
Black 210 1.02 5 10 0.01
Mixed Background 90 0.44 6 4 0.01
Oriental 70 0.34 9 2 0.00
Severity 12 5 0.01
Slight 62,135 83.57 42 2 0.00
Serious 10,695 14.39 Weekday
Fatal 1,517 2.04 Sunday 7,891 10.61
Road Condition Monday 10,927 14.70
Dry 48,276 64.93 Tuesday 10,913 14.68
Wet/Damp 23,192 31.19 Wednesday 11,183 15.04
Snow 730 0.98 Thursday 10,904 14.67
Frost/Ice 2,040 2.74 Friday 12,495 16.81
Flood 109 0.15 Saturday 10,034 13.50
Visibility Road Type
Daylight 45,092 72.51 Roundabout 4,778 6.43
Darkness - lights lit 8,662 13.93 One Way Street 1,811 2.44
Darkness - no lighting 8,434 13.56 Dual Carriageway 6,259 8.43
Single Carriageway 60,896 81.98
Slip Road 534 0.72
Speed Limit
20 768 1.03
30 35,332 47.52
40 6,381 8.58
50 3,119 4.20
60 23,853 32.08
70 4,894 6.58
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C.2 χ2 Significance Test for Simulated Poisson distribu-
tion
Table 54: Observed and Expected Accident Occurrences
No. of
Acci-
dents
(Xi)
Observed (Oi) P (X = x) Expected (Ei) Oi − Ei (Oi − Ei)2 (Oi−Ei)
2
Ei
1 0 0.00 0.17 -0.17 0.03 0.17
2 4 0.00 0.83 3.17 10.06 12.14
3 2 0.01 2.76 -0.76 0.58 0.21
4 9 0.02 6.90 2.10 4.39 0.64
5 17 0.04 13.81 3.19 10.18 0.74
6 30 0.06 23.02 6.98 48.79 2.12
7 27 0.09 32.88 -5.88 34.56 1.05
8 44 0.11 41.10 2.90 8.42 0.20
9 46 0.13 45.67 0.33 0.11 0.00
10 36 0.13 45.67 -9.67 93.42 2.05
11 43 0.11 41.51 1.49 2.21 0.05
12 33 0.09 34.59 -1.59 2.54 0.07
13 22 0.07 26.61 -4.61 21.27 0.80
14 11 0.05 19.01 -8.01 64.13 3.37
15 12 0.03 12.67 -0.67 0.45 0.04
16 10 0.02 7.92 2.08 4.33 0.55
17 4 0.01 4.66 -0.66 0.43 0.09
18 5 0.01 2.59 2.41 5.82 2.25
19 4 0.00 1.36 2.64 6.96 5.11
20 1 0.00 0.68 0.32 0.10 0.15
21 0 0.00 0.32 -0.32 0.11 0.32
22 1 0.00 0.15 0.85 0.73 4.93
23 4 0.00 0.06 3.94 15.49 241.68
Total 1 365 278.72
• H0 : Number of daily accidents ˜ Poisson
• H1 : Number of daily accidents is not ˜ Poisson
• Significance level: α = 0.05
• Degrees of freedom: 23− 2 = 21
• Critical value: 32.671
• χ2 = (Oi−Ei)2Ei = 278.72 > 32.671
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The null hypothesis is rejected. However, this result seems to be driven by
slightly larger then expected deviations in the extremes. When Xi = 1, 2, 23 are
excluded, the null hypothesis is no longer rejected.
• Degrees of freedom: 20− 2 = 18
• Critical value: 28.869
• χ2 = (Oi−Ei)2Ei = 24.74 < 28.869
Therefore, the distribution of daily accidents can be approximated reasonably
well by the Poisson distribution.
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C.3 Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 55: Ologit Results
Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Vehicles -0.012 0.040 0.760 -0.092 0.067
Driver Sex = Female -0.396*** 0.093 0.000 -0.579 -0.213
Driver Age 0.003 0.003 0.225 -0.002 0.008
Breath Test = Positive 1.031*** 0.178 0.000 0.682 1.379
Hit and Run -0.623 0.559 0.265 -1.717 0.472
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.477*** 0.198 0.000 1.089 1.865
UK Licence = Provisional 0.012 0.216 0.957 -0.412 0.436
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.633** 0.253 0.012 -1.129 -0.137
Ethnicity = Asian 0.530 0.361 0.141 -0.177 1.237
Ethnicity = Black 0.270 0.347 0.437 -0.410 0.950
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.275** 0.543 0.019 0.211 2.340
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.608 0.778 0.435 -2.133 0.917
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.025 0.106 0.815 -0.232 0.182
Road Condition = Snow -0.158 0.576 0.784 -1.287 0.972
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.619** 0.289 0.032 -1.185 -0.052
Road Condition = Flood 0.595 0.540 0.271 -0.464 1.653
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.299* 0.167 0.073 -0.028 0.626
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.383*** 0.103 0.000 0.181 0.584
Casualties 0.402*** 0.034 0.000 0.335 0.469
Road Type = One Way Street -0.150 0.676 0.824 -1.475 1.174
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.045 0.375 0.905 -0.780 0.690
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.549 0.361 0.129 -0.159 1.257
Road Type = Slip Road -2.053** 0.839 0.014 -3.697 -0.409
Speed Limit 0.021*** 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.029
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.163 0.147 0.266 -0.451 0.124
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.277 0.503 0.581 -0.709 1.263
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.445 0.272 0.102 -0.088 0.977
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.958** 0.399 0.016 -1.740 -0.176
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.012 0.896 0.990 -1.744 1.767
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.324 0.337 0.337 -0.984 0.337
Weekday 0.303** 0.136 0.026 0.036 0.570
OAPs 0.447*** 0.069 0.000 0.312 0.582
Pedestrians 1.246*** 0.314 0.000 0.630 1.861
Cycles -0.352 0.282 0.212 -0.904 0.201
Constant
Observations 5201
Pseudo R squared 0.0959
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Table 56: Likelihood Ratio Test
Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Vehicles -0.028 0.040 0.488
Driver Sex -0.402*** 0.092 0.000
Driver Age 0.003 0.003 0.228
Breath Test 1.032*** 0.175 0.000
Hit and Run -0.645 0.548 0.240
Seat Belt 1.416*** 0.194 0.000
UK Licence -0.233** 0.107 0.030
Ethnicity 0.149 0.095 0.118
Road Condition -0.085 0.064 0.183
Visibility 0.174*** 0.050 0.001
Casualties 0.397*** 0.034 0.000
Road Type 0.208*** 0.079 0.009
Speed Limit 0.014*** 0.003 0.000
Weather -0.051 0.041 0.217
Weekday 0.272** 0.135 0.044
OAPs 0.453*** 0.068 0.000
Pedestrians 0.993*** 0.299 0.001
Cycles -0.258 0.249 0.300
Observations 5201.000
χ2: 34.71
p-value: 0.0151
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Table 57: Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption
Variable χ2 p-value df
All 30.77** 0.014 16
Vehicles 3.36* 0.067 1
Driver Sex 2.84* 0.092 1
Driver Age 2.18 0.140 1
Breath Test 5.42** 0.020 1
Hit and Run 1.04 0.307 1
Seatbelt 2.44 0.118 1
UK Licence 1.42 0.234 1
Ethnicity 2.38 0.123 1
Road Condition 2.05 0.152 1
Visibility 8.71*** 0.003 1
Casualties 0.11 0.740 1
Road Class 0.04 0.842 1
Road Type 1.85 0.173 1
Speed Limit 0.75 0.387 1
Weather 0.24 0.628 1
Weekday 0.14 0.709 1
The variables OAPs, pedestrians and cycles were dropped from this test since
the low frequency of non-zero values prevented the test from running.
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Table 58: HCM Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Severity Severity Lnsigma Lnsigma cut1 cut1 cut2 cut2
Severity
Vehicles -0.0372 0.572
Driver Sex = Female -0.637*** 5.90e-05
Driver Age 0.00249 0.726 0.00598*** 0.00899
Breath test = Positive 1.452*** 2.54e-07
Hit and Run = 1 -0.867 0.284
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 2.112*** 4.35e-09
Uk licence = Provisional 0.0655 0.831
Uk licence = Unlicensed -0.746* 0.0605
Ethnicity = Asian 0.616 0.260
Ethnicity = Black 0.325 0.521
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 2.152*** 0.00677
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.908 0.433
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.0184 0.907
Road Condition = Snow -0.438 0.608
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.836** 0.0416
Road Condition = Flood 0.820 0.315
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.435* 0.0870
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.452*** 0.00372
Casualties 0.568*** 0 0.0824*** 0.00231
Road Type = One Way Street -0.220 0.819
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.139 0.800
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.731 0.167
Road Type = Slip Road -3.009** 0.0292
Speed Limit 0.0314*** 6.84e-06
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.276 0.218
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.493 0.507
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.713* 0.0781
Weather = Raining with high winds -1.350** 0.0278
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.103 0.936
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.368 0.462
Weekday = 1 0.368* 0.0768
lnsigma
cut1
cut2
Constant 6.401*** 0 10.09*** 0
Observations 5,201 5,201 5,201 5,201
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 59: Constrained Gologit Results
Slight P-value Serious P-value
Vehicles -0.012 0.760 -0.012 0.760
Driver Sex = Female -0.396*** 0.000 -0.396*** 0.000
Driver Age 0.003 0.225 0.003 0.225
Breath Test = Positive 1.031*** 0.000 1.031*** 0.000
Hit and Run -0.623 0.265 -0.623 0.265
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.477*** 0.000 1.477*** 0.000
UK Licence = Provisional 0.012 0.957 0.012 0.957
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.633** 0.012 -0.633** 0.012
Ethnicity = Asian 0.530 0.141 0.530 0.141
Ethnicity = Black 0.270 0.437 0.270 0.437
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.275** 0.019 1.275** 0.019
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.608 0.435 -0.608 0.435
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.025 0.815 -0.025 0.815
Road Condition = Snow -0.158 0.784 -0.158 0.784
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.619** 0.032 -0.619** 0.032
Road Condition = Flood 0.595 0.271 0.595 0.271
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.299* 0.073 0.299** 0.073
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.383*** 0.000 0.383*** 0.000
Casualties 0.402*** 0.000 0.402*** 0.000
Road Type = One Way Street -0.150 0.824 -0.150 0.824
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.045 0.905 -0.045 0.905
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.549 0.129 0.549 0.129
Road Type = Slip Road -2.053** 0.014 -2.053** 0.014
Speed Limit 0.021*** 0.000 0.021*** 0.000
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.163 0.266 -0.163 0.266
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.277 0.581 0.277 0.581
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.445 0.102 0.445 0.102
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.958** 0.016 -0.958** 0.016
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.012 0.990 0.012 0.990
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.324 0.337 -0.324 0.337
Weekday 0.303** 0.026 0.303** 0.026
OAPs 0.447*** 0.000 0.447*** 0.000
Pedestrians 1.246*** 0.000 1.246*** 0.000
Cycles -0.352 0.212 -0.352 0.212
Constant -4.750*** 0.000 -7.074*** 0.000
Observations 5201.000
Pseudo R squared 0.096
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Table 60: Unconstrained Gologit Results
Slight P-value Serious P-value
Vehicles -0.026 0.530 0.075 0.327
Driver Sex = Female -0.411*** 0.000 0.020 0.933
Driver Age 0.003 0.204 0.003 0.625
Breath Test = Positive 1.100*** 0.000 -0.127 0.848
Hit and Run -0.643 0.250 1.278 0.248
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.381*** 0.000 2.003*** 0.000
UK Licence = Provisional -0.020 0.928 0.184 0.711
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.627** 0.013 -0.429 0.467
Ethnicity = Asian 0.440 0.227 1.040** 0.099
Ethnicity = Black 0.242 0.485 0.997 0.142
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.102** 0.044 2.044** 0.014
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.557 0.474 -15.585 0.996
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.019 0.858 -0.269 0.332
Road Condition = Snow -0.199 0.730 -0.174 0.914
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.616** 0.033 -15.595 0.989
Road Condition = Flood 0.556 0.303 2.597** 0.023
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.316* 0.059 -1.594 0.125
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.328*** 0.002 1.042*** 0.000
Casualties 0.391*** 0.000 0.442*** 0.000
Road Type = One Way Street -0.108 0.874 -2.963 0.999
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.038 0.919 13.032 0.993
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.549 0.129 13.641 0.992
Road Type = Slip Road -2.038** 0.016 -3.598 0.999
Speed Limit 0.021*** 0.000 0.016 0.114
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.166 0.259 -0.186 0.676
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.264 0.601 1.572 0.323
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.369 0.176 1.213** 0.015
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.909** 0.023 -16.462 0.990
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.081 0.928 -14.638 0.997
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.304 0.367 -0.087 0.935
Weekday 0.311** 0.024 0.085 0.810
OAPs 0.428*** 0.000 0.642*** 0.000
Pedestrians 1.295*** 0.000 1.719*** 0.003
Cycles -0.255 0.366 -0.928 0.108
Constant -4.689*** 0.000 -20.453 0.988
Observations 5201
Pseudo R squared 0.1083
196
Table 61: Partially Constrained Gologit Results
Slight p-value Fatal p-value
Vehicles -0.025 0.539 0.114* 0.082
Driver Sex = Female -0.397*** 0.000 -0.397*** 0.000
Driver Age 0.003 0.208 0.003 0.208
Breath Test = Positive 1.048*** 0.000 1.048*** 0.000
Hit and Run -0.644 0.248 1.059 0.269
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.437*** 0.000 1.437*** 0.000
UK Licence = Provisional 0.007 0.976 0.007 0.976
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.609** 0.016 -0.609** 0.016
Ethnicity = Asian 0.523 0.146 0.523 0.146
Ethnicity = Black 0.277 0.424 0.277 0.424
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.285** 0.018 1.285** 0.018
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.603 0.436 -0.603 0.436
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.031 0.770 -0.031 0.770
Road Condition = Snow -0.174 0.763 -0.174 0.763
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.632** 0.029 -0.632** 0.029
Road Condition = Flood 0.580 0.281 0.580 0.281
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.324* 0.053 -1.792* 0.078
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.342*** 0.001 0.878*** 0.000
Casualties 0.399*** 0.000 0.399*** 0.000
Road Type = One Way Street -0.133 0.845 -0.133 0.845
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.027 0.943 -0.027 0.943
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.565 0.118 0.565 0.118
Road Type = Slip Road -2.024** 0.016 -2.024** 0.016
Speed Limit 0.021*** 0.000 0.021*** 0.000
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.160 0.275 -0.160 0.275
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.295 0.557 0.295 0.557
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.441 0.103 0.441 0.103
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.944** 0.018 -0.944** 0.018
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.010 0.991 0.010 0.991
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.312 0.354 -0.312 0.354
Weekday 0.298** 0.028 0.298** 0.028
OAPs 0.424*** 0.000 0.648*** 0.000
Pedestrians 1.253*** 0.000 1.253*** 0.000
Cycles -0.363 0.205 -0.363 0.205
Constant -4.711*** 0.000 -7.631*** 0.000
Observations 5201
Pseudo R squared 0.1017
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Table 62: Estimated coefficients for Ologit, HCM and PC-Gologit
Variable Ologit HCM PC-Gologit
Slight Serious
Vehicles -0.012 -0.0372 -0.025 0.114*
Driver Sex = Female -0.396 -0.637*** -0.397*** -0.397***
Driver Age 0.003 0.00249 0.003 0.003
Breath Test = Positive 1.031 1.452*** 1.048*** 1.048***
Hit and Run -0.623 -0.867 -0.644 1.059
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.477 2.112*** 1.437*** 1.437***
UK Licence = Provisional 0.012 0.0655 0.007 0.007
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.633 -0.746* -0.609** -0.609**
Ethnicity = Asian 0.530 0.616 0.523 0.523
Ethnicity = Black 0.270 0.325 0.277 0.277
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.275 2.152*** 1.285** 1.285**
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.608 -0.908 -0.603 -0.603
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.025 -0.0184 -0.031 -0.031
Road Condition = Snow -0.158 -0.438 -0.174 -0.174
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.619 -0.836** -0.632** -0.632**
Road Condition = Flood 0.595 0.820 0.580 0.580
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.299 0.435* 0.324* -1.792*
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.383 0.452*** 0.342*** 0.878***
Casualties 0.402 0.568*** 0.399*** 0.399***
Road Type = One Way Street -0.150 -0.220 -0.133 -0.133
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.045 -0.139 -0.027 -0.027
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.549 0.731 0.565 0.565
Road Type = Slip Road -2.053 -3.009*** -2.024** -2.024**
Speed Limit 0.021 0.0314*** 0.021*** 0.021***
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.163 -0.276 -0.160 -0.160
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.277 0.493 0.295 0.295
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.445 0.713* 0.441 0.441
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.958 -1.350** -0.944** -0.944**
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.012 0.103 0.010 0.010
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.324 -0.368 -0.312 -0.312
Weekday 0.303 0.368* 0.298** 0.298**
OAPs 0.447 0.424*** 0.648***
Pedestrians 1.246 1.253*** 1.253***
Cycles -0.352 -0.363 -0.363
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Table 63: Log Odds and Odds
Slight Fatal
Variable Log Odds Odds Log Odds Odds
Vehicles -0.025 0.975 0.114 1.121
Driver Sex = Female -0.397 0.673 -0.397 0.673
Driver Age 0.003 1.003 0.003 1.003
Breath Test = Positive 1.048 2.851 1.048 2.851
Hit and Run -0.644 0.525 1.059 2.884
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.437 4.207 1.437 4.207
UK Licence =
Provisional
0.007 1.007 0.007 1.007
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.609 0.544 -0.609 0.544
Ethnicity = Asian 0.523 1.687 0.523 1.687
Ethnicity = Black 0.277 1.319 0.277 1.319
Ethnicity = Mixed
Background
1.285 3.614 1.285 3.614
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.603 0.547 -0.603 0.547
Road Condition =
Wet/Damp
-0.031 0.970 -0.031 0.970
Road Condition = Snow -0.174 0.841 -0.174 0.841
Road Condition =
Frost/Ice
-0.632 0.532 -0.632 0.532
Road Condition = Flood 0.580 1.786 0.580 1.786
Visibility = Darkness -
Lights lit
0.324 1.382 -1.792 0.167
Visibility = Darkness -
no lighting
0.342 1.407 0.878 2.406
Casualties 0.399 1.490 0.399 1.490
Road Type = One Way
Street
-0.133 0.876 -0.133 0.876
Road Type = Dual
Carriageway
-0.027 0.974 -0.027 0.974
Road Type = Single
Carriageway
0.565 1.759 0.565 1.759
Road Type = Slip Road -2.024 0.132 -2.024 0.132
Speed Limit 0.021 1.021 0.021 1.021
Weather = Raining
without high winds
-0.160 0.852 -0.160 0.852
Weather = Snowing
without high winds
0.295 1.343 0.295 1.343
Weather = Fine with
high winds
0.441 1.554 0.441 1.554
Weather = Raining with
high winds
-0.944 0.389 -0.944 0.389
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Weather = Snowing with
high winds
0.010 1.010 0.010 1.010
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.312 0.732 -0.312 0.732
Weekday 0.298 1.348 0.298 0.424
OAPs 0.424 1.528 0.648 1.911
Pedestrians 1.253 3.502 1.253 3.502
Cycles -0.363 0.696 -0.363 0.696
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Table 64: Marginal Effects
Variable Value Pr(Slight) Pr(Severe) Pr(Fatal)
Vehicles 1 0.849 0.135 0.016
2 0.852 0.130 0.018
3 0.855 0.125 0.021
4 0.857 0.119 0.023
5 0.860 0.113 0.027
6 0.863 0.107 0.030
7 0.865 0.101 0.034
8 0.868 0.094 0.038
9 0.870 0.087 0.043
10 0.873 0.079 0.048
Driver Sex Male 0.838 0.140 0.022
Female 0.882 0.103 0.015
Driver Age 20 0.878 0.106 0.015
30 0.866 0.117 0.017
40 0.853 0.128 0.019
50 0.839 0.140 0.022
60 0.823 0.152 0.024
70 0.807 0.166 0.027
80 0.790 0.180 0.030
Breath Test Positive 0.858 0.123 0.018
Negative 0.709 0.245 0.046
Hit and Run Not Hit and Run 0.852 0.128 0.020
Hit and Run 0.917 0.073 0.010
Seatbelt Seatbelt 0.859 0.123 0.018
No Seatbelt 0.628 0.307 0.065
UK Licence Full 0.851 0.129 0.020
UK Licence Provisional 0.846 0.133 0.021
Unlicensed 0.895 0.092 0.013
Ethnicity White 0.854 0.127 0.019
Asian 0.785 0.184 0.031
Black 0.831 0.146 0.023
Mixed Background 0.632 0.303 0.065
Oriental 0.914 0.076 0.010
Road Condition Dry 0.848 0.132 0.020
Wet/Damp 0.854 0.127 0.019
Snow 0.880 0.105 0.015
Frost/Ice 0.912 0.077 0.011
Flood 0.774 0.193 0.033
Visibility Daylight 0.865 0.119 0.016
Darkness - Lights
lit
0.827 0.170 0.003
Darkness - no
lighting
0.826 0.140 0.034
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Casualties 1 0.902 0.087 0.011
2 0.859 0.124 0.017
3 0.802 0.173 0.025
4 0.730 0.232 0.038
5 0.643 0.300 0.056
6 0.547 0.370 0.083
7 0.447 0.434 0.119
8 0.351 0.482 0.167
9 0.265 0.506 0.229
10 0.194 0.503 0.304
Road Type Roundabout 0.893 0.094 0.014
One Way Street 0.899 0.088 0.013
Dual Carriageway 0.897 0.090 0.013
Single Carriageway 0.835 0.143 0.023
Slip Road 0.977 0.020 0.003
Speed Limit 30 0.900 0.088 0.012
40 0.881 0.104 0.014
50 0.860 0.122 0.018
60 0.836 0.143 0.021
70 0.809 0.166 0.026
Weather Fine without high
winds
0.850 0.130 0.020
Raining without
high winds
0.867 0.116 0.017
Snowing without
high winds
0.805 0.167 0.027
Fine with high
winds
0.789 0.181 0.030
Raining with high
winds
0.932 0.060 0.008
Snowing with high
winds
0.846 0.133 0.020
Fog or Mist 0.879 0.106 0.015
Weekday Weekend 0.880 0.105 0.015
Weekday 0.849 0.131 0.020
OAPs 1 0.819 0.155 0.026
2 0.755 0.198 0.047
3 0.678 0.240 0.081
4 0.590 0.273 0.136
5 0.497 0.286 0.217
6 0.403 0.273 0.324
7 0.315 0.235 0.450
8 0.239 0.182 0.580
9 0.175 0.127 0.698
10 0.125 0.080 0.795
Pedestrians 1 0.658 0.284 0.058
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2 0.391 0.456 0.153
3 0.172 0.493 0.335
4 0.061 0.364 0.575
5 0.019 0.199 0.782
6 0.006 0.088 0.907
7 0.002 0.032 0.966
8 0.000 0.010 0.989
9 0.000 0.003 0.997
10 0.000 0.001 0.999
Cycles 1 0.889 0.097 0.014
2 0.918 0.072 0.010
3 0.940 0.053 0.007
4 0.956 0.039 0.005
5 0.969 0.028 0.004
6 0.978 0.020 0.003
7 0.984 0.014 0.002
8 0.989 0.010 0.001
9 0.992 0.007 0.001
10 0.994 0.005 0.001
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Table 65: Partially Constrained Gologit Results with Interactions
Slight P-value Serious P-value
Vehicles -0.022 0.594 0.112* 0.090
Driver Sex = Female -0.400*** 0.000 -0.400*** 0.000
Driver Age 0.002 0.432 0.002 0.432
Breath Test = Positive 1.075*** 0.000 1.075*** 0.000
Hit and Run -0.676 0.228 1.046 0.275
Seatbelt = No Seatbelt 1.440*** 0.000 1.440*** 0.000
UK Licence = Provisional 0.007 0.972 0.007 0.972
UK Licence = Unlicensed -0.559** 0.025 -0.559** 0.025
Ethnicity = Asian 0.522 0.150 0.522 0.150
Ethnicity = Black 0.277 0.425 0.277 0.425
Ethnicity = Mixed Background 1.290** 0.018 1.290** 0.018
Ethnicity = Oriental -0.621 0.426 -0.621 0.426
Road Condition = Wet/Damp -0.013 0.899 -0.013 0.899
Road Condition = Snow -0.143 0.803 -0.143 0.803
Road Condition = Frost/Ice -0.624*** 0.032 -0.624** 0.032
Road Condition = Flood 0.605 0.262 0.605 0.262
Visibility = Darkness - Lights lit 0.325* 0.052 -1.814* 0.075
Visibility = Darkness - no lighting 0.343*** 0.001 0.867*** 0.000
Casualties 0.431*** 0.000 0.431*** 0.000
Road Type = One Way Street -0.190 0.782 -0.190 0.782
Road Type = Dual Carriageway -0.033 0.930 -0.033 0.930
Road Type = Single Carriageway 0.554 0.125 0.554 0.125
Road Type = Slip Road -2.337** 0.011 -2.337** 0.011
Speed Limit 0.022*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.000
Weather = Raining without high winds -0.180 0.222 -0.180 0.222
Weather = Snowing without high winds 0.277 0.581 0.277 0.581
Weather = Fine with high winds 0.431 0.113 0.431 0.113
Weather = Raining with high winds -0.938** 0.018 -0.938** 0.018
Weather = Snowing with high winds 0.028 0.975 0.028 0.975
Weather = Fog or Mist -0.314 0.351 -0.314 0.351
Weekday 0.288** 0.034 0.288** 0.034
OAPs 0.748*** 0.000 1.003*** 0.000
Pedestrians 1.786*** 0.000 1.786*** 0.000
Cycles -0.167 0.473 -0.167 0.473
Constant -0.101** 0.017 -0.101** 0.017
OAPs#Casualties -0.251 0.104 -0.251 0.104
OAPs#Casualties#Pedestrians -4.778*** 0.000 -7.698*** 0.000
Observations 5201
Pseudo R squared 0.103
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C.4 Robustness Checks
C.5 χ2 Tests
Figure 22: Driver Age 17 - 20
(a) All drivers aged 17-20
(b) Male and female drivers ages 17 - 20
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Table 67: Driver Age 17 - 20
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2
p-
value
Expected Observed χ2
p-
value
Expected Observed χ2
p-
value
2005 0.007 0.145 17747*** 0.000 0.005 0.100 12378*** 0.000 0.003 0.046 4516*** 0.000
2006 0.007 0.146 16549*** 0.000 0.004 0.102 14905*** 0.000 0.003 0.046 3594*** 0.000
2007 0.009 0.149 13044*** 0.000 0.006 0.102 9600*** 0.000 0.004 0.050 3444*** 0.000
2008 0.009 0.144 10924*** 0.000 0.004 0.097 12241*** 0.000 0.004 0.048 2921*** 0.000
2009 0.009 0.131 8621*** 0.000 0.005 0.091 7989*** 0.000 0.004 0.043 2119*** 0.000
2010 0.006 0.122 10556*** 0.000 0.003 0.085 10968*** 0.000 0.003 0.037 1980*** 0.000
2011 0.006 0.131 16583*** 0.000 0.003 0.091 16901*** 0.000 0.003 0.041 3380*** 0.000
2012 0.007 0.129 13334*** 0.000 0.004 0.087 11469*** 0.000 0.003 0.043 3735*** 0.000
2013 0.005 0.131 19297*** 0.000 0.003 0.088 15184*** 0.000 0.002 0.044 5839*** 0.000207
Figure 23: Driver Age 21 - 29
(a) All drivers aged 21 - 29
(b) Male and female drivers aged 21 - 29
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Table 68: Driver Age 21 - 29
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.066 0.202 1521*** 0.000 0.042 0.132 1185*** 0.000 0.025 0.070 552*** 0.000
2006 0.072 0.215 1356*** 0.000 0.044 0.143 1222*** 0.000 0.028 0.074 452*** 0.000
2007 0.078 0.197 872*** 0.000 0.050 0.138 847*** 0.000 0.029 0.061 219*** 0.000
2008 0.068 0.207 1264*** 0.000 0.040 0.137 1202*** 0.000 0.029 0.072 343*** 0.000
2009 0.073 0.204 980*** 0.000 0.042 0.139 1074*** 0.000 0.031 0.066 197*** 0.000
2010 0.065 0.209 1245*** 0.000 0.039 0.139 1133*** 0.000 0.027 0.073 362*** 0.000
2011 0.067 0.203 1444*** 0.000 0.041 0.136 1293*** 0.000 0.027 0.070 443*** 0.000
2012 0.061 0.211 1945*** 0.000 0.035 0.141 1897*** 0.000 0.026 0.071 492*** 0.000
2013 0.070 0.210 1381*** 0.000 0.042 0.142 7215*** 0.000 0.029 0.069 336*** 0.000209
Figure 24: Driver Age 30 - 39
(a) All drivers aged 30 - 39
(b) Male and female drivers aged 30 - 39
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Table 69: Driver Age 30 - 39
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.172 0.216 2.271 0.132 0.113 0.146 15.164*** 0.000 0.061 0.072 4.673** 0.031
2006 0.174 0.202 2.080 0.149 0.115 0.136 1.747 0.186 0.062 0.068 0.365 0.546
2007 0.156 0.205 13.222*** 0.000 0.103 0.139 29.891*** 0.000 0.055 0.068 10.218*** 0.003
2008 0.156 0.185 0.000 0.996 0.101 0.122 4.778** 0.029 0.057 0.064 1.207 0.272
2009 0.141 0.187 15.822*** 0.000 0.094 0.124 20.063*** 0.000 0.050 0.064 13.688*** 0.000
2010 0.146 0.194 14.138*** 0.000 0.095 0.124 16.071*** 0.000 0.054 0.072 13.288*** 0.000
2011 0.132 0.182 35.960*** 0.000 0.085 0.118 43.478*** 0.000 0.049 0.066 28.168*** 0.000
2012 0.128 0.178 39.506*** 0.000 0.081 0.118 65.408*** 0.000 0.049 0.062 13.748*** 0.000
2013 0.127 0.181 50.713*** 0.000 0.083 0.121 62.734*** 0.000 0.045 0.061 27.756*** 0.000211
Figure 25: Driver Age 40 - 49
(a) All drivers aged 40 - 49
(b) Male and female drivers aged 40 - 49
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Table 70: Driver Age 40 - 49
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.202 0.181 132.560*** 0.000 0.141 0.124 65.968*** 0.000 0.066 0.057 17.566*** 0.000
2006 0.201 0.183 108.710*** 0.000 0.138 0.125 45.862*** 0.000 0.066 0.058 14.400*** 0.000
2007 0.209 0.192 116.170*** 0.000 0.144 0.129 56.330*** 0.000 0.069 0.064 9.268*** 0.002
2008 0.215 0.196 116.710*** 0.000 0.145 0.131 49.681*** 0.000 0.073 0.067 10.781*** 0.001
2009 0.204 0.193 77.022*** 0.000 0.132 0.131 14.957*** 0.000 0.075 0.064 19.605*** 0.000
2010 0.214 0.195 97.502*** 0.000 0.148 0.132 46.949*** 0.000 0.070 0.066 6.087** 0.014
2011 0.210 0.197 106.400*** 0.000 0.138 0.135 25.562*** 0.000 0.076 0.064 28.847*** 0.000
2012 0.207 0.190 116.370*** 0.000 0.132 0.124 33.338*** 0.000 0.077 0.069 15.845*** 0.000
2013 0.205 0.187 113.910*** 0.000 0.135 0.118 56.984*** 0.000 0.073 0.071 5.036** 0.025213
Figure 26: Driver Age 50 - 59
(a) All drivers aged 50 - 59
(b) Male and female drivers aged 50 - 59
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Table 71: Driver Age 50 - 59
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.185 0.133 258.200*** 0.000 0.138 0.095 180.460*** 0.000 0.053 0.039 39.005*** 0.000
2006 0.181 0.128 239.590*** 0.000 0.134 0.089 174.830*** 0.000 0.053 0.039 32.309*** 0.000
2007 0.173 0.126 204.580*** 0.000 0.131 0.090 155.730*** 0.000 0.048 0.037 22.363*** 0.000
2008 0.173 0.126 183.880*** 0.000 0.126 0.083 147.580*** 0.000 0.052 0.044 11.866*** 0.001
2009 0.171 0.130 147.600*** 0.000 0.122 0.084 117.480*** 0.000 0.053 0.048 7.023*** 0.008
2010 0.176 0.130 153.830*** 0.000 0.120 0.087 88.713*** 0.000 0.058 0.045 22.535*** 0.000
2011 0.174 0.124 226.160*** 0.000 0.123 0.085 145.100*** 0.000 0.055 0.041 33.799*** 0.000
2012 0.174 0.126 217.180*** 0.000 0.124 0.086 143.110*** 0.000 0.055 0.041 34.423*** 0.000
2013 0.179 0.128 123.220*** 0.000 0.126 0.087 144.300*** 0.000 0.056 0.040 41.023*** 0.000215
Figure 27: Driver Age 60 - 69
(a) All drivers aged 60 - 69
(b) Male and female drivers aged 60 - 69
216
Table 72: Driver Age 60 - 69
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.097 0.067 108.010*** 0.000 0.089 0.048 187.440*** 0.000 0.018 0.019 0.337 0.562
2006 0.101 0.071 98.283*** 0.000 0.086 0.048 149.400*** 0.000 0.024 0.023 0.905 0.342
2007 0.106 0.076 97.256*** 0.000 0.092 0.053 150.860*** 0.000 0.022 0.024 0.658 0.417
2008 0.111 0.082 85.735*** 0.000 0.095 0.056 137.000*** 0.000 0.025 0.026 0.157 0.692
2009 0.125 0.091 102.030*** 0.000 0.101 0.062 125.020*** 0.000 0.032 0.030 1.741 0.187
2010 0.124 0.085 110.970*** 0.000 0.102 0.059 130.820*** 0.000 0.030 0.027 2.506 0.113
2011 0.131 0.091 154.910*** 0.000 0.107 0.065 172.870*** 0.000 0.031 0.028 3.696* 0.055
2012 0.141 0.095 191.290*** 0.000 0.110 0.065 189.700*** 0.000 0.037 0.031 10.335*** 0.001
2013 0.140 0.091 202.360*** 0.000 0.106 0.061 183.840*** 0.000 0.039 0.030 19.676*** 0.000217
Figure 28: Driver Age 70+
(a) All drivers aged 70+
(b) Male and female drivers aged 70+
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Table 73: Driver Age 70+
All Male Female
Year Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
Expected Observed χ2 p-
value
2005 0.038 0.056 51.587*** 0.000 0.042 0.039 3.849** 0.050 0.006 0.018 173.080*** 0.000
2006 0.035 0.055 63.044*** 0.000 0.042 0.038 5.689** 0.017 0.005 0.018 216.450*** 0.000
2007 0.036 0.054 51.465*** 0.000 0.040 0.041 0.006 0.941 0.006 0.014 70.803*** 0.000
2008 0.040 0.061 54.960*** 0.000 0.043 0.043 0.359 0.549 0.007 0.018 106.460*** 0.000
2009 0.044 0.063 36.246*** 0.000 0.048 0.046 1.773 0.183 0.007 0.017 82.727*** 0.000
2010 0.044 0.064 36.228*** 0.000 0.045 0.047 0.021 0.887 0.008 0.018 63.422*** 0.000
2011 0.049 0.070 45.589*** 0.000 0.050 0.049 1.617 0.204 0.009 0.022 125.280*** 0.000
2012 0.053 0.072 30.450*** 0.000 0.053 0.051 2.481 0.115 0.010 0.022 102.830*** 0.000
2013 0.056 0.073 20.646*** 0.000 0.056 0.052 9.935*** 0.002 0.011 0.021 55.056*** 0.000219
